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1 INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter is begun by a presentation of the background, research questions 
and  research  gap  of  the  study.  Next,  the  positioning  and  scope  of  the  study  are  
presented, followed by a definition of an international joint venture. Lastly, the 
structure of the study is described. 
1.1 Background 
Ever since early 70’s, the choice of partner(s) has been considered a key decision 
in the literature on international joint ventures (IJVs) as well as international stra-
tegic alliances (ISAs) (e.g. Child et al. 2005, Harrigan 1985, Geringer 1988, 
Sorensen & Reve 1998, Tomlinson 1970). Partner selection is viewed as crucial 
for formation, operation and subsequent success or failure of the venture 
(Beamish 1987, Blodgett 1991, Nielsen 2003, Parkhe 1993). Selection of the right 
partner should lead to planned/superior performance whereas selecting a non-
suitable partner may lead to great problems in management and decision making 
and may even eventually cause leakage of tacit knowledge and/or to other prob-
lems, such as unwanted development with regard to the image of the foreign part-
ner (e.g. Child & Faulkner 1998). Results in several studies have indicated that 20 
to  even  70  percent  of  the  IJVs  are  failures,  are  unstable  and/or  do  not  meet  the  
goals set for them (Geringer & Hebert 1991, Hennart et al. 1999, Parkhe 1993, 
Yeheskel et al. 2004). In several cases the problems are directly linked to the ex-
istence of multiple parents and the partnership dynamics, thus making it clear that 
partner selection is a major issue in the IJV decision making process. Therefore it 
is somewhat surprising that partner selection – at least a more detailed analysis of 
the selection, especially scope-wise and perspective-wise – has received rather 
limited attention. 
However, although a number of IJV partner selection studies declare the im-
portance of the partner selection process, research has strongly focused on the 
selection criteria and their relative importance. Even though several researchers 
both before and after the year 2000 considered IJV partner selection to be an un-
der-researched topic (eg. Glaister and Buckley 1997, Nielsen 2003, Robson 
2002), there now exists a bulk of literature on IJV and ISA partner selection crite-
ria and its relative importance and especially its connection to the underlying IJV 
formation motives (Chen & Glaister 2005, Dong & Glaister 2006). Rather than a 
problem of quantity, this study argues that existing IJV partner selection research 
suffers from its narrow criteria-oriented scope. A lack of process-oriented studies 
on partner selection constitutes a clear gap in the IJV literature (Duisters et al. 
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2011). It is not clear to what extent, and under which circumstances, the process 
of IJV partner selection can be considered a truly separable and distinct decision 
making entity within the process of IJV formation. 
By approaching partner selection in a more holistic manner – examining partner 
selection beyond the selection criteria and taking a process-orientated perspective 
– this study seeks to further explain how firms select their IJV partners, how the 
IJV context effects into the decision making within the IJV partner selection pro-
cess, and explores the relationship between IJV partner selection and the subse-
quent performance of the venture. 
The  theoretical  framework  of  the  study  relies  upon  several  different  streams  of  
literature. The discussion on what kind of partners firms look for and select for 
IJVs – in other words, how firms evaluate their prospective partner candidates 
and thus weigh different selection criteria – draws from transaction cost theory, 
resource-based view of the firm, resource dependency theory, as well as organiza-
tional learning perspective. Meanwhile, to explain decision making within the IJV 
partner selection process, the theoretical background is mainly built upon strate-
gic decision making literature and models drawn and adapted from purchasing 
literature. 
1.2 Research questions and gap 
In order to justify the research gap, the following arguments are presented: 
First, the rich literature on international joint ventures and strategic alliances has 
not been shy of stressing the key role of partner selection with regard to the suc-
cess/performance of the venture (e.g. Harrigan 1985, Geringer 1988, Glaister and 
Buckley 1997). Meanwhile, in light of its widely noted importance research on 
partner selection in general has been relatively limited and its performance impli-
cations extremely scarce. 
Even more apparent within the IJV/ISA partner selection literature than its rela-
tive scarcity is its narrow focus in general. Although several authors make a point 
that research on IJV/ISA partner selection is underdeveloped (e.g. Roy 2006, 
Nielsen 2003, Glaister and Buckley 1997), there seems to be a respectable amount 
of studies focusing on which criteria firms apply when selecting IJV/ISA partners 
and the contextual factors effecting said criteria and their order of priority (e.g. 
Glaister 1996, Glaister and Buckley 1997, Hitt et al. 2000, Nielsen 2003, Robson 
2002, Tatoglu and Glaister 2000, Tomlinson 1970). However, the afore-
mentioned selection criteria research has done little to forward our grasp of 
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IJV/ISA partner selection as a process.  In  other  words  –  while  the  existing  re-
search has focused on the criteria firms use when evaluating prospective partner 
candidates, it fails to portray the big picture of how firms select their partners. 
Also, it is not clear to what extent, and under which circumstances, the process of 
IJV partner selection can be considered a truly separable and distinct decision 
making entity within the process of IJV formation, even though the present litera-
ture suggests otherwise (Al-Khalifa and Peterson 1999). 
Studies following the steps of Geringer (1988) have focused only on the evalua-
tion of prospective IJV partners – one single mechanism of the selection process – 
and hence do not portray the whole complexity of selection. According to Harri-
son (1987), the analysis accorded the subject of decision making in scholarly 
journals usually focuses only on the decision itself, rather than on the process of 
arriving at an outcome that meets an objective. The number of scholarly case 
studies on alliances – identifying processes, dynamics and evolution – has re-
mained limited and the scope narrow (Shenkar and Reuer 2006). Furthermore, it 
is here argued that the mainstream of IJV and ISA partner selection research re-
lies on a number of implicit assumptions, and this reliance forms a limitation for 
the research (Wong and Ellis 2002). It is also argued that, although selection cri-
teria are important, more holistic perspectives are also needed; the question of 
“how do firms select their alliance/joint venture partners?” should be approached 
as a process rather than as a set of criteria, as the mainstream of IJV/alliance part-
ner selection studies tend to eventually rather focus on answering the question 
“what kind of IJV/alliance partners do firms select?” due to approaching partner 
selection as a set of criteria. As a number of studies ever since the sixties has ex-
amined the decision making process of FDIs (for a review, see e.g. Björkman 
1989, Das and Teng 1999, Larimo 1987) this stream of literature has not spawned 
research focusing specifically on IJV partner selection processes. Thus, it is con-
cluded that lack of process-oriented studies on partner selection constitutes a clear 
gap in the IJV literature.  
Finally, it has been argued that the criteria for IJV partner selection are largely 
case-specific (see e.g. Geringer 1988, Varis 2004). However, contextual factors 
which have their effects on the relative importance of the selection criteria can be 
distinguished. After all, IJV partners aren’t selected in a vacuum, which signifies 
the importance of considering different contexts in which partner selection is em-
bedded (Hitt et al. 2000). The impact of several contextual factors on the relative 
importance of selection criteria has been observed in the IJV partner selection 
literature (e.g. Glaister 1996, Glaister and Buckley 1997, Hitt et al. 2000, Nielsen 
2003, Robson 2002, Tatoglu and Glaister 2000, Tomlinson 1970), yet all these 
studies limit their observations to the partner selection criteria instead of the se-
4      Acta Wasaensia 
lection process entity. Forming a thorough and concise view of the contextual 
influences on IJV partner selection would greatly help us to explain the origins of 
its case-specific nature and the large variance of results in earlier IJV/ISA partner 
selection studies. 
In light of the presented research gap, the study addresses the following research 
questions: 
The main research question of the dissertation is as follows: How do firms select 
their IJV partners and how does partner selection influence the subsequent IJV 
performance? 
As previously stated, it is argued here that more holistic approaches to studying 
the IJV partner selection phenomenon are needed in the midst of a stream of liter-
ature focusing on a single selection process component, and thus this ideology is 
communicated via the main research question which is general and broad by na-
ture. For additional focus and breakdown of the research agenda, the following 
sub-questions are derived from the main research question: 
- What kind of influence do contextual factors (i.e. firm-specific, location-
specific and investment-specific factors as well as features of the strate-
gic context of the firm) have on IJV partner selection? 
The objective rising from the first sub-question is to contribute to our knowledge 
on why IJV partner selection is considered largely case-specific by both the firms 
selecting their partners and researchers focusing on the topic. The aimed outcome 
here is to produce an output entailing the influence of various contextual elements 
on different components of IJV partner selection. 
- Do firms that select their IJV partners under lesser limitations in re-
gards to time, information and financial and/or other resources end up 
with more suitable partners and a higher satisfaction on IJV perfor-
mance in comparison to the more limited firms? 
The second sub-question is derived from a foreword written by J.P. Killing in 
arguably the most essential work on IJV partner selection by Geringer (1988), 
suggesting that “One of the first questions that must be addressed is whether or 
not firms that spend more time and effort in the search process do in fact end up 
with what look like, according to Geringer’s criteria, more ‘suitable’ partners” 
(Killing in Geringer 1988: xv). Also, the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 
1957) is reflected in the question via limited time, information and resources. 
Still, there is a significant gap in IJV partner selection research in answering such 
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a question that obviously deals more directly with a process entity of selecting 
partners than a selection criteria-oriented approach. 
- What are the key factors and decisions within the IJV formation process 
that differentiate firms in regards to how they select their IJV partners? 
The third sub-question concerns the process-oriented approach in the study, aim-
ing to explain the diversity of paths firms may take on their quest for IJV partners, 
and more specifically, to identify those points (i.e. decisions) within the processes 
and the contextual factors that most significantly divide the selection process 
modes from each other. In addition, the discussion in this regard is also targeted at 
explaining the extent to which the process of selecting IJV partners is truly sepa-
rable from the IJV formation decision making process entity. 
1.3 Scope and positioning of the study 
As outlined by Wong and Ellis (2002), IJV research can be broadly categorized 
into three areas: 1) antecedents (e.g. IJV formation motives and partner selection; 
e.g. Geringer 1988 and 1991, Tallman and Shenkar 1994); 2) outcomes (studies 
relating to failure and performance; e.g. Brown, Rugman and Verbeke 1989, 
Makino and Delios 1996, Pearce 1997); and 3) specific management issues (e.g. 
control and conflict – Fey and Beamish 2000, Yan and Gray 1994). The issue of 
partner selection is arguably pre-eminent in this list of topics for the success and 
stability of the joint venture “marriage” is widely held to be determined by the 
compatibility of the alliance partners (Child et al. 2005, Luo 1997, Saxton 1997). 
It is by no means a completely neglected area of research; Reus and Ritchie 
(2004) found almost 30 studies with a linkage to partner selection in their review 
of IJV research in ten major journals with regard to studies on international busi-
ness between the years 1988 an 2003 (For comparison among these 388 IJV stud-
ies in total, the most popular points of focus were entry strategies and partner 
learning, together covering close to 100 articles). In fact, Since Tomlinson’s 
(1970) study on partner selection in UK-Indian IJVs, this particular topic has 
grown into its own and, although not significant in numbers, a rather coherent 
stream of IJV literature. 
Although it was established that research on IJV partner selection exists to a cer-
tain degree, it is largely plagued by homogeneity in footsteps of Geringer (1988) 
and his focus on partner selection criteria. Studies such as Glaister (1996), Maurer 
(1996), Arino, Abramov, Skorobogatykh, Rykounina and Vila (1997), Glaister 
and Buckley (1997), Luo (1998), Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), Tatoglu and 
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Glaister (2000; 2002), Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Edhec and Borza (2000), Robson 
(2002), Nielsen (2003), Dong and Glaister (2006), Roy (2006), Salavrakos and 
Stewart (2006) and Li & Ferreira (2008) have contributed in the IJV partner se-
lection research. These studies, among others, have built on Geringer’s (1988) 
typology, and provided results on the relative importance of selection criteria in 
different geographical contexts, examined and identified a number of contextual 
variables affecting the relative importance of the criteria and, although signifi-
cantly lesser in numbers, found indication of a relationship between the relative 
importance of selection criteria and the subsequent performance of the venture. 
What these studies do not account for, however, is the process entity of IJV part-
ner selection. The very limited amount of process-oriented studies on partner se-
lection, either for IJVs or ISAs, is surprising given that the selection process, 
deemed to be fundamental in the pursuit of high performing ventures, can be dis-
assembled into at least two stages; initial identification and subsequent evaluation 
of potential candidates (Williams and Lilley 1993, Wong and Ellis 2002). Ac-
cording to Tallman and Phene (2006) the process of structuring alliances involves 
initiation, operation, and restructuring or termination. The initiation of alliances, 
then, unfolds into three stages: The first stage involves a choice regarding the 
organizational form, at which point cooperation through alliance is selected. The 
second stage represents the partner search and selection process, while the last 
stage comprises negotiations with the selected partner to create a framework that 
establishes complementarities and fosters the development of synergies. There are 
some rough process descriptions on how JV or strategic alliance partners are se-
lected (Mitsuhashi 2002, Young et al. 1989) yet there is a significant need for a 
more concise effort to capture the phenomenon and especially empirical examina-
tion on the partner selection process. Significant amount of research has been 
done on FDI decision making processes (for reviews, see e.g. Björkman 1989, 
Das and Teng 1999, Larimo 1987) but, in spite of its logical suitability, the exist-
ing IJV literature lacks in this type of approach on specifically IJV partner selec-
tion processes. 
This need for additional process orientation is amplified by several implicit pre-
dispositions that have their effect on previous IJV partner selection research when 
observed from a process oriented perspective (Wong and Ellis 2002). Most visi-
bly early partner selection process descriptions (Ellram 1991, 1996; Mitsuhashi 
2002, Young et al. 1989) do not effectively account for bounded rationality, and 
the limitations it either directly or indirectly causes for firms looking for their 
prospective partners, with the exception of Wong and Ellis (2002) and their study 
focusing solely on partner identification. 
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Furthermore, although often cited in IJV and alliance literature (e.g. Duisters et al. 
2011, Varis 2004), the Ellram (1991) model depicts a partnering process, drawn 
in the context of purchasing partnerships, and should thus be carefully applied in 
the IJV context. Some models do enrich the partner selection literature – such as 
Beekman & Robinson (2004) on supplier partnerships, Nijssen et al. (2001) on 
technology partnerships, as well as Chung et al. (2000), Dekker (2008) and Niel-
sen  (2010)  on  generally  alliances  or  inter-firm  partnerships  –  yet  none  seem  to  
focus on international joint ventures, nor base their findings on empirical study 
targeting specifically manufacturing units. 
The question of scope becomes a key issue especially in such a popular research 
field as joint ventures and alliances (see Reus & Ritchie 2004). Therefore, alt-
hough several recent studies (e.g. Liu et al. 2010, Yeniurt et al. 2009) touch upon 
the subject of partner selection while focusing on other key issues of alliance 
formation and operation and partner selection studies occur in other partnership 
areas such as studies on franchising partner selection (e.g. Altinay 2006), their 
inclusion is in this study strictly limited to aspects that  are key to answering the 
posited research questions and building the theoretical framework. 
Decision processes have been extensively studied within the economic literature 
ever since the early 20th century (see, e.g., Dewey 1910). Decision process re-
search can be roughly divided into three categories: Firstly, descriptive research 
focuses on how and why individuals make decisions (De Boer 1998), instead of 
what exactly a decision maker should do (Wickham 2004), answering the ques-
tion of how decisions are made (Brännback 1996). Secondly, normative research 
focuses on how decisions should be made (Brännback 1996), and its evaluation of 
decision models is based on their ability to produce rational alternatives (De Boer 
1998). Lastly, the prescriptive research combines normative and descriptive ele-
ments, answering the question of how can individuals be assisted in making better 
decisions while taking their cognitive limitations into account (Kansola 2010). 
According to Schwenk (1995), some of the major areas of strategic decision mak-
ing literature include (1) strategic decision models and characteristics, (2) biases 
in strategic decision making, (3) individual and organizational minds, and (4) 
upper echelons (CEOs, top management teams, and boards of directors), logically 
connected in the study of strategic decision making. This study mainly deals with 
the first area, crossing briefly over to the other areas, such as cognitive biases 
(Das and Teng 1999, Schwenk 1995). 
Researchers have, since the mid-fifties, tried to model strategic decision making 
processes. Simon’s (1957) I-D-C (intelligence, design, choice) model is still 
probably the best-known phase model within the decision making literature up to 
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date and laid a major groundwork for the field. Strategic decision processes have 
ever since been modeled in several ways, and later classified in different typolo-
gies (for review, see e.g. Schwenk 1995, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992, Lyles and 
Thomas 1988, Hickson 1987, Hickson et al. 1986), leading on to studies effec-
tively synthesizing previous typologies and classifications (e.g. Das and Teng 
1999, Hart 1992), answering the call for additional synthesis and pluralism to 
advance integrated theory development in the field of strategy (Shoemaker 1989). 
As a critique on the bulk of research on decision making, Larimo (1987) states 
that most of the literature on decision making in the business environment, up 
until mid-eighties, is argued to be rather abstract, theoretical and normative by 
nature. 
Decision making processes in relation to foreign direct investment specifically 
have also been studied, in significantly lesser numbers, since the 1950’s and espe-
cially since Aharoni’s (1966) often-cited study of FDI decision making in US 
firms up to the late 1980’s (for review, see e.g. Björkman 1989). Still, interna-
tional joint venture decision making, a specific subsection within FDI decision 
making research, has been neglected within these types of research frameworks, 
and this study attempts to analyze and explain the decision making process taking 
place when partners are selected for international joint ventures. 
1.4 Defining an international joint venture 
The definition of a joint venture has not been universally agreed upon. Geringer 
(1988:4) defines a joint venture as “a discrete entity created by two or more legal-
ly distinct organizations (the partners), each of which contributes less than 100 
percent of its assets and actively participates, beyond a mere investment role, in 
the joint venture’s decision making”. Although it is in some studies defined as 
involving creation of a new and independent jointly owned entity and thus ex-
cluding partial acquisitions (e.g. Jormanainen 2010, Meyer 2007, Inkpen and 
Beamish 1997), an alternative view as defined by transaction cost economists also 
includes those entities where one of the partners takes an equity position in the 
other partner or partners (Gulati 1995). The justification for the inclusion of par-
tial  acquisitions  is  based  on  the  premise  that  a  direct  equity  investment  by  one  
firm into another essentially creates an equity joint venture between one firm’s 
existing shareholders and the new corporate investor (Pisano 1989). Key here, 
from the TCE point of view, is that beyond a certain threshold the shared owner-
ship structure effectively deters opportunistic behavior (Gulati 1995). 
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To allow comparison of the behavior of firms undertaking partial acquisitions to 
those forming Greenfield joint ventures, in this study an equity joint venture is 
defined in footsteps of Hennart (1988, 2000, 2009), who stated the following 
(Hennart 1988: 362): “An equity joint venture arises as two or more sponsors 
bring given assets to an independent legal entity and are paid for some or all  of 
their  contribution from the profits  earned by the entity,  or when a firm acquires 
partial ownership of another firm.” Chen and Hennart (2004: 1126) similarly stat-
ed that IJVs can be formed either by splitting ownership of the new entity with 
the  local  partners  (Greenfield  IJV)  or  by  acquiring  a  stake  equity  of  an  existing  
firm (acquisition IJV). Thus, in this study, the definition of a joint venture allows 
for two different forms of establishment – through Greenfield investment, or 
through partial acquisition. 
Additionally following Hennart’s (1988) definitions, non-equity joint ventures are 
here labeled as contracts instead of joint ventures, and thus the term “joint ven-
ture” refers to equity joint ventures in this study. Also, for the joint venture to be 
considered international, the nationality of one or more partners in the IJV must 
be other than the country of residence of the IJV. 
In many instances, the study mentions IJVs and ISAs in the same connection. 
This is not a reference to the two terms’ similarity – the reasoning here is based 
on the fact that general alliance literature is significantly richer in partner selec-
tion studies, and findings concerning the two fields are largely compatible. How-
ever, it should be noted that the term ‘alliance’ is understood here as an umbrella 
label for different kinds of collaborative partnerships (Faulkner and de  Rond 
2000), whereas the term ‘strategic alliance’ as partnerships of two or more corpo-
rations  or  business  units  that  work  together  to  achieve  strategically  significant  
objectives that are mutually beneficial (Elmuti and Kathawala 2001:205). 
1.5 Structure of the study 
Following the introductory chapter (Chapter 1) presenting the objectives, scope 
and structure of the study, the first theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) is built upon 
the grounds of the main bulk of IJV partner selection criteria research following 
the lead of Geringer (1988). Together with the first empirical chapter (Chapter 5), 
the main goal here is to expand upon the knowledge on contextual influence on 
the relative importance of partner selection criteria, as well as to examine the rela-
tionship between the selection criteria and IJV performance. Following the main-
stream of IJV partner selection criteria studies, it is here aimed to define the limits 
of the selection criteria approach in explaining the IJV partner selection phenom-
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enon. Its main theoretical grounds rely upon the resource-based view of the firm, 
the resource dependency theory and transaction cost theory. 
In Chapter 2, a set of hypotheses regarding the contextual effect on partner selec-
tion criteria and its relationship with IJV performance are stated, and further em-
pirically examined in Chapter 5 in a quantitative study focusing on IJVs formed 
in 1988-2002 and a Finnish firm acting as the foreign partner. 
In the second theoretical chapter (Chapter 3), the phenomenon of IJV partner se-
lection is examined from a process-oriented point of view. The main goal of the 
chapter is to explain how firms differ with regard to the paths they take in select-
ing their IJV partners, adding to the process descriptions of previous research by 
proposing alternative process modes. The theoretical backbone of Chapter 3 is 
built upon a behavioral theory approach, comprising models and typologies 
drawn from the strategic decision making literature and partnering models drawn 
from the purchasing literature. 
After Chapter 5, the quantitative study focusing on IJVs with Finnish owner-
shipformed in 1988–2002, Chapter 6 takes a qualitative approach to examining 
the processes of four case IJVs formed in 1997–2000 with a Finnish firm acting 
as the foreign partner, thus forming the second empirical chapter of the study. In 
addition to describing the selection process, Chapter 6 focuses on the context ef-
fect on partner selection decision making and performance implications of choos-
ing specific paths in the IJV formation. Lastly, Chapter 6 examines the extent to 
which the IJV partner selection process can be seen as its own separate decision 
making entity within the IJV formation process. 
The last chapter (Chapter 7) comprises the summary and conclusions of the study. 
Also, limitations of the study and further research avenues are discussed. 
The material in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, focusing on IJV partner selection crite-
ria, context effect on its relative importance, and its performance implications, is 
originally based on (here revised and significantly expanded upon) the article: 
Larimo, J and S. Rumpunen (2006). ‘Partner selection in international joint ven-
tures’, Journal of Euromarketing 16:1/2, 119–137. 
The material in Chapters 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, partly comprising the theoretical part 
for approaching IJV partner selection from a process-oriented perspective, is orig-
inally based on (here revised and significantly expanded upon) the paper: 
Rumpunen, S. and A. Viljamaa (2008). IJV partner selection: A new approach. 
Presented at the 34th EIBA Annual Conference, Tallinn, Estonia, Dec 11–13, 
2008. 
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2 IJV PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA 
LITERATURE 
The second chapter comprises the first theoretical part of the study, and it aims to 
contribute to a theoretical framework on IJV partner selection by examining the 
impact of the IJV context on the relative importance of IJV selection criteria, and 
the relationship between the selection criteria and the eventual IJV performance. 
The chapter begins by presenting theoretical points of departure with emphasis on 
economic theories. Then, a literature review on criteria-oriented IJV partner selec-
tion research is presented, and it is followed by discussion on the contextual im-
pact on the IJV partner selection criteria. The chapter is finalized by discussion on 
the relationship between the partner selection criteria and the IJV performance. 
Altogether five hypotheses are set for forthcoming quantitative empirical exami-
nation (Chapter 5). 
2.1 Theoretical points of departure 
Partner selection for international joint ventures can be approached from several 
different theoretical angles. Taking a single- or dual-theory-driven approach to 
explain IJV partner selection is arguably not the optimal solution. As described by 
Varis and Conn (2002), several IB theories, such as transaction cost theory, re-
source-based view of the firm, market power theory, organizational learning per-
spective, resource dependency theory as well as sociological approaches offer 
perspectives on how IJV/alliance partners are selected. However, all these theo-
ries are limited in certain ways, thus the use of any one approach alone would be 
unlikely to guarantee successful partner selection. Instead, taking a theory-driven 
approach would require a use of several theories simultaneously. 
Several economic theories popular to explaining international business on various 
facets, such as transaction cost theory, the resource-based view of the firm, and 
the resource dependency theory, all have their ways of explaining the IJV ra-
tionale, and thus also suggest why firms choose to ally with certain types of part-
ners in different contexts. Therefore, they constitute a useful theoretical backdrop 
for examining how, or according to which criteria, firms evaluate and select their 
prospective partners, and form here the backbone of the theoretical discussion of 
Chapter Two. 
Transaction cost theory (TCT), developed by Williamson (1985, 1988), has been 
one of the most popular theories among research concerning international joint 
ventures (e.g. Parkhe 1993, Hennart 1988), and often mentioned as the principal 
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theoretical  approach  to  studying  IJV  formation  and  development  (Robson  et  al.  
2002). According to transaction cost theory firms look for solutions that allow 
them to reduce transaction costs, which in turn are driven by asset specificity, 
transaction frequency and the uncertainty over the outcome of the transaction 
(Williamson 1985). Also, transaction cost theory includes the assumption that 
firms are rationally bounded, mainly in reference to that all possible future con-
tingencies can’t be seen in advance, and contracts remain incomplete (Williamson 
1988). According to TCT, a necessary condition for a firm to choose to joint ven-
ture is that the production cost achieved through internal development or acquisi-
tion is significantly higher than external sourcing (Kogut 1988). 
In the context of selecting a partner for an international joint venture, transaction 
cost theory suggests that an organization selects its IJV or alliance partners by 
balancing in between the transaction costs incurred in allying with a particular 
partner, and the ability to control the particular partner’s actions, thus suggesting 
that the optimal candidate is the one that necessitates the lowest transaction costs, 
which at the same time is the most “controllable” (Varis and Conn 2002). Regard-
ing uncertainty in transactions, Williamson (1985) suggested two types of uncer-
tainties: the uncertainty due to external environmental changes, and the internal 
behavioral uncertainty, in which it is difficult to assess whether the other party is 
living  up  to  its  contractual  obligations.  Uncertainty  and  its  effects  on  alliance  
partner selection have been studied by Mitsuhashi (2002) who presented different 
types of selection uncertainty and mechanisms firm use to reduce selection uncer-
tainty, which will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters. 
Although transaction cost theory explains alliance formation and partner selection 
well on a general level, it comes up short in explaining the finer points of partner 
selection; a good example here would be its focus on cost reduction instead of 
value creation, while the latter might actually be more appropriate to the alliance 
scenario (Varis and Conn 2002). Transaction cost theory has been criticized for 
its tendency to observe an individual as a too simple, dishonest and unmotivated 
actor who must be directed through prohibitions and sanctions, and for neglect-
ing, for example, an individual’s will and capability for cooperation, creativity, 
volunteering and entrepreneurship, and lastly, for its inability to adequately rec-
ognize the importance of trust (Vuorinen 2005). The critique by Ghoshal and Mo-
ran (1996) suggests that, when interpreted incorrectly or too broadly, transaction 
cost theory may even have damaging consequences within an organization. Even 
though Williamson (1985) himself posits such limitations upon transaction cost 
theory as measurement difficulties, primitive models, underdeveloped tradeoffs, 
the overly unattractive view of human nature, among others, TCT has spawned a 
significant stream of opposing literature that mainly concentrates on the social 
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dimension economic activities (Vuorinen 2005). Still, Williamson (1988) himself 
suggests TCT to be applied in conjunction with other theories rather than as a 
stand-alone explanation of economic activity. 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) essentially builds on the principle that 
the application of the bundle of valuable resources the firm has at its disposal 
primarily forms the basis for its competitive advantage (Rumelt 1984, Wernerfelt 
1984). A sustained competitive advantage, according to Barney (1991), would 
require the resources to be heterogeneous and not perfectly mobile; in effect, re-
sources that are both inimitable and non-substitutable without great effort. Ac-
cording to the resource-based view of the firm, firms should specifically look for 
IJV partners who enable the IJV to develop, structure or combine resources in a 
way that is the most durable and difficult to copy (Varis and Conn 2002). Firms 
may have specific resource endowments, but may need additional resources to be 
competitive in particular markets (Hitt et al. 1999). These kinds of needs, from 
the RBV perspective, are the primary reason for the existence of strategic allianc-
es (Hitt et al. 2000). 
A key element of the RBV-oriented IJV literature is that the realization of the 
potential benefits to a firm from forming an IJV depends on its finding a partner 
who can provide complementary capabilities that match its own and enable the 
IJV to meet the firm's strategic objectives (Buckley and Casson 1988, Child and 
Yan 2003, Geringer 1991). Although the RBV perspective is an obvious theoreti-
cal backdrop in IJV partner selection criteria research, some of its key features 
such as the inimitability of resources are often outside the spotlight. Geringer 
(1988) expectedly found in his study on IJV partner selection of US firms that the 
perception of the difficulty of internal development in regards to certain re-
sources, reflecting the inimitability of said resources, had a positive effect on the 
relative importance of these resources and/or capabilities as partner selection cri-
teria. 
Resource dependency theory, complementing the resource based view of the firm, 
suggests that by controlling critical resources – such as technology, management 
know-how, service support, knowledge of local markets and customs, distribu-
tion, procurement and equity share (Yan and Gray 2001) – a firm can make an-
other firm dependent on it (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Originally developed by 
Emerson (1963), a key notion of resource dependency theory is that a firm cannot 
develop or internally access all resources required for competitive operation in a 
specific environment. While resource dependency theory is considered to com-
plement the resource-based view of the firm, organizational learning perspective 
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can similarly be considered as an extension to the more general resource depend-
ency theory (Varis and Conn 2002). 
The application of the RBV perspective and the resource dependency theory in 
IJV partner selection research has resulted in some location or target-country-
specific findings. This goes along the notion by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), stat-
ing that resource dependency theory emphasizes the importance of contexts and 
situational contingencies as determinants of organizational behavior. For exam-
ple, Hitt et al. (2000) found that in addition to seeking local market knowledge 
and access, developed market firms with large resource endowments try to lever-
age their resources by selecting alliance partners with complementary capabilities 
and unique competencies. They also found that alliance partners may be selected 
largely for access to resources and organizational learning opportunities that may 
enhance a focal firm’s capabilities. 
The RBV and the resource dependency theory, when connected to the organiza-
tional learning perspective, also offer as a combination a theoretical explanation 
to an often recurring setting in IJVs formed between partners from developed and 
emerging markets, also stressing the dyadic nature of a partnership. As RBV sug-
gests, developed market firms with large resource endowments try to leverage 
their resources by selecting alliance partners with complementary capabilities and 
unique competencies in addition to seeking local market knowledge and access 
(Hitt et al. 2000). Meanwhile, firms from emerging markets often enter alliances 
to acquire knowledge and capabilities (Mothe and Quelin 1998). The tendency of, 
for  example,  the  Chinese  firms  to  enter  in  IJVs  with  Western  European  firms  
driven by the motive of acquiring new technology and knowledge, is very well 
documented within the IJV literature concerning Chinese firms (e.g. Beamish 
1993, Davidson 1987, Dong and Glaister 2006, Luo 1997,  Maurer 1996). 
Another setting, as depicted by Hitt et al. (2000) regarding the connection be-
tween RBV and organizational learning perspectives in IJV relationships between 
firms from developed and emerging markets, was made in relation to quality of 
production. As the importance of quality for competitiveness has risen, pushed by 
the proliferation of the ISO standards worldwide, developed market firms want 
partners that can produce quality goods. At the same time the emerging market 
firms  want  partners  from  whom  they  can  learn  to  produce  higher  quality,  thus  
acquiring knowledge to meet international quality standards and enhancing their 
resource endowments. 
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2.2 Review of the criteria-oriented IJV partner 
selection research 
As outlined by Wong and Ellis (2002), IJV research can be broadly categorized 
into three areas: 1) antecedents (e.g. IJV formation motives and partner selection; 
e.g. Geringer 1988 and 1991, Tallman and Shenkar 1994); 2) outcomes (studies 
relating to failure and performance; e.g. Brown, Rugman and Verbeke 1989, 
Makino and Delios 1996, Pearce 1997); and 3) specific management issues (e.g. 
control and conflict – Yan and Gray 1994, Fey and Beamish 2000). The issue of 
partner selection is arguably pre-eminent in this list of topics for the success and 
stability of the joint venture “marriage” is widely held to be determined by the 
compatibility of the alliance partners (Child et al. 2005, Luo 1997, Saxton 1997). 
It  is  often  brought  up  within  the  IJV  and  ISA  literature  that  central  to  IJV/ISA  
formation is the quest for a suitable partner (e.g. Blodgett 1991, Brown, Rugman 
and Verbeke 1989, Harrigan 1988, Parkhe 1993, Sorensen and Reve 1998) and in 
many occasions it has been mentioned as the key to the ultimate success of the 
venture (e.g. Child and Faulker 1998). Recognition of this fact has inspired an 
area of IJV research that specifically focuses on the partner selection criteria pref-
erences of MNEs when establishing an IJV. Although this area of research is of-
ten referred to as underdeveloped (e.g. Roy 2006) or at least of relatively little in 
amount (e.g. Glaister and Buckley 1997, Nielsen 2003), previous research to date 
has been able to successfully identify selection criteria employed by firms, cate-
gorized these criteria, demonstrated preference variations in the criteria and their 
categories, and suggested potential drivers of these preference variations. Also, 
some papers have explored linkages between partner selection criteria and the 
subsequent performance of the JV (Awadzi 1987, Beamish 1987, Maurer 1996). 
The study by Tomlinson (1970) is unanimously regarded as the first study placing 
a more detailed focus on IJV partner selection. In his study Tomlinson analyzed 
the IJV behavior and performance of UK-based companies in 71 IJVs in India 
and Pakistan. Seven years later he conducted a joint study with Thompson (1977) 
focusing on IJVs established by Canadian companies in Mexico. Tomlinson’s 
(1970) findings on selection criteria applied by firms selecting their IJV partners 
were the first  of their  kind, thus laying the groundwork for a new stream of IJV 
research. After Tomlinson (1970), during the 70’s and early-to-mid 80’s, a hand-
ful of studies (e.g. Adler and Hlavacek 1976, Awadzi 1987, Beamish 1987, Dan-
iels 1971, Lasserre 1984, Renforth 1974) surfaced, providing insight to mainly on 
what firms look for in their potential partners by introducing relevant selection 
criteria, as well as examining certain factors affecting the characteristics a firm 
may look for in their potential partner candidates. 
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However, the study by Geringer (1988, 1991) can be regarded as the ground-
breaking work focusing on IJV partner selection. Geringer (1988), who was able 
to identify a total of 27 different selection criteria in his study of US-based IJVs, 
suggested that despite the almost unlimited range of alternative criteria that might 
exist, it is possible to provide a simple two-fold typology consisting of task-
related and partner-related selection criteria. This has been the common basis 
shared by the vast majority of IJV/ISA partner selection studies ever since early 
90’s. In this criteria typology, the task-related selection criteria concern the skills 
and resources a firm would look for in its prospective partner, in response to con-
sideration of the nature of its own potential contributions along with what the new 
business would require to be successful. Partner-related selection criteria are 
those referring to the ability of the partner to work with the focal firm efficiently 
and effectively (e.g., compatibility of top management teams). In contrast to task-
related criteria, which focus on relative partner contributions to making a business 
prosper, partner-related criteria are not contingent on the IJV context. Another 
main contribution by Geringer was the identification and estimation of the corre-
lations of the key variables which affect the relative importance of some of the 
selection criteria. 
In the later studies the task- and partner-related selection criteria categorization 
has been applied with modifications by e.g. Glaister (1996), Glaister and Buckley 
(1997), Tatoglu and Glaister (2002) and Nielsen (2003) who applied mostly simi-
lar sets of selection criteria. However, these four studies used slightly different 
definitions of task-related and partner-related criteria in comparison to the origi-
nal definitions, rendering the comparison of results more difficult. In the view of 
three of these four studies (Glaister 1996, Glaister and Buckley 1997, Tatoglu and 
Glaister 2000) partner-related criteria were those “that became relevant only if the 
chosen mode involves presence of multiple partners”, thus not following Gerin-
ger’s (1988) idea of criteria associated with the efficiency and effectivity of part-
ners’ cooperation. Nielsen (2003) defined partner-related criteria as “criteria asso-
ciating with the efficiency and effectivity of the partner” yet ended up using al-
most exactly the same set of criteria as the three studies discussed above. Luo 
(1998), on the other hand, extended Geringer’s (1988) typology by adding a third 
category of criteria measuring the financial fit of the IJV partners. Furthermore, 
Robson (2002), following Geringer’s (1988) definition, focused solely on partner-
related criteria. 
Regarding the point of view of previous IJV partner selection research, the study 
by Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) differs from the others by analyzing the views of 
both the foreign and the local partner, whereas in vast majority of the other stud-
ies the focus has been on the selection criteria used by the foreign partner. Also, 
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Arino, Abramov, Skorobogatykh, Rykounina and Vila (1997), Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson (1999), as well as Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Edhec and Borza (2000) are also 
among those having contributed in the IJV partner selection research. These stud-
ies, among others, have built on Geringer’s (1988) typology, and provided results 
on the relative importance of selection criteria in different geographical contexts, 
examined and identified a number of contextual variables affecting the relative 
importance of the criteria and, although lesser in numbers, found indication of a 
relationship between the relative importance of selection criteria and the subse-
quent performance of the venture. Additionally, Li and Ferreira (2008) focused on 
firms’ preference to select prior partners for ISAs in developing countries, finding 
that the technological commitment is a major predictor for selecting prior part-
ners, and also that institutional distance between the home and host country in-
creases the likelihood for selecting prior partners. They didn’t, however, focus on 
other aspects of partner selection other than the tendency of selecting prior part-
ners. 
Additionally, several studies have contributed in joint venture and alliance partner 
selection without an international perspective, and thus are not included in Table 
1. Hoffmann and Schlosser (2001) examined different types of alliances, includ-
ing joint ventures, contractual alliances, minority shareholdings and other types of 
alliances, both national and international. Their findings regarding alliance suc-
cess factors indicate the importance of trust and commitment, yet also such 
“hard” facts such as strategic compatibility and appropriate governance mecha-
nisms. Pangarkar and Choo (2001) studied Singaporean alliances, finding that 
firms mostly tend to seek symmetric partners in several respects such as firm size, 
experience, goals, culture, management style and operating policies, thus reduc-
ing the uncertainty experienced in selecting partners. More recently, Shah and 
Swaminathan (2008), by using an experimental method, found that the critical 
criteria for assessing alliance partners’ attractiveness and selection vary depend-
ing on the differential levels of process manageability and outcome interpretabil-
ity inherent to a strategic alliance with a sample comprising U.S. executive MBA 
students. 
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Table 1. The main IJV and ISA studies focusing on partner selection criteria. 
Author(s) Year Main focus Geographic focus Sample size      Point of view 
Li and 
Ferreira 
2008 Preferring prior co-op 
in emerging countries 
 ISAs in emerging 
countries with US 
foreign partners 
 286 ISAs foreign partner 
Dong and 
Glaister 
2006 PS criteria and 
motives 
 IJVs in China  203 ISAs local partner 
Roy 2006 PS crit., performance, 
host country legal 
environment 
 IJVs with Canadian 
foreign partners 
 113 IJVs foreign partner 
Salavrakos and 
Stewart 
2006 PS criteria and 
performance 
Greek IJVs in Eastern 
Europe 
45 IJVs foreign partner 
Chen and 
Glaister 
2005 PS criteria and 
motives 
Taiwanese IJVs in 
China 
40 IJVs foreign partner 
Nielsen 2003  PS criteria and 
contextual effects 
IJVs with Danish for-
eign partners 
120 foreign partner 
Robson 
 
2002 Partner-related crit., 
performance, collab-
oration outcomes 
IJVs in UK 94 local partner 
Hitt et al. 
 
2000 PS crit. and market 
context (emerging/ 
developed) 
IJVs of several national-
ities 
202 firms foreign partner 
Tatoglu 2000 PS criteria and 
motives 
 IJVs in Turkey with 
WE foreign partners 
39 IJVs foreign partner 
Tatoglu and 
Glaister 
2000 PS criteria, motives, 
country of origin 
effect 
IJVs in Turkey with 
OECD foreign partners 
39 foreign, 30 
local partners 
dyadic (i.e. 
both) 
Zhang 2000 PS crit., motives, 
location 
IJVs in China 106 (82 % 
IJVs) 
foreign partner 
Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson 
1999 PS crit. classification, 
experience 
IJVs in Bahrain 42 IJVs foreign partner 
Glaister and 
Buckley 
1997 PS criteria and 
contextual effects 
UK IJVs with WE/JAP/ 
USA partners 
53 IJVs UK firm as a 
for./loc. partner 
Arino et al. 1997  PS criteria, partner 
contributions, rela-
tionship management 
IJVs in RUS with FRA/ 
ITA/SPA foreign part-
ners 
8 IJVs  foreign partner 
Dacin 
 
1997  PS criteria between 
US and Korean firms 
 ISAs by US and Kore-
an firms 
 not defined  Not defined 
Luo 
 
1997 PS criteria and 
performance 
 IJVs in China  116 IJVs foreign partner 
Saxton 
 
1997 Partner and relation-
ship characteristics, 
performance 
Several nationalities 98 responses not defined 
Glaister 1996 PS criteria and 
motives 
UK ISAs with WE 
foreign partners 
50 ISAs local partner 
Maurer 1996 PS criteria and 
performance 
US IJVs in China 33 IJVs foreign partner 
Demirbag, 
Mirza and Weir 
1995 PS criteria and 
motives 
 IJVs in Turkey  47 foreign, 21 
local partners 
dyadic 
Glaister and 
Wang 
1993 PS criteria and 
motives 
IJVs in China with UK 
foreign partners 
21 IJVs foreign partner 
Geringer 
 
1988 Strategic determi-
nants of PS criteria 
IJVs with US firms as 
foreign partners 
90 IJVs foreign partner 
Awadzi 
 
1987 PS criteria and 
bargaining power 
IJVs in the US  40 IJVs local partner 
Beamish 
 
1987 PS criteria and 
performance 
IJVs in LDCs by US 
and CAN MNEs 
 66 IJVs foreign partner 
Tomlinson and 
Thompson 
1977 PS criteria CAN-MEX IJVs  40 responses dyadic 
Renforth 1974 PS criteria, operation 
characteristics 
US IJVs in Trinidad and 
Jamaica 
 49 IJVs foreign partner 
Daniels 1971 Partner selection and 
characteristics 
IJVs in the US with 
Euro foreign partners 
40 IJVs foreign partner 
Tomlinson 1970  PS criteria and 
contextual effects 
IJVs in India with UK 
foreign partners 
 71 IJVs foreign partner 
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2.3 Context effect 
It has been argued that the criteria for IJV partner selection are largely case-
specific (see e.g. Varis 2004). However, contextual factors which have their ef-
fects on the relative importance of the selection criteria can be distinguished. The 
impact of several contextual factors on the relative importance of selection crite-
ria has been observed in the IJV partner selection literature. They can be roughly 
divided into foreign-partner-specific, IJV location-specific and investment-
specific factors. Also, some of the past studies have taken the impact of the mo-
tive for the IJV formation on the relative importance of selection criteria under 
observation. 
There are several foreign-partner-specific factors that might condition the relative 
importance of the selection criteria. Here we focus on, firstly, the size of the firm, 
and secondly, the experience of the firm on different aspects of international op-
erations, such as experience in completing FDI, experience in forming IJVs, and 
experience in operating in the target country. 
Also, the location-specific factors of the IJV, such as the geographic loca-
tion/region of the IJV, the distance between the home and host countries of the 
IJV partners (both culturally and physically), and the level of economic develop-
ment of the host country of the unit, may also be expected to have an influence on 
the relative importance of various selection criteria. The lower the distance – eco-
nomic, cultural, physical – the more similar the home and host countries usually 
are, and the lower the amount of expected problems between partners depending 
on the distance. Greater distance has been connected to higher level of IJV prob-
lems and conflict (Lane and Beamish 1990), misunderstandings (Lyles and Salk 
1996), collaborative problems (Mowery et al. 1996) and knowledge transfer prob-
lems (Hamel 1991). 
Thirdly, there are numerous factors potentially influencing the relative importance 
of the selection criteria that do not naturally fit the foreign-partner-specific or the 
location-specific categories, but are instead specific only to the investment in 
question. These investment-specific factors refer in this study to the form of estab-
lishment (Greenfield IJV vs. partial acquisition), the relatedness of the IJV opera-
tion for the foreign partner, the relative size of the partners, and the initiator of the 
IJV. 
In addition to these, Geringer’s (1991) results suggested that the relative im-
portance of the selection criteria is closely related to three variables associated 
with the parent firm’s strategic context: These variables were the management 
perceptions of: 1. The extent to which that dimension critical to the venture’s per-
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formance (i.e. a critical success factor, CSF), 2. The parent firm’s current position 
vis-à-vis that CSF dimension, and 3. The anticipated difficulty to be encountered 
in internal efforts to achieve a viable competitive position on that CSF dimension. 
These variables were seen to explain a substantial proportion of the observed var-
iance in the relative importance of the selection criteria. A more common aspect 
of the strategic context of the firm researched in connection to IJV formation is 
the investment motivation. However, its impact on the relative importance of 
partner selection criteria have been examined very limitedly (Glaister 1996, 
Tatoglu and Glaister 2000, Nielsen 2003). 
The following sub-chapters (2.3.1 to 2.3.4) deal with different contextual factors 
of IJV partner selection, followed by a chapter (2.4) concerning the relationship 
between the selection criteria and IJV performance. Each of these chapters con-
clude with a hypothesis, worded in a very general manner in accordance to sever-
al previous studies (e.g. Chen & Glaister 2005, Glaister & Buckley 1997, Pan-
garkar 1997). Each of hypotheses 1 to 4 concern a relationship between the rela-
tive importance of partner selection criteria and a certain group of contextual fac-
tors, instead of individual contextual factors. This is due to avoiding an amount of 
ca. 20 hypotheses and thus aiming to a more concentrated presentation. 
2.3.1 Foreign-partner-specific factors 
There are several foreign-partner-specific factors that might condition the relative 
importance of the selection criteria. Here, the focus is on size and experience of 
the foreign partner. Experience is further separated into experience on foreign 
direct investment (FDI experience), experience on forming international joint 
ventures (IJV experience), and target-country-specific experience of the foreign 
partner.  
Size of the firm is likely to be related to the underlying motives for the IJV, as by 
common logic, smaller firms are obviously more likely to, for example, be more 
limited in regards to financial and managerial resources, and be more motivated 
to reach economies of scale through the IJV. Meanwhile, larger firms may be 
more strongly motivated to diversify their operations or to block competition es-
pecially in saturated industries. Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) found that the 
importance of criteria relating to local standing and marketing and technological 
competence decreased by the size of the company (measured by the number of 
employees). 
Regarding experience and its effect on partner selection criteria, a linkage based 
on transaction cost theory can be argued for. Internal and external uncertainty that 
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firms deal with, and that affect transactions as posited in transaction cost theory 
(Williamson 1985), in conjunction with Mitsuhashi’s (2002) finding that firms 
use certain mechanisms such as the relational mechanism (weighing previous 
relations with prospective partner candidates) to reduce selection uncertainty, 
indicates a relationship between a firm’s international experience and the relative 
importance it places on criteria related to familiarity. However, lacking target-
country-specific experience also translates to having no previous local coopera-
tors  in  the  target  country,  shutting  out  the  criteria  of  previous  positive  coopera-
tion. Finally, if the company lacks earlier FDI, IJV and/or target-country-specific 
experience it can be logically expected to value partner-related aspects such as 
trust due to perceived environmental uncertainty. Empirical findings suggest that 
firms with wide experience in foreign acquisitions were more likely to acquire 
firms in better a financial state than those with limited acquisition experience 
(Lindvall 1991), indicating that criteria concerning financial resources is valued 
more by the experienced firms. 
The earlier studies surprisingly include only a very limited amount of research 
results on the influence of foreign-partner-specific factors on the relative im-
portance of partner selection criteria. In the study by Nielsen (2003) concerning 
IJVs and alliances of Danish companies it was found against expectations that 
international experience did not have any influence on the relative importance of 
partner-related selection criteria but the degree of experience had some im-
portance on the relative importance of task-related selection criteria. Al-Khalifa 
and Peterson (1999) found that firms with geographically widespread JV experi-
ence placed more emphasis on partner-related aspects instead of task-related as-
pects, and that increased international experience decreased the importance of 
personal characteristics. Regarding firm size, in addition to Al-Khalifa and Peter-
son (1999) and Tomlinson (1970), only Glaister and Buckley (1997) have studied 
the size of the partners as a contextual variable to partner selection among the 
main reference studies. In their study the analysis concerned the relative size of 
the partners, which is here considered to better fit under the category of invest-
ment-specific factors rather than foreign-partner-specific factors. Therefore the 
results by Glaister and Buckley (1997) are in this regard discussed later on in the 
more appropriate connection. 
Thus, the earlier studies give very limited empirical evidence on the role of for-
eign-partner-specific factors on the relative importance of various selection crite-
ria. Therefore, for the empirical part of the study is expected that: 
H1 The relative importance of partner selection criteria is influenced by 
the foreign-partner-specific factors. 
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2.3.2 Location-specific factors 
The location of the IJV along geographic location, cultural and geographic dis-
tance between home and host countries of the IJV partners, and economic devel-
opment  level  of  the  target  country  of  the  unit  may  also  be  expected  to  have  an  
influence on the relative importance of various selection criteria. The lower the 
distance – economic, cultural, geographic – the more similar the home and host 
countries usually are and the lower the amount of expected problems between 
partners depending on the distance. Greater distance has been linked to higher 
level of IJV problems and conflict (Lane and Beamish 1990), misunderstandings 
(Lyles and Salk 1996), collaborative problems (Mowery et al. 1996) and 
knowledge transfer problems (Hamel 1991).  
Geringer (1988), Glaister (1996) and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) did not analyze 
the influence of distance on the relative importance of selection criteria (in the 
last study all IJVs were established in the same target country, Turkey). Among 
the other studies, findings by Glaister and Buckley (1997) indicate that the rela-
tive importance of partner-related criteria differed in IJVs in different levels of 
distance, but no variation was found for the relative importance task-related crite-
ria in regards to distance. Access to knowledge of local culture, access to regula-
tory permits, and reputation of the partner were much more weighed as the selec-
tion criteria of the partner in IJVs located in Japan than in the USA or Europe 
whereas the role of the international experience of the partner was clearly lower 
in the former than in the latter IJVs. 
In the study by Nielsen (2003) it was found that although trust between top man-
agement, access to market knowledge, and relatedness of partner business were 
highly ranked for all the four reviewed areas (Western Europe, USA, Asia, the 
rest of the world) there was strong support for the variation with relative im-
portance of both related to task- and partner-related selection criteria among dif-
ferent regional areas. For example, the importance of “accessing product-specific 
knowledge” was highly ranked in regards to the other areas (WE, USA, Asia) but 
not  in  the  group  consisting  of  the  rest  of  the  world,  whereas  the  importance  of  
“accessing local cultural knowledge” and “accessing regulatory knowledge” was 
valued clearly higher in Asia than in other areas, especially in their home region 
of Western Europe, where the Danish companies seemed to be content with their 
own existing level of knowledge. Furthermore, the criteria “favorable past associ-
ation” was clearly higher ranked in IJVs formed in Western Europe and in the 
group “rest  of the world” than especially in Asia,  whereas “access to links with 
major suppliers” was clearly more highly appreciated in the USA than in the other 
three areas. 
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In the other previous studies, Hitt et al. (2000) found that developed market firms 
tried to leverage their resources to gain competitive advantages by searching for 
partners with unique competencies and local market knowledge and access, 
whereas firms from emerging markets were looking for partners with financial 
capabilities. Furthermore, Glaister and Wang (1993) found that in joint ventures 
established by UK-based companies in China the ability to negotiate with host 
government, relatedness of business, trust between top management, and financial 
status/resources of partner were the most weighed criteria. 
Thus one would expect that, for example, product and/or production process-
related knowledge, brands and distribution systems are more weighed in OECD 
countries, whereas criteria such as relationships with local government, access to 
labor, management, local markets and customs are more weighed in non-OECD 
countries or other culturally and economically more distant countries from the 
point of view of Western European firms. Furthermore, relations with local gov-
ernment seem to be much more important in non-OECD than in OECD-countries. 
Therefore for the empirical part it is expected that: 
H2 The relative importance of the partner selection criteria is influenced 
by the IJV location-specific factors. 
2.3.3 Investment-specific factors 
Investment-specific factors are here defined as those factors that apply to the spe-
cific IJV constellation, rather than the location/environment, or traits of a specific 
parent in the IJV. In this study the investment-specific factors under focus are the 
form of establishment, relatedness of the operation, relative partner size and the 
initiation for the IJV partnership. 
It seems that in several studies the analysis of IJVs includes only units established 
in the form of a Greenfield investment, i.e. a separate new unit is established. 
However, IJVs can also be established through partial acquisitions (Hennart 1988, 
2009, Gulati 1995, Pisano 1989). There are some key differences between the two 
forms of establishment. Greenfield investment refers to everything being built 
from scratch whereas acquisition, here partial acquisition, refers to buying a share 
in an already existing company. Furthermore, a Greenfield investment always 
means an expansion in the existing total capacity, whereas a partial acquisition 
does not. Finally, a Greenfield investment generally differs from a partial acquisi-
tion due to the fact that in the case of a Greenfield investment the first inflow of 
revenue usually comes after a certain period of time. These fundamental differ-
ences would suggest that differences in IJV partner selection, more specifically 
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the relative importance given to the selection criteria, can be expected depending 
on the form of establishment. 
Concerning the field of investment, an IJV can be classified to either related or 
unrelated to the business of the present operation of the foreign partner, a classifi-
cation more frequently applied in the acquisition literature (Kusewitt 1985) yet 
applicable  in  IJV  research  as  well  (Larimo  1993).  In  a  related  IJV  the  foreign  
partner has earlier knowledge and experience from the field and the firm may, for 
example, pursue to expand towards a new geographic area, increase power and/or 
to block competition via the IJV. In an unrelated IJV the foreign partner lacks 
earlier knowledge or experience from the field, pursuing to diversify in order to 
expand its product portfolio. Although the foreign partner does not possess prod-
uct-specific experience, the management may rely on its ability to transfer such 
knowledge as for example managerial knowledge and marketing knowledge from 
one field of business to another. Because of the unfamiliarity of business to the 
firm, different aspects in relation to planning, implementation and management of 
the investment are more problematic and cause more risk for the firm in unrelated 
types of IJVs (Larimo 1993). Thus, because of these differences between related 
and unrelated types of IJVs, especially in accordance to the differing resource 
needs between the two types, it may be expected that there will also exist differ-
ences in the relative importance given to various partner selection criteria depend-
ing on the type of the IJV. 
The impact of the size of the foreign partner on the relative importance of the se-
lection criteria was already discussed in connection to the foreign-partner-specific 
factors. Firm size can also be discussed within the investment-specific factors by 
focusing on the relative size of the IJV partners. The smaller the local IJV partner 
in relation to the foreign firm, the more likely it may be expected that the relative 
importance of some specific product/production-related knowledge, and/or access 
to a valuable brand is higher than in cases where the relative size of the local 
partner is larger. In the latter cases such criteria as access to capital/financial re-
sources or relations with local government may be expected to be given more 
importance than in the former cases. 
To the extent partners are either proactive or reactive with respect to the initiative 
for the IJV and thus either making the initial proposal or they are reacting to the 
other partner’s approach, differences in the importance of particular selection cri-
teria are likely to exist between initiating and non-initiating partner firms. It may 
be logically expected that firms reacting to an outside IJV proposition value crite-
ria such as trust, commitment and reputation more highly due to uncertainty con-
cerning potential opportunistic behavior of the initiator. 
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The earlier studies include fairly limited empirical results in relation to the influ-
ence of the investment-specific factors on partner selection. Apparently all the 
IJVs in several studies have been established in the form of a Greenfield invest-
ment. Therefore analysis on the form of establishment and its impact on IJV part-
ner selection remains a gap in the literature. However, some earlier results regard-
ing the relative size and initiation to the IJV can be found. Against expectations, 
Glaister and Buckley (1997) found that the relative importance of the selection 
criteria varied only very limitedly with the relative partner size in their UK based 
sample. Three partner-related selection criteria – experience in technology appli-
cations, international experience and management in depth – were more important 
in IJVs where the foreign partner was larger than the UK partner. Relatively 
smaller UK firms, which presumably lacked these attributes, were seeking them 
through collaboration with larger partners. Similarly, the task-related selection 
criterion of access to capital was more important in those IJVs where the non-UK 
partner was larger. This indicated that relatively smaller UK partners required 
capital inputs from larger partners for the IJV to succeed (ibid p. 218). The au-
thors assume that the non-significant differences may be dependent on the sample 
of their study and of the classification of sample firms only to two categories: the 
UK partner was larger vs. the other partner was larger. 
Demirbag, Mirza and Weir (1995) and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) found that 
there were in fact quite many differences in the motives for the IJVs between lo-
cal (Turkish) and foreign (US, European, and Japanese) firms. They also found a 
contrast between the motives of initiator and non-initiator local firms. However, 
the empirical results by Glaister and Buckley (1997) did not indicate support to 
this view, but the relative importance of the selection criteria were virtually inde-
pendent of which partner firm initiated the IJV. The results by Glaister and Buck-
ley indicated following explanations (see p. 217): The partner-related selection 
criterion of the degree of favorable past association between partners was more 
important in those IJVs which were initated by the UK partner than in those initi-
ated by the other partner or third-party intermediaries. This indicated that the UK 
firms which were proactive in seeking to establish an IJV solicit partners from 
those foreign firms that were known to them. Subtracting the pool of potential 
partners into those foreign firms which were already known clearly reduced the 
searching costs of finding a suitable partner. Where good working relationship 
prevailed between partners this indicated that there was a better understanding of 
the resource inputs and behavior expected from each partner and more rapid 
movement along the experience curve of operating the IJV than would had been 
in  cases  of  relatively  unknown partners.  Firms  which  were  approached  with  the  
request to form an IJV were less able to control partner choice and so gave less 
prominence to previous relationships. The criteria of financial status/financial 
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resources of the partner and the reputation of the partner firm were more im-
portant selection criteria for those UK partners which did not initiate the IJV. In 
the conclusions of their study Glaister and Buckley state that the influence of the 
initiator on the relative importance of various selection criteria clearly warrants 
closer examination. 
In summary, the influence of various investment-specific factors on partner selec-
tion has been analyzed very limitedly so far. Furthermore, e.g. related to the in-
fluence of the initiative on the relative weights of various selection criteria the 
earlier results seem to be rather mixed. Therefore, for the empirical part of the 
study we expect that: 
H3 The relative importance of partner selection criteria is influenced by 
the investment-specific factors. 
2.3.4 Motives for the IJV 
There is a rich literature focusing on motivation for IJV formation. Gomes-
Casseres (1988) identified three major motives of IJVs: 1) Supply-based IJVs, 
which are organized along the supply line and involve resource transfer beyond 
simple exchange relationship. These IJVs are mainly established to reduce trans-
action costs and enhance the possibility for the development innovations; 2) 
Learning-based IJVs motivated by creation and transfer of tacit knowledge across 
organizational boundaries; and 3) Market-based IJVs motivated by a need to re-
duce competition. 
Several authors have provided many additional reasons for the establishment of 
IJVs from a strategic point of view (e.g. Contractor and Lorange 1988, Harrigan 
1985, Porter and Fuller 1986). Fundamentally IJVs are motivated by the desire to 
achieve some benefits of a global strategy or, from a resource dependency per-
spective, the need to compensate for the absence of – or weakness in – a (per-
ceived) needed asset or competency (Nielsen 2003). 
Perhaps a more fundamental aspect of IJV motives is to focus on the FDI motive 
and purpose instead of examining the drivers for choosing a collaborative opera-
tion mode. Dunning (1993) has classified the motives for FDI into four main 
groups by stating that there are: 1. natural resource seeking, 2. market seeking, 3. 
efficiency seeking, and 4. strategic asset seeking FDI. Dunning’s approach has 
been applied in several later studies (e.g. Tahir 2003) and also adopted to be used 
here in the quantitative empirical study to analyze the relationship between the 
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FDI motivation and the relative importance of the selection criteria (see Chapter 
5). 
The main investment motive is likely to have an impact on partner selection, as 
firms may be expected to value the capabilities of a potential partner differently 
depending on the motive for the investment. If the main investment motive relates 
to seeking natural resources, importance of such criteria as access to materials 
and possibly access to low-cost labor should logically be expected to be consid-
ered more important. In cases where the main motivation falls into the category of 
market seeking, then such criteria as knowledge of local markets and culture, and 
access to distribution channels are likely valued higher. In the other forms of IJVs 
criteria such as access to technology, products, and brands are likely to be pre-
ferred. 
The results in earlier studies about the relationship between motives for the IJV 
and importance of various selection criteria are mixed. As can be seen in Table 2, 
investment motives have been the most frequent variable analyzed in relation to 
the partner selection criteria. Glaister and Buckley (1997) did not find any support 
for the relationship between the purpose of the IJV and the selection criteria. 
However, they analyzed the differences between units in the manufacturing and 
tertiary sectors, not between different types of manufacturing units. Glaister 
(1996) found support only for the relationship with task-related selection criteria, 
but not for the partner-related and also Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) found only 
moderate support for the relationships. However, Nielsen (2003) found strong 
support for the relationship between motives and the relative importance of selec-
tion criteria (all the seven regression equations had moderate to high R squares 
and significant F values), while Chen and Glaister (2005) found moderate support 
for their hypotheses concerning the relationship between relative importance of 
the selection criteria and the strategic motivation for IJV formation. Furthermore, 
Dong and Glaister (2006) found support for their hypothesis that the task-related 
selection criteria are significantly more strongly determined by strategic motives 
for alliance formation than the partner-related criteria. Thus, also here we expect 
that: 
H4 The relative importance of selection criteria is influenced by the mo-
tives for the IJV formation. 
Contextual factors examined in previous studies concerning IJV partner selection 
are listed in Table 2. The left side column consists of all contextual factors, 
whereas the middle column lists all studies that found a strong effect of certain 
contextual variable on the relative importance of the partner selection criteria, and 
the right side column lists all studies that found a moderate or a limited effect. 
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Table 2.  Previous results concerning the impact of contextual factors on IJV 
partner selection. 
Results in previous studies 
Contextual 
factor 
Strong effect on selec-
tion criteria 
Moderate or limited effect on 
selection criteria 
Admin.gov.form of the 
alliance 
Nielsen (2003)  
Firm size  Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999), 
Glaister and Buckley (1997), Tom-
linson (1970) 
Geographic location of the 
IJV 
 Buckley and Glaister (1997) 
Host country legal 
environment 
Roy (2006)  
Industry of IJV  Buckley and Glaister (1997) 
Initiation of the IJV  Buckley and Glaister (1997) 
International experience  Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) 
JV experience  Al-Khalifa and Peterson (1999) 
Level of development of 
IJV host country 
 
Hitt et al. (2000)  
Motives for IJV formation Nielsen (2003) Glaister (1996), Tatoglu and Glais-
ter (2000), Tomlinson (1970), 
Chen and Glaister (2005), Dong 
and Glaister (2006), Demirbag, 
Mirza & Weir (1995) 
Nationality of the foreign 
partner 
Nielsen (2003) Buckley and Glaister (1997), Dacin 
(1997) 
Nature of business  Tomlinson (1970) 
Operation characteristics 
(family/non-fam.owned) 
 Renforth (1974) 
Purpose of the IJV  Buckley and Glaister (1997) 
Prior int. alliance experience  Nielsen (2003) 
Relative partner size 
 
 Buckley and Glaister (1997) 
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Detailed results – the exact selection criteria that were found to be affected by a 
certain contextual variable, as well as the strength and direction of such relation-
ships – are unfortunately not presentable in a table or figure smaller without oc-
cupying several  pages,  explaining the compact form of the table.  As each of the 
previous studies perceive IJV partner selection as a set of ca. 20 to 30 individual 
criteria, the detailed findings are usually robust and not easily summarized. Also, 
a limited influence of a given contextual factor is likely to be found even in the 
weakest cases, as any meaningful variable is likely to affect at least two to four 
different criteria. Therefore, no separate column for negative results exists on the 
table, and a decision was made to simply present previous results concerning the 
IJV context by the significance of a given contextual factor. 
2.4 Partner selection criteria and IJV performance 
Research on IJV performance has received much more attention than a more de-
tailed analysis of the relative importance of IJV partner selection criteria. Howev-
er, there are only a couple of studies taking a look at the relationship between 
performance and partner selection criteria although the relationship with later 
performance of the IJV has been referred to in each one of the main reference 
studies.  
Results in earlier studies indicate that a great share of the IJVs do not meet the 
goals  set  for  them,  are  instable  or  are  divested  during  the  years  (20  to  70  % of  
IJVs,  depending  on  the  study,  see  e.g. Robson, Leonidou and Katsikeas 2002). 
But which factors are linked with better IJV performance? The results are very 
mixed and do not give clear answers (Robson et al. 2002). Most studies have in-
dicated that foreign parent size and international experience, inter-partner busi-
ness overlap, size symmetry between partners or distribution of equity ownership 
have not been clearly linked with the performance of the IJV. A greater socio-
cultural distance has more often been linked negatively than positively to IJV 
performance, but a lot of studies indicate a statistically non-significant link (e.g. 
Luo 1997, Robson et al. 2002). 
The studies by Geringer (1988), Glaister (1996) and Glaister and Buckley (1997) 
did not include the performance aspect. Nielsen (2003) analyzed the IJV perfor-
mance but not the link with selection criteria. The results indicated that on a scale 
from 1 (worse than expected) to 3 (better than expected) the mean financial per-
formance was 2.36 – thus the reviewed Danish companies were usually very sat-
isfied with the financial performance of the IJV. Also Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) 
focused only on the measurement of IJV performance and on the analysis of the 
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influence of the agreement between partners on the performance along various 
performance measures. The results indicated that both the foreign, but especially 
the local partners, were satisfied with their IJVs in Turkey (mean values 3.85 and 
4.20 on a five-point scale where 5=very satisfied). 
Concerning the main reference studies, Nielsen (2003) analyzed the IJV perfor-
mance but not its relationship with the selection criteria, with results indicating 
that on a scale from 1 (worse than expected) to 3 (better than expected) the mean 
financial performance was 2.36. hus the reviewed Danish companies were usually 
very satisfied with the financial performance of the IJV. Also, Tatoglu and Glais-
ter (2000) focused only on the measurement of IJV performance and on the anal-
ysis of the influence of the agreement between partners on the performance along 
various performance measures. Instead, in somewhat more detail, the relationship 
between the selection criteria and IJV performance has been studied by Tomlin-
son (1970), Beamish (1987), and Maurer (1996). Out of these three, only Maurer 
could not find any relationship between selection criteria and IJV performance. 
Tomlinson found that companies which had given the greatest weight to favora-
ble earlier relationship had experienced the best performance, while in cases 
where status of the local partner and especially in cases where the partner selec-
tion was a forced choice, the level of performance had clearly been poorer. In the 
study by Beamish the best performance was found in cases where a high prefer-
ence in partner selection was given to partner’s ability to arrange capable man-
agers to  the  IJV,  and  where  the  partner  provided  access/knowledge to the local 
economy and customs. The poorest performance was found among cases where 
high  preference  was  given  to  partner’s ability to satisfy requirements set by the 
host government concerning the share of local ownership. It is noteworthy that all 
of these three studies were focused on IJVs established in non-OECD countries. 
However, combined with the earlier discussion they give basis to assume that: 
H5 The relative importance of the partner selection criteria will vary with 
IJV performance. 
2.5 Summary and gap definition 
Although several authors make a point that research on IJV/ISA partner selection 
is scarce, there seems to be a respectable amount of studies focusing on which 
criteria firms apply when selecting IJV/ISA partners. Also, despite almost an un-
limited amount of contextual factors potentially effecting the relative importance 
of these criteria can be identified and argued for, the research on the effect of fac-
tors relating to the strategic context, the location of the IJV as well as firm-
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specific and investment-specific factors on the selection criteria has grown signif-
icantly throughout the last two decades. However, the selection criteria research 
following the steps of Geringer (1988) has a very limited potential to grasp 
IJV/ISA partner selection as a process, but rather focuses only on the evaluation 
of prospective IJV partners – one single mechanism of the selection process. 
As established in here on Chapter 2, transaction cost theory, the resource-based 
view of the firm, resource dependency theory and organizational learning theory – 
alone or in any combination – all have their ways of explaining the IJV rationale, 
and thus also suggest why firms choose to ally with certain types of partners in 
different contexts. Therefore, they constitute a useful theoretical backdrop for 
examining how, or according to which criteria, firms evaluate and select their 
prospective partners. This component of IJV formation, the evaluation of partner 
candidates and the partner selection criteria, has so far been the focus of prior IJV 
partner selection research. 
Meanwhile, the explanatory power of the theories mentioned above comes into 
question when the focus on partner selection moves beyond the selection criteria 
and towards the decision making process which leads to the IJV formation. Does 
analysis on the selection criteria and its relative importance allow us to holistical-
ly understand how firms select their IJV partners within differing contexts, and 
how the process of IJV partner selection reflects on the subsequent performance 
of the IJV? As pointed out by Varis (2004), common managerial wisdom suggests 
that success and failure is more the result of motivated and technically competent 
managers than coherence between static pre-alliance criteria. It is here concluded 
that an approach deriving from the behavioral theory of the firm, perceiving IJV 
partner selection as a decision making process, is called for to holistically explain 
the IJV partner selection phenomenon. 
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3 ENHANCING RESEARCH APPROACH 
THROUGH PROCESS ORIENTATION 
 
Like all major strategic decisions, foreign direct investments are not one shot, but 
a process, requiring a sequential series of complex decisions by management, and 
involving, at least at their early stages, high levels of perceived risks and uncer-
tainty (Aharoni and Brock 2010). It is commonly recognized that organizational 
decisions are not made according to the rational model of choice (March and 
Sevon 1988). In order to get a better understanding of why foreign direct invest-
ments (FDIs) take place, knowledge of how the processes preceding the invest-
ments evolve is needed, and it can be gained by studying decision making pro-
cesses in their historical context, i.e. by analyzing and explaining why they evolve 
towards the final FDI decisions in the way they do (Björkman 1989). 
To better illustrate the underlying process in IJV partner selection, the theoretical 
framework is here enriched by drawing from the strategic decision making 
(SDM) literature, as well as purchasing literature, and arguing for the importance 
of understanding bounded rationality and its consequences when discussing the 
paths firms follow in their quest for IJV partners. Contrary to the rational choice 
model, the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) suggests that 
search for IJV partners is limited, biased, and messy – the decision process is time 
consuming and often alternative partners and design configurations are not care-
fully researched by either of the two principals (Woodside and Pitts 1998). Recent 
literature (Aharoni and Brock 2010) has encouraged IB researchers to apply the 
behavioral point of view in IJV research, to reincorporate the concept of bounded 
rationality, and thus give the study of decision making an important role in the 
ongoing development of the IB field. Therefore, this study aims to explain how 
IJV partners are selected by drawing from the SDM literature. The SDM literature 
and its typologies especially benefit the current study in its quest to present and 
explain variety in IJV partner selection from a process-oriented perspective, in 
contrast to prior literature (e.g. Mitsuhashi 2002, Young et al. 1989). 
The chapter aims to establish that, firstly, limiting the focus into selection criteria 
when studying IJV partner selection is insufficient in explaining how firms select 
their IJV partners under differing contexts, and in the same vein, that the existing 
IJV partner selection research is limited in its capability to grasp the phenomenon 
holistically. Secondly, it is here aimed to establish that firms significantly differ in 
regards to the paths they follow in their  quest  for suitable IJV partners,  and that 
this variation can to a certain degree be explained by contextual factors affecting 
different components in the firms’ decision making processes. Last, it is here ar-
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gued that the process of partner selection is not a universally independent and 
separable decision making process from within the whole IJV formation process 
entity, and certain conditions are set for its separability. The chapter concludes 
with a presentation of the theoretical framework of the study.  
3.1 Rational decision making and bounded rationality 
The term rational and the concept of rationality are subject to varying interpreta-
tions, frequently referring to the overall process of making a decision or to some 
part of the behavioral pattern making up that process, and thus rational behavior 
or rationality is a core concept of decision making (Harrison 1987). Rational be-
havior, especially according to researchers of economics and statistics, is seen as 
making a decision that, after a review of all the alternatives, promises to maxim-
ize the satisfaction or utility of the decision maker (Cyert et al. 1963). March and 
Sevon (1988) portray traditional rational choice models as presuming the decision 
maker to possess: (1) knowledge of alternatives, (2) knowledge of consequences, 
(3) knowledge of preferences, and (4) rules by which a decision maker can select 
the best alternative based on its consequences for his/her preferences. 
When making a decision, most individuals believe that their objective is com-
pletely rational or logical at that moment, and that there is an objective and sever-
al alternatives from which a choice is made to achieve the objective (Jones 1962). 
However, researchers have found that one of the cognitive biases in relation to 
strategic decision making suggests that executives’ recollections of their past 
strategies are often biased, and strategies are often recalled as more rational and 
consistent with current strategies than they really were (Golden 1992). 
A relatively obvious and logical, yet important, notion regarding rationality in 
decision making stands as follows: Because one decision has been rational does 
not necessarily mean that the decision maker will always make rational decisions, 
and thus a given executive may, for example, be patiently rational in one decision 
making situation and seemingly non-rational in another (Harrison 1987). There-
fore, as Harrison suggests, decisions rather than people should be classified into 
rational and non-rational, or perhaps better, as Lee (1971) states, use a continuum 
of ‘degree of rationality’ in assessing and classifying decision makers in particu-
lar decision situations. Stressing the decision situation rather than the decision 
maker logically translates into stressing the importance of situational or contextu-
al factors, related to for example the strategic context or motivation of the deci-
sion maker, or the environment (i.e. location-specific factors) that affect the ra-
tionality of a given decision situation. 
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The economics literature often depicts rational behavior as making a decision 
that, after a review of all the alternatives, promises to maximize the satisfaction of 
utility  of  the  decision  maker  (Cyert  et  al.  1964).  Instead  of  maximizing, Simon 
(1957, 1960) suggested that attempting to search for every possible alternative is 
not always feasible, thus arguing for the an individual’s tendency to apply the 
satisficing strategy, or in other words, look for a solution that is good enough. The 
limited capacity of the human mind for comprehending all alternatives for a given 
decision is implied by the concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1957, 1960). 
The basic proposition of the bounded rationality model is that decision makers 
tend to be rational but are constrained by cognitive limitations, habits and biases 
(Cyert and March 1963, March and Simon 1958). 
Bounded rationality, in the context of IJV partner selection and by common logic, 
is mainly in play through the following factors: (a) firms often have a limited 
amount of time to find a partner and set up the venture for strategic and/or other 
reasons; (b) firms usually operate under limited financial and/or other resources, 
and/or (c) firms must base decisions on limited information. Thus, these factors 
may drive the firm into a selection process where the decision maker acts as a 
satisficer, reflecting the tendency to select the first option that seems adequate in 
regards to most needs, rather than looking for the optimal solution. The term ‘sat-
isficing’ was coined into its modern use by Simon (1957) who argued that human 
beings lack the cognitive resources to maximize – referring to our limited knowl-
edge on relevant probabilities of outcomes, our ability to evaluate outcomes with 
sufficient precision, and our weak and unreliable memories. Bounded rationality, 
in this context, is a version of reality that takes into account these limitations. 
A lack of studies on IJV processes incorporating the concept of bounded rationali-
ty is clear (Aharoni and Brock 2010). In the study by Woodside and Pitts (1998) 
concerning IJV decision processes, both of the two studied cases fit the predic-
tions expected from the bounded rationality model of decision making (cf. Cyert 
and March 1963, Wilson and Wilson 1988) as the final choice of IJV partners was 
the first candidate that exceeded a set of minimum cut-off criteria (i.e. a conjunc-
tive decision making rule). 
3.2 The strategic decision making literature 
Research on strategic decision making processes has been fairly extensive, and a 
large amount of decision models have been revealed, each denoting a different 
perspective for the decision making process and highlighting particular aspects 
embodied in it (Das and Teng 1999, Schwenk 1995). This has led to several clas-
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sifications of different types of decision models (for review, see e.g. Cyert and 
Williams 1993, Das and Teng 1999, Hickson et al. 1987, Larimo 1987, Nutt 
1976). Harrison (1987) argues that there is virtually no limit to the number of 
models of decision making that can be developed to serve the purposes and ad-
vance the discipline of the model builder. 
As previous decision making literature often states, the firms benefit from per-
ceiving their decision making as a process (Kansola 2010). Garvin and Roberto 
(2001) found that firms generally make better decisions when decision making is 
perceived as a process rather than a single situation. Obviously, the quality of the 
process itself matters, as Irving (1989) found support for the rather logical notion 
that firms implementing high-quality decision making processes make significant-
ly less decisions leading to unwanted results or complete failures. 
The IDC (Intelligence-Design-Choice) model by Simon (1960) is likely the most 
famous phase model (Björkman 1989, Harrison 1987, Larimo 1987), describing 
the activities that organizational decision making processes comprise. First, intel-
ligence is undertaken to appropriately define the decision making problem. Then, 
search for alternative solutions to this problem takes place, including gathering 
information on the future consequences of different alternatives, hence the label 
design for this stage. The third stage choice refers to the final stage where the 
evaluation of alternatives according to pre-defined criteria takes place, and finally 
the alternative with the highest utility is chosen. 
Research specifically targeting FDI decision making steadily accumulated from 
the mid-1950’s (Barlow and Wender 1955) to late 80’s (Björkman 1989, Larimo 
1987). Aharoni’s (1966) study on US firms’ FDI planning is considered the 
groundbreaking work in the field of FDI decision making, analyzing the US 
firms’ FDIs decisions and the impact of foreign goverments’ policies on the deci-
sion making process. Although criticized for its ethnocentricity (Buckley 1979) 
among other issues, Aharoni’s findings offer a useful model for research due to a 
detailed description of different stages in the FDI decision process (Larimo 1987). 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976) attempted to model the strategic deci-
sion making process by identifying three major phases with subphases within 
each, and also included interrupts and recycles by which decision makers may 
return  to  earlier  phases.  Their  three  major  phases,  with  obvious  likeness  to  Si-
mon’s IDC model, were: (1) The identification phase (decision recognition and 
diagnosis), (2) the development phase (search and design), and (3) the selection 
phase (screen, evaluation-choice, authorization). The model has since been fre-
quently used as a basis for studying different types of decision making processes, 
such as FDI decision processes of Finnish firms (Larimo 1987) and production 
 Acta Wasaensia     37 
  
strategy decision making of Finnish firms (Kansola 2010). Its significance within 
the field is also reflected by Gore’s (1992) division of decision making processes 
into two main groups: The model by Mintzberg et al. (1976), and other models. 
Several studies, however, argue that strategic decision making processes usually 
do not evolve linearly through the different phases of the IDC model and these 
arguments have been backed up by empirical evidence (Björkman 1989). Witte 
(1972) goes as far as questioning the whole idea of breaking decision making 
processes down into different phases based on their belief that human beings can 
not avoid immediate development of different alternatives while gathering infor-
mation, and while doing so becoming forced to a decision. 
Researchers since Mintzberg et al. (1976) have since focused on identifying and 
describing categories or types of strategic decision processes, and most of the 
typologies  presented  deal  with  the  subject  of  rationality  or  the  extent  to  which  
decision makers follow a systematic process in reaching carefully thought-out 
goals (e.g. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992, Hickson 1987, Hickson et al. 1986, 
Lyles  and  Thomas  1988).  The  amount  of  process  typologies  has  led  some  re-
searchers to synthesize earlier findings and thus facilitate typologies based on 
commonalities in previous research. Hart’s (1992) synthesis resulted in a frame-
work of five styles of strategy making processes (command mode, symbolic 
mode, rational mode, transactive mode, generative mode). 
In a later study aiming at a synthesis, Das and Teng (1999) conclude in their ex-
amination of former classifications of decision processes (e.g. Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki 1992, Hickson 1987, Lyles and Thomas 1988) that a considerable con-
sensus exists among them. By slightly modifying the names of decision modes to 
conform the naming in the majority of these studies, they end up presenting a 
modified classification of Lyles and Thomas (1988) including the following cate-
gories: (a) rational mode; (b) avoidance mode; (c) logical incrementalist mode; 
(d) political mode; and (e) garbage can mode. The two main justifications for this 
particular classification was, firstly, that it covers the most important modes of 
strategic decision making, and secondly, it seems to capture a continuum from the 
most systematic and structured decision making processes (rational mode) at one 
end to the most ill-structured and anarchical modes at the other (Das and Teng 
1999). The features of the typology are presented in Table 3 in more detail. 
Overall, a review of the strategic decision making literature suggests that, firstly, 
the IJV partner selection process can take a variety of forms in light of the deci-
sion process typologies described above (and presented in Table 5). Also, the lit-
erature, especially the phase models of Mintzberg et al. (1976) and Simon (1960) 
in connection to the fore-mentioned more recent typologies (Das & Teng 1999), 
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suggests certain common denominators creating a basis to approach the IJV part-
ner selection decision process by breaking it down to certain main stages. 
Table 3.  A presentation of strategic decision making process typology based 
on the synthesis by Das and Teng (1999). 
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3.3 Process-oriented research on partner selection 
According to Tallman and Phene (2006) the process of structuring alliances in-
volves initiation, operation, and restructuring or termination. The initiation of 
alliances falls into three stages: The first stage involves a choice regarding the 
organizational form, at which point cooperation through alliance is selected. The 
second stage represents the partner search and selection process, while the last 
stage comprises negotiations with the selected partner to create a framework that 
establishes complementarities and fosters the development of synergies. 
The shortage of process-oriented studies on IJV or ISA partner selection is sur-
prising given that the selection process, deemed to be fundamental in the pursuit 
of high performing ventures, can be disassembled into at least two stages; initial 
identification and subsequent evaluation of potential candidates (Williams and 
Lilley 1993). However, not all studies define partner selection to encompass both 
of these stages. Varis (2004: 26) defines the term “partner selection” as “man-
agement processes and routines which lead to a decision to form a partnership 
with a certain business partner selected from a group of potential candidates”. 
This definition suggests that the element of partner search – the identification of 
candidates – precedes partner selection, instead of integrating it into the concept.  
There are some rather rough process descriptions on how IJV or alliance partners 
are selected, yet there is a significant need for a more concise effort to capture the 
phenomenon and especially empirical examination on the partner selection pro-
cess. As presented by Young et al. (1989), the partner selection process consti-
tutes of the following four stages: 1. Drawing a profile of the desired partner at-
tributes; 2. Identification and screening of potential partner candidates; 3. Prelim-
inary contacts and negotiations; and 4. Final selection. The authors did not present 
empirical evidence or thorough argumentation to back up the process description. 
Ellram (1991) described the partnering process by a five-stage model, consisting 
of the following stages: 1. Preliminary phase; 2. Identify potential partners; 3. 
Screen and select; 4. Establish relationship; and 5. Evaluate relationship. In this 
model the stages directly dealing with partner selection can be identified as stages 
two (Identify potential partners: a) determine selection criteria, b) identify poten-
tial partners) and three (Screen and select: a) contact potential partners, b) evalu-
ate partners, c) decision). This model, however, is drawn in the context of pur-
chasing partnerships, and should as such be distanced from the IJV context. 
More recently, studies such as Beekman & Robinson (2004) on supplier partner-
ships,  Nijssen  et  al.  (2001)  on  technology  partnerships,  as  well  as  Chung  et  al.  
(2000), Dekker (2008), Duisters et al. (2011) and Nielsen (2010) on generally 
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alliances or inter-firm partnerships, have contributed in the partner selection pro-
cess literature, each stressing the need for stronger process orientation in the field. 
None of these studies focus on international joint ventures, nor base their findings 
on empirical study targeting specifically manufacturing units. 
Yet the findings of different inter-firm relationship and alliance partner selection 
process studies as described above offer valuable insight in the various stages that 
may appear in a partner selection process also in the IJV context, they leave a gap 
in explaining the variety of how firms select partners under different contexts. 
Duisters et al. (2011) present a synthesis of previous partnering models, ending up 
with 16 possible stages in the process, and after empirical evidence, conclude that 
certain stages (developing a partner selection team, negotiating the alliance with 
the prospected partner, screening of short-listed candidates against specific selec-
tion criteria) were most important in regards to a successful alliance. However, 
their insight is limited in explaining this exploratory finding. Their quantitative 
results also suggest that successful firms applied a more structured approach to 
partner selection process compared to lower performers. Controlling for variables  
 
Figure 2. Partner selection process as described by Young et al. (1989), Partner-
ing process by Ellram (1991) and Alliance formation process by Mit-
suhashi (2002). 
1. Drawing a profile of 
the desired partner 
attributes 
2. Identification and 
screening of potential 
partner candidates 
3. Preliminary contacts 
and negotiations 
4. Final selection 
1. Preliminary phase 
2. Identify potential partners: 
- determine selection criteria 
- identify potential partners 
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- contact potential partners 
-  evaluate partners 
- decision 
4. Establish relationship 
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1. Defining opportuni-
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Ellram 1991 
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of company size and alliance experience due to their impact on available re-
sources, time, and experiential knowledge implicitly refers to bounded rationality, 
a seldom but important notion within the partnering literature. 
Kanter (1994) approaches the partner selection process by likening it to the per-
sonal relationships courtship ritual that is being driven by both emotional attach-
ment and cold-blooded analysis. Kanter points out three fundamental factors that 
need to be accounted for when setting up an alliance: 1) Self-analysis – relation-
ships benefit when the partners know themselves; 2) Chemistry – Deals often turn 
on the rapport between chief executives, and it is equally important that the man-
agers in the lower levels get along; and 3) Compatibility – companies’ cultures, 
philosophies and fundamental ways of doing business tested by the courtship pro-
cess. 
Focusing plainly on the selection criteria would mean, in a context of either an 
IJV or  ISA partner  selection  process,  looking  at  the  first  and  final  stages  of  the  
process (as described by Young 1989, see previous page), as the previous descrip-
tions of IJV formation and partner selection processes usually include a stage 
where a profile of desired features of prospective partners is drawn prior to mov-
ing on to identifying partner candidates – either explicitly (Hamill and Hunt 1998, 
Young et al. 1989) or more implicitly in the form of including such stage as de-
termining the selection criteria (Ellram 1991, Mitsuhashi 2002). Actually, the 
study by Geringer (1988) is the only one within the mainstream of IJV partner 
selection research to distinguish between even these two stages, as his results in-
dicated an often recurring two-step selection process: On the first stage many of 
the researched firms emphasized initial screening based on task-related selection 
criteria to ensure the IJV rationale and competitiveness, whereas the final selec-
tion between those fulfilling the task-related expectations was mainly based on 
partner-related criteria to reveal the candidate for highest level of potential for 
being able to cooperate successfully with the firm. 
Dong and Glaister (2006: 581) argue similarly for a two-stage-evaluation process, 
and also include the aspect of satisficing vs. maximizing (Simon 1957, 1960) 
strategies into their equation: “Where multiple firms qualify as appropriate col-
laborators following the logic of task-related selection criteria, partner-related 
selection criteria require that the choice of the ‘‘right’’ partner should be based on 
a consideration of how the chosen partner will best fit with the focal firm. Ques-
tions such as whether there has been favorable past association between the part-
ners, whether the national and corporate cultures of the partners are compatible, 
and whether trust exists between the partners’ management teams, are important 
for determining the ‘‘optimal’’ collaborator from a partner-related selection per-
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spective.” Still, both of the stages are a part of the single mechanism of evaluation 
in light of the whole selection process entity. 
Essentially, barely any attention has been previously paid for the fact that the firm 
might not have been aware of its best available options (i.e. ignoring the identifi-
cation and initial screening of potential partner candidates) – if any options even 
were weighed against each other. After all, it is obvious that whatever criteria are 
being applied in the selection of the partner, the firm can not rely on making the 
optimal selection of partner without being aware of what exactly it would be 
available to select from. Even though this particular stream of research is close to 
non-existent, its importance is noted. Killing (in a foreword to Geringer 1988) 
states, that one of the first questions in IJV partner selection that must be ad-
dressed is whether or not firms that spend more time and effort in the search pro-
cess do in fact end up with what look like, according to Geringer’s criteria, more 
“suitable” partners. Also, Brouthers et al. (1995) suggest that most firms spend 
too little time looking for an appropriate partner. 
The results by Tomlinson (1970) indicated that in most studied IJVs the partner 
selection process was conducted far from thoroughly. Potential candidates were 
evaluated only superficially or not at all, and no comprehensive evaluation of the 
prospective partners’ motives or skills/resources was undertaken. Geringer’s 
(1988) findings partially supported this as there was a huge variation between 
reviewed IJVs in how intensively the selection process was conducted. On the 
other hand, a clear majority of the firms had identified several organizations or 
company representatives who met up with minimal requirements. Despite these 
notions from the late 80’s, for the following twenty years the IJV/ISA partner 
selection research has almost completely leaned on the selection criteria and its 
relative importance. 
Addressing this particular gap in the IJV partner selection literature, the study by 
Wong and Ellis (2002) concerning partner identification process of 18 Sino-Hong 
Kong  IJVs  attempts  to  answer  a  question  which,  though  pivotal  in  the  IJV  for-
mation process, has received scant attention in the literature, namely, how do in-
vestors come to identify potential alliance partners. The evidence on partner iden-
tification is scant but includes Tomlinson’s (1970) finding that alliance partners 
often have an association or connection that predates the venture formation.  
By applying a network perspective and observing partner selection under the con-
straints of bounded rationality, Wong and Ellis (2002) found that partner identifi-
cation was primarily conducted, across firm types and industries, by heavily lean-
ing on existing social networks which were defined in terms of business, familial 
and friendship ties. In the initial search and identification process, weak ties be-
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tween actors were most valuable in terms of generating the largest number of 
leads. However, strong ties, where they existed, expedited the search process and 
provided a more robust basis for final selection and subsequently inter-partner 
cooperation. Also Gulati (1995) suggests that the network of prior alliances often 
serves as an information guide in the choice of potential partners. Another sug-
gestion by Wong and Ellis (2002), based on their findings and a comparison to 
others, is the existing correlation between the value of social ties and the uncer-
tainty of exchange. This further suggests that social ties will be least valuable 
between IJV partners from countries with similar levels of economic develop-
ment. 
In line with Wong and Ellis (2002), Maurer (1996) found in his study of US-Sino 
IJVs located in China, that the majority of JV partners were identified on the basis 
of a prior association (customers, suppliers, even former JV partners). Moreover, 
the manner in which potential alliance partners were identified had an unequivo-
cal effect on the subsequent evaluation process. Specifically, the US managers in 
the study screened an average of 3-4 partners unless there was a prior association, 
in which case only one potential partner was considered. This supports the previ-
ously untested idea that partner identification is distinct from partner evaluation. 
From this it can be assumed that the efficacy of the evaluation process is contin-
gent upon the prior identification process. 
When considering the division of partner identification and evaluation (William-
son and Lilley 1993, Wong and Ellis 2002), there’s also a clear connection be-
tween the two. As argued by Wong and Ellis (2002), if partner identification is 
conducted in an ad hoc and unsystematic fashion, there may well be little point in 
conducting a comprehensive screening following the procedures outlined in the 
studies mentioned above. Also, identification of familiar partners negates some of 
the need for a thorough evaluation as the candidates’ traits are already known to 
the investor. In either of the above cases, the performance of the resulting JV may 
well be influenced more by the identification process than the evaluation process. 
On this basis, it can be stated that partner identification is a critical and distinct 
decision in the overall selection process (Wong and Ellis 2002). 
In their search for potential IJV/ISA partners, firms deal with different types of 
selection  uncertainty,  depicting  a  condition  in  which  firms  do  not  know a  priori  
which alliance partners will best serve their interests (Mitsuhashi 2002). Mit-
suhashi (2002) found that selection uncertainty consisted of uncertainty in regards 
to (1) technological competence of prospective partners, (2) behavior of prospec-
tive partners, and (3) commercial success. Here, the difference between the first 
two categories of selection uncertainty fits well in with not only the traditional 
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task- and partner-related selection criteria distinction, but also Williamson’s 
(1985) TCA-based description of uncertainties in partnering: the uncertainty due 
to external environmental changes, and the internal behavioral uncertainty, in 
which it is difficult to assess whether the other party is living up to its contractual 
obligations. The TCA premise here was basically that as uncertainty increases, so 
will the likelihood of vertical integration (Ellram 1996). 
Mitsuhashi (2002) also found that firms use specific mechanisms while dealing 
with  different  types  of  uncertainty,  such  as  (1)  the  relational  mechanism  (i.e.  
weighing pre-existing relations and networks), (2) the internal mechanism (i.e. 
weighing and benefiting of internal collaborative know-how and boundary-
spanning), and (3) the contextual mechanism (relying upon the reputations of pro-
spective partners). Therefore, Mitshuhashi’s (2002) findings suggest an interest-
ing avenue for explaining the process of partner selection in terms of decision 
making under uncertainties, and thus motivated by reducing this uncertainty. 
Another hole in the IJV partner selection literature concerns the lack of focus on 
the personnel involved in the partner selection process. It also constitutes another 
area within IJV partner selection literature that demands further research, as the 
current knowledge mostly stands at Geringer’s (1988) exploratory findings on the 
role of IJV sponsors, i.e. the personnel involved in the process. For example, Ger-
inger (1988) found indications of differences on how different levels of manage-
ment (middle vs. top-level) tend to weigh certain (task- vs. partner-related) selec-
tion criteria. Also, Geringer (1988) noted that top-level management tends to be 
more involved in strategically more important ventures, which goes along com-
mon sense. 
Björkman (1989) suggests, based on a review and comparison of differing results 
in the studies by Anderson (1983), March and Olsen (1976), Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) and Witte (1972), that the novelty of the strategic decision in question may 
influence the extent to which distinct decision making phases can be identified; 
more specifically, in cases where firms are familiar with a certain type of strategic 
decision the phases may be more visibly distinct, which would lead to an assump-
tion that previous experience in forming international joint ventures makes it 
more likely for firms to have more visibly identifiable and distinct stages in their 
IJV partner decision making processes. 
Therefore, looking deeper into how firms select their IJV partners, including how 
they identify potential partners and undertake the initial screening of partner can-
didates constitutes an area of research with potential for contribution within the 
partner selection research. This potential is especially valid in the form of linking 
the process into its outcomes, such as the performance of the IJV. It may be ex-
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pected that several firm-specific (e.g. experience [international/IJV/target coun-
try], parent size) and location-specific (e.g., level of development of the target 
country, socio-cultural distance) factors influence the way how the firm proceeds 
and succeeds in identifying potential candidates. Also, strategic context of the 
firm (the FDI/IJV formation stimuli and motives) is a potential influence on the 
initial steps of the selection process, for example in terms of the length and inten-
sity of the process. 
For example, a firm highly valuing a fast entry into the target market is by com-
mon logic more likely to select the first identified strategically adequate partner 
rather than spending time and resources on a comprehensive process of identifica-
tion and evaluation of all potential partner candidates. After all, if the traditional 
assumption in IJV research is that investors choose partners that exceed the max-
imum number of desired criteria, an alternative view posits that under the con-
straints of bounded rationality, investors may simply settle for a candidate that 
satisfies some key criterion (Cyert and March 1992, March 1994). In search con-
texts characterized by high uncertainty and risk, optimal exchange partners cannot 
be easily identified, and thus rather than trying to identify ideal partner in the 
market, investors will limit their search to those potential partners about whom 
they have the greatest knowledge and then select the best choice from among this 
restricted set (Podolny 1994). To summarize, a firm that is strategically motivated 
to complete the market entry as fast as possible is, following Simon’s (1957) ter-
minology, keen to take the road of a satisficer under the constraints of bounded 
rationality than aiming for the optimal partner candidate in the population. 
3.4 Limitations and implicit assumptions in previous 
research 
Previous research in the area of IJV/ISA partner selection has relied on a number 
of unquestioned assumptions especially regarding partner identification and has 
generally focused on the subsequent step of partner evaluation. According to 
Wong and Ellis  (2002),  it  is  plausible to assume that the default  proposition im-
plicit in the IJV literature is that partner selection is made on the basis of objec-
tive information gathered systematically via market research. In other words, once 
the decision to cooperate has been made, the identification of potential partners 
follows a linear process whereby a large number of candidates are systematically 
screened according to the predetermined criteria identified by Geringer (1988) 
and others. According to Tsang (1995), initial identification of potential alliance 
partners may be based on sources such as embassies and consulates, government 
agencies, management consulting companies, and investment advisors.  
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However, Wong and Ellis (2002) note that there is some evidence to indicate that 
foreign investors do not follow this approach in practice. They argue for an exist-
ence of an implicit assumption in the IJV partner selection literature referring to 
the initial identification process consisting of the following stages: 1) identifying 
those characteristics desired in a potential partner, 2) determining the appropriate 
channels or information sources to identify likely candidates, and 3) approaching 
the right prospects accordingly. Within the sample of Wong and Ellis (2002) in 
none of their 18 examined cases was this pattern of behavior observed (the study 
by Wong and Ellis 2002 is described in more detail in Chapter 2.3). 
The vast majority of IJV/ISA partner selection studies, with few exceptions (e.g. 
Tatoglu 2000), focus on the point of view of either (most commonly) the foreign 
partner or the local partner instead of recognizing the selection process as a dyad-
ic process. A commonly implicit pre-disposition within these studies is that these 
firms are proactive in their search for a partner, following a decision already made 
to set up a venture in a chosen target country and recognition of a need to be ad-
dressed by partner selection. It is often overlooked that each of the partners in fact 
go through a process of partner selection, whether they select a partner from a 
vast amount of prospects or plainly choose whether to enter into a proposed IJV 
or not. 
Also, the traditional IJV partner selection literature seldom considers the fact that 
firms may not be able to enter an IJV agreement with any of its top partner choic-
es. As Geringer (1988) describes, there may be a significant distinction between 
the outcomes that are ultimately obtained from the partner selection process and 
the selection criteria that were originally developed and applied by the organiza-
tion.  For  instance,  sometimes  suitable  partners  are  unavailable  or  unwilling  to  
participate in the proposed JV. Geringer (1988) accounted several instances 
where organizations reported an inability to conclude a JV agreement with their 
top two or three partner choices. 
It is often stressed in the literature that the process of partner selection forms its 
own decision making entity within the whole process of IJV formation (e.g. Tom-
linson 1970, Geringer 1988, Glaister and Buckley 1997). Also, Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson (1999) support Tomlinson’s (1970) original statement that the motivat-
ing factors for establishing a JV should be clearly differentiated from the motivat-
ing factors involved in partner selection; they are two separate decision processes. 
A contradiction within the Geringer-led stream of research is constituted by the 
study by Glaister and Buckley (1997), who in their questionnaire ask their re-
spondents to, for example, rate the importance of the task-related selection criteria 
in the form of ”How important was the formation of the joint venture in allowing 
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access to inputs that your company did not have”, thus not clearly distinguishing 
between the IJV formation motives and the motivation for choosing a specific 
partner, which was considered important by e.g. Tomlinson (1970) and Al-
Khalifa  and  Peterson  (1999).   However,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  process  of  
partner selection is not a universally independent decision making process in re-
gards to all or perhaps even the majority of real-life IJVs or ISAs, which is argued 
for in Chapter 3.5. 
3.5 Alternative partner selection process modes 
As established in previous chapter, the research findings of a process-based ap-
proach on IJV/ISA partner selection are narrow and mostly exploratory, and cer-
tainly lacking a concise empirical evaluation and validation. Because of the short-
age of literature on the field, an approach inspired by Viljamaa’s (2007) empirical 
analysis of small Finnish manufacturing firms’ provider selection in context of 
external expert services is taken here in Chapter 3.5. In the following, the four 
modes of provider selection identified by Viljamaa (2007) are described, and their 
applicability in an IJV/ISA context – arguably different from Viljamaa’s research 
setting – is discussed. Four modes of partner selection in IJVs are then proposed, 
and some preliminary propositions suggested for empirical studies.  
Whereas process-oriented approach constitutes an obvious research gap within 
IJV/ISA partner selection, it is also rare in studies on professional services pur-
chasing (Day and Barksdale 1994). Research has used decision making process 
stages as leverage for learning about, for example, influences on decision making, 
but, as in IJV studies, there has been relatively little empirical effort to determine 
whether the stages themselves correspond to activities in firms (cf. McQuiston 
1989). Some sources suggest that the stages in expert services purchasing are of-
ten in fact not followed (e.g. Gallouj 1997, Stock and Zinszer 1987), and that only 
one potential provider may be considered (e.g. O’Farrell and Moffat 1991).  
There are some fairly obvious differences when comparing a selection of an ex-
ternal expert service provider and a selection of an IJV partner that should be 
clearly expressed when examining the possibility of adapting findings from one 
of these fields to another. Firstly, in partner selection process within IJV opera-
tions, there is a strong dyadic dimension, referring to a two-way selection process, 
i.e. the selection process is conducted by each of the partners. Although the same 
can be stated concerning selection of expert service providers (e.g. Martin, Horne 
and Chan 2001), since the service provider naturally has the option of choosing its 
clients, the expert service provider selection can be more naturally viewed as a 
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purchasing process. In comparison, as described by Kanter (1994), the partner 
selection process for IJVs can be likened to the courtship ritual of personal rela-
tionships, driven by both emotional attachment and cold-blooded analysis. It 
seems also logical to assume that firms choosing IJV or alliance partners are far 
more likely to be rejected by their preferred partner candidates. The rejection rate 
can also be logically assumed to significantly rise in cases of firms looking to 
partially acquire a share of an existing company, in other words form an IJV via a 
partial acquisition, due to the fact that another firm would have to be willing to 
share its ownership. 
Secondly, the strategic importance of the IJV partner selection decision is gener-
ally significantly higher in light of resource demands when compared to selection 
of expert service providers. Therefore firms can be logically expected to commit 
more time and resources for the selection process in the IJV partner selection con-
text. Thirdly, the selection processes examined by Viljamaa (2007) did not in-
volve an international aspect which has a major influence on IJV partner selec-
tion, especially when forming an IJV, for example,  to a physically,  culturally or 
economically distant country (see Chapter 2.3.2) due to, for example, the per-
ceived context uncertainty and the mechanisms firms use to reduce uncertainty 
(Mitsuhashi 2002). Additionally, Viljamaa’s (2007) study focused on SMEs, 
which must be accounted for, as firm size is arguably a factor on IJV partner se-
lection, and essentially reflects upon the availability of knowledge and resources 
for this process, and thus increasing the impact of bounded rationality. 
However, there are also a number of similarities in expert service provider selec-
tion and IJV partner selection. In both situations, as posited in transaction cost 
theory (Williamson 1988), the selector is faced with uncertainty concerning the 
future outputs of the selectee. In one case the uncertainty stems from working 
within an international context and in the other from dealing with knowledge 
asymmetry inherent to expert services (Viljamaa 2007). In both cases, the selector 
must essentially make a judgment on whether the resources of the selectee are 
complementary and sufficient (cf. Geringer’s (1988) task-related criteria) and 
whether the selector and selectee are compatible (cf. Geringer’s (1988) partner-
related criteria, Kanter’s (1994) chemistry). In both cases, the selector must ac-
cept a risk in making the choice (e.g. Laroche, Bergeron and Goutaland 2003). 
The word “selection” is often used in the literature to denote the final decision on 
which partner or provider is chosen (e.g. Young et al. 1989). The practice is po-
tentially problematic because it confuses the notions of comparison and decision: 
selection implies both. Selection can also justifiably encompass the search for 
potential providers/partners, for such a search in itself means that candidates are 
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sorted into potential and non-potential providers/partners, i.e. accepted or rejected 
from further consideration. Hence, in the following search for potential provid-
ers/partners, assessment of potential providers/partners, and the choice of provid-
er/partner are all viewed as elements of selection.  
Based on an empirical analysis, Viljamaa (2007) identified four different modes 
of selection used in case firms: Evaluation of alternatives, default selection, en-
twined selection and short selection. Next, each of the modes is described and 
then discussed in the IJV partner selection context.  
Evaluation of alternatives 
Evaluation of alternatives refers to the selection mode in which the selector com-
pares several alternative providers prior to making the choice. Models of B-to-B 
services purchasing usually include the assumption that multiple alternatives are 
sought and compared. The empirical data in Viljamaa’s (2007) study suggests 
otherwise; only few of the cases involved actual evaluation of alternative provid-
ers, i.e. seeking out several potential providers and comparing them prior to mak-
ing a selection. This may be due to bounded rationality - the search for alterna-
tives takes management time, which is a scarce resource in SMEs. Also, the more 
extensive the search, the more time the evaluation of potential providers will take, 
and thus it is doubly reasonable to limit the number of alternatives. After all, the 
firm still retains the option of continuing the search later if none of the evaluated 
providers prove satisfactory (Viljamaa 2007). 
The evaluation of alternatives based on multiple criteria is to an extent seen as the 
assumed mode of partner selection within most of the IJV literature (see models 
presented in Chapter 3.2). However, the requirements for such a selection process 
(being proactive, lack of time constraints relating to strategic motives or other 
reasons, sufficient resources for an extensive search) causes one to consider its 
frequency within real-life IJVs. 
Still, it must be noted that evaluation of multiple alternatives can take place even 
though the firm originally did not initiate the process. For example, rejecting an 
offer for unsuitable partner characteristics may nevertheless trigger the firm’s 
interest in entering an IJV in a specific country, and thus lead on to its own search 
for potential partners. In this case, the outside initiation could be seen as the basis 
for need recognition, leading to the actual partner selection process. 
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Default selection 
In default selection the selector makes an ‘automatic’ choice because an alterna-
tive  exists  that  is  so  obvious  that  the  possibility  of  seeking  alternatives  is  not  
raised – the selectee is selected by default. In the default selection cases examined 
by Viljamaa (2007) the interviewees give no indication of considering their 
choice of a particular provider, or even particularly assessing that provider’s ca-
pabilities relative to their need. The cases involve either continuing an existing 
relationship or a close connection between selector and selectee. However, Vilja-
maa (2007) suggests that the default provider only gets the assignment when there 
is no clear reason to look for an alternative, i.e. for example a previous business 
relationship is not in itself sufficient.  
In the context of IJVs the mode of default selection of a local partner can occur 
only under the circumstances where the firm already has previous experience of 
operating in the target country and thus relationships exists to create the potential 
for an ‘obvious choice’. As found by Geringer (1988), typically among the first 
considered partner prospects are the distributors, suppliers and customers for the 
industry  of  the  proposed  venture.  Also,  the  importance  of  strong  ties,  i.e.  the  
strong relying on existing connections in identifying potential partners as found 
by Wong and Ellis (2002) as well as Maurer (1996), supports the idea of default 
selection existing as a mode of partner selection process in the context of IJVs or 
ISAs. In the IJV/ISA context, however, it may also be common that there exists a 
small (2-4 firms) default pool of prospective partners, which is largely determined 
by the firm’s existing social networks in the target country. 
Entwined selection 
In entwined selection the client firm simultaneously considers both the decision to 
use expert services and the decision to use the particular provider. The process of 
purchasing is initiated or activated by external parties, the initiative often coming 
from the future service provider. Although in most of these cases similar services 
could be acquired from other providers as well, Viljamaa’s (2007) interviewees 
give no indication that alternatives are considered. Rather, the focus is on the de-
cision of whether the service is used at all, and the provider selection is taken 
more or less for granted. The client firm’s decision making is focused on what is 
to be done, rather than who does it. Provider selection is simply entwined with the 
decision to use expert services. In some cases entwined selection is a matter of 
accepting a proposal. The firm is offered an opportunity that is acceptable, and 
the provider making the offer is engaged for the service. In traditional purchasing 
models need recognition and the provider decision are treated as if they were sep-
arate – in these cases there is no indication they are (ibid.). 
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In the IJV context, the entwined selection mode challenges to some extent the 
notion of how the process of partner selection is a separable decision making enti-
ty within the process of IJV formation, which is, as stated earlier, a common posi-
tion taken within previous IJV/ISA partner selection literature. In this case, the 
choice of partner(s) and the decision to set up an IJV can not be separated, and 
thus the decision to enter an IJV agreement embodies the choice of partner(s). 
As the previous partner selection literature most often implicitly assumes that 
firms enter the partner selection process systematically, driven by an earlier rec-
ognized need, leading to identification of candidates and evaluation based on mul-
tiple selection criteria, another clear pre-disposition is that the firm is proactive 
throughout the process. This has led the IJV/ISA partner selection research during 
the last decades to neglect the point of view of the ‘passive’ or ‘reactive’ partner, 
i.e. the one who’s not responsible for the initial contact and proposition to enter 
IJV negotiations. 
Based on previous literature, Glaister and Buckley (1997) assumed that to the 
extent that partners are either proactive or reactive with respect to the initiative 
for the joint venture, and thus either making the initial approach or responding to 
an approach, then differences in the importance of particular selection criteria are 
likely to be evidenced between initiating and non-initiating partner firms. Howev-
er, the influence of who was responsible for the initial contact was found to be 
virtually of no importance vis-à-vis the relative importance of partner selection 
criteria. In light of the entwined selection mode as depicted above, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the influence of initiation is a more relevant focus as a 
determinant of IJV partner selection when observed from a process-oriented per-
spective when compared to studies focusing on the single mechanism of evalua-
tion/selection criteria. 
Short selection 
In short selection mode a single potential provider is evaluated by the selector. 
The essential difference to cases entailing an entwined selection is that a provider 
is chosen, rather than a service, even if the choice is made from a list of one. The 
evaluation in short selection carries the possibility of rejecting the potential pro-
vider, and engaging in a second or third round of short selection (Viljamaa 2007). 
However, there is not comparison of potential providers, except in the sense that 
the potential provider being evaluated is compared against other providers that 
might be found, assuming the selector is willing and able to invest more effort.  
The mode of short selection in IJV context would be, in comparison to entwined 
selection, significantly more in line with previous IJV partner selection research. 
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In this case, there is a distinction between partner selection process and the deci-
sion to set up an IJV. Although no more than one potential partner goes under the 
stage of evaluation, the selection process in short selection mode is a separable 
entity within the whole process of IJV formation, assuming that a decision to en-
ter the target country via an IJV has been previously made. Also, it should be not-
ed that firms may engage in serial short selection, i.e. having rejected one evalu-
ated candidate they look for another that satisfies their minimum requirements for 
starting the planned IJV. Basing their arguments on the behavioral theory of the 
firm (Cyert and March 1963), Woodside and Pitts (1998) lean towards a serial 
short selection mode in comparison to evaluation of alternatives, proposing that 
firms search and evaluate potential partners sequentially, thus evaluating and de-
ciding are not delayed until a consideration set of several candidates is found, and 
that potential partners are usually accepted or rejected without thorough and com-
parative evaluations. 
In comparison to evaluation of alternatives, similar to the rational mode (Das and 
Teng 1999), it could be argued that firms in short selection are more likely to ap-
proach the selection by looking for a partner that is adequate rather than optimal – 
rejecting the candidate in case of not exceeding the requirements and therefore 
restarting the process with another candidate, and thus satisficing in their selec-
tion – whereas in evaluation of alternatives the focus is on search for an optimal 
partner, following the rational choice thinking and the maximizing behavior (Har-
rison 1987). In light of bounded rationality and thus limited resources, it could be 
expected by common logic that SMEs are more likely to apply a short selection 
mode rather than evaluation of alternatives, especially if it lacks experience in 
operating in the target country.  
The four modes of partner selection – evaluation by alternatives, default selection, 
entwined selection, and short selection, are thus all considered plausible in the 
IJV partner selection context. Further, each of the modes suggests certain pre-
dispositions within factors related to the characteristics and resources of the firm, 
the characteristics of the target country, strategic motives for the IJV formation, 
strategic importance of the IJV to the firm, as well  as the role of initiator of the 
IJV process. Viljamaa’s (2007b) discussion on selection modes, while suggestive 
of  the  forms  of  partner  selection  in  IJVs,  does  not  depict  the  IJV selection  pro-
cess,  nor  does  it  consider  selection  criteria.  Figure  3  shows  a  composite  of  the  
four modes in the IJV/ISA partner selection context, modified to include setting 
of selection criteria as proposed in both Young et al. (1989) and Ellram (1991). 
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1. Decide selection 
criteria 
2. Search and 
identify potential 
partners 
3. Evaluate 
potential partners 
4. Final choice 
Traditional partner 
selection 
Default partner 
selection 
0. Decision on 
IJV/ISA exists 
1. The ‘obvious’ 
partner is chosen 
0. Decision on 
IJV/ISA exists 
1. The possibility of 
IJV/ISA is raised by 
potential partner 
2. IJV/ISA along with 
potential partner is 
accepted or rejected 
0. No decision on 
IJV/ISA exists 
Entwined partner 
selection 
(1. Decide criteria) 
2. Search and 
identify a potential 
partner 
3. Evaluate the 
potential partner 
4. Accept partner or 
return to stage 0/1/2 
Short partner 
selection 
0. Decision on 
IJV/ISA exists 
 
Figure 3. Alternative modes of partner selection (applied from Viljamaa 2007 
and further modified under the IJV context). 
To summarize, it is proposed that IJV/ISA partner selection can occur in various 
modes.  Some suggestions are also made as the occurrence of these. First, based 
on bounded rationality, small and inexperienced firms with limited resources are 
more likely to choose partners considered adequate rather than optimal, thus ap-
plying the satisfacing approach (Harrison 1987, Simon 1957, 1960). This makes it 
less likely for these firms to undertake the IJV partner selection process based on 
the mode referred to as either the rational mode (e.g. Das and Teng 1999) or as 
the evaluation of alternatives mode as in the application of the Viljamaa (2007) 
typology in the previous chapter. 
Also, as was argued in the previous chapter, the mode default selection would 
require existing connections and target-country-related experience, making it non-
applicable for firms considering entry via an IJV into a new target country and 
with a local partner. On the mode entwined selection, the decision to set up an 
IJV and a choice of a partner are considered as bundle, making it by common 
logic a likely option for firms who do not act as the initiator in the IJV formation 
process. By definition, in the case of the entwined selection mode the partner se-
lection process can not be regarded as its own separable decision making entity 
within the IJV formation process, thus creating basis for the argument for the sep-
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arability of the partner selection process within the IJV formation process (e.g. 
Al-Khalifa and Peterson 1999). 
Also, the strategic motivation for the IJV formation, especially the time dimen-
sion it may embody – is of potential significance when considering the modes of 
partner selection the firm may undertake, again due to bounded rationality and the 
tendency to select the first option that meets a given need or select the option that 
meets most needs rather than the “optimal” solution (Manktelow 2000, Harrison 
1987, Simon 1957). As stated by Killing (in foreword to Geringer 1988), in the 
real world time is scarce, and perfect partners do not exist for every project. 
3.6 Summary of the theoretical framework 
Chapters two and three comprised the theoretical part of this study, dealing with 
the phenomenon of international joint venture partner selection with differing 
approaches. Chapter two followed the mainstream of IJV partner selection re-
search in the vein of Geringer (1988) and others, perceiving IJV partner selection 
merely through partner selection criteria and their relative importance. To broad-
en the perspective on the phenomenon, chapter three approached IJV partner se-
lection as a decision making process, arguing for the existence of variety in types 
of processes firms undergo when selecting IJV partners. 
In chapter two, the first theoretical part of the study, the framework regarding the 
IJV partner selection criteria was established, and five hypotheses were set for 
subsequent empirical testing in the quantitative empirical part in chapter five. 
Four of the hypotheses concerned the impact of the IJV context on the relative 
importance of the selection criteria. IJV context was further dissected into for-
eign-partner-specific, location-specific and investment-specific factors, as well as 
the strategic context of the firm. In the fifth hypothesis a relationship between the 
relative importance of the selection criteria and the performance of the IJV was 
expected. The argumentation in setting the hypotheses was mainly built upon re-
source dependency theory, the resource-based view of the firm, transaction cost 
theory and several empirical findings of previous studies. The contribution of the 
chapter is essentially tied into establishing a more holistic perspective on the con-
textual impact on how firms evaluate their IJV partners, or more specifically, on 
how firms weigh the variety of partner selection criteria under differing contexts, 
as well as in an examination of the relationship between the partner selection cri-
teria and the performance of the IJV. 
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In chapter three, the second theoretical part of the study, a process-oriented per-
spective on the IJV partner selection phenomenon was taken, mainly building on 
strategic decision making literature. It was argued that existing process descrip-
tions of IJV and/or ISA partner selection resemble the ideology of the rational 
choice theory, and lack in their ability to explain how the majority of firms, espe-
cially those operating under bounded rationality due to varied situational or con-
textual reasons, search and select their partners. Although it is commonly recog-
nized that organizational decisions are not made according to the rational model 
of choice (March and Sevon 1988), the variety of different modes an IJV partner 
selection process may take has remained an uncharted territory, thus forming the 
central gap for this second theoretical part of the study. It was emphasized that the 
IJV context, dissected similarly to the previous chapter into factors relating to the 
foreign partner, the IJV location, the specific investment and the strategic contin-
gencies, has an impact on the mode and level of rationality a partner selection 
process may undergo. 
Summarizing the process-oriented partner selection research in the IJV literature, 
three aspects are essentially pointed out as IJV partner selection is perceived from 
a process-oriented perspective: 
Firstly, a rational choice model does not portray the complex reality of IJV part-
ner selection decision processes. Instead, the processes tend to be completed un-
der the constraints of bounded rationality – the scarcity of information, time 
and/or resources – essentially affecting the path a firm follows in its quest for an 
IJV partner. These constraints can be expected to arise from firm-specific (e.g. the 
size and experience of the firm and its decision makers), location-specific (e.g. 
physical and cultural distance between the home and host countries, level of de-
velopment) and investment-specific (e.g. initiatiator, form of investment) factors, 
as well as from factors related to the strategic context of the firm. 
Secondly, decision processes can be broken down to several phases and/or rou-
tines in varying ways, yet some broad-viewed consistency can be recognized – 
the pre-decision process period containing the identification of the prob-
lem/opportunity/crisis and the stimuli to enter the decision process is emphasized 
as  the  starting  point,  whereas  a  design  (Simon  1960)  or  development  (e.g.  
Mintzberg et al. 1976) phase follows, leading to choosing (Simon 1960) or select-
ing (Mintzberg et al. 1976). Although the phase theorem does not receive une-
quivocal support from within the field (e.g. Witte 1972), the models give ground 
to a general level process component breakdown. Following these classic phase 
models, in combination to existing IJV and alliance structuring literature, inspec-
tion of an IJV partner selection decision process would logically focus on three 
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main components: (1) pre-partner selection decision process period, including the 
IJV trigger/stimuli and general readiness for the IJV, (2) partner search/identifica-
tion, and (3) partner evaluation and choice. 
 Thirdly, an almost unlimited amount of decision process typologies can be de-
veloped. Still, previous typologies have been synthesized fairly effectively, lead-
ing to general level decision process typologies (e.g. Das and Teng 1999) by 
which different modes of decision processes can be presented in order of rational-
ity of each process mode. Also, applying other types of partnering models, such 
as those presented in the purchasing literature (e.g. Ellram 1996, Viljamaa 2007) 
would seem useful in the IJV partner selection research context. These models 
also seem to suggest that the process of selecting an IJV partner can not be re-
garded as an independent decision making process separate to the IJV formation 
decision process entity, as in several cases the decision to form an IJV is entwined 
with the choice of a specific partner. Furthermore, examining whether the partner 
selection decision making process is truly a separable entity demands inspection 
regarding the whole IJV formation process, especially key decisions such as deci-
sion on the target country/area,  decision on direct  investment,  decision to invest  
on a collaborative venture, and a decision on the form of investment (a Greenfield 
IJV or a partial acquisition). 
Thus, the two-fold theoretical part spawns a framework (Figure 4) illustrating 
how IJV partner selection is influenced by four different types of contextual and 
situational factors, and suggests an influence of IJV partner selection on the sub-
sequent performance of the venture. IJV partner selection is here perceived from 
the following points of view: (1) as a set of task- and partner-related selection 
criteria; and (2) as a decision making process entity, comprising partner identifi-
cation, partner evaluation and choice. The first empirical part – a quantitative 
study – focuses on the selection criteria point of view whereas the second empiri-
cal part – a qualitative study – focuses on partner selection as a decision making 
process. 
Each arrow in Figure 4 represents a hypothesis set in Chapter 2, yet only on the 
headline level – certain individual features of each box are included only in one of 
the two empirical studies: Regarding strategic context, the quantitative study only 
focuses on the FDI motivation, while the subsequent qualitative study expands 
also to FDI stimuli and the perceived strategic importance of the venture. Like-
wise, regarding performance, the quantitative study focuses solely on IJV perfor-
mance, while the qualitative study also aims to differentiate between IJV perfor-
mance and the success of the actual partner selection process. Furthermore, re-
garding the upper three boxes dealing with different types of IJV context, the sub-
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lined features in each box form the contextual factors of the quantitative study, 
whereas the qualitative study approaches each type of IJV context from a more 
general level – reflecting in practice as questions that deal with mainly the head-
line level of each context type rather than separate contextual variable. 
 
 
Figure 4. The theoretical framework of the study. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter the methodological choices, justifications, and the sample/case 
descriptions are presented. First, the research design is discussed on a general 
level. This is followed by separate chapters concerning the quantitative and quali-
tative studies. Also, the validity and reliability are discussed separately in regards 
to the quantitative and qualitative studies. 
4.1 Research design 
The empirical part of this study is built on a mixed-method approach and it was 
completed in two distinct stages, also reflecting the learning process within the 
making of this study. First, a quantitative study was completed in order to statisti-
cally examine the impact of contextual variables on the relative importance of the 
selection criteria, and the relationship between the selection criteria and the IJV 
performance. The choice of quantitative approach to a criteria-oriented empirical 
study was based on its natural applicability for such research, as also perceived by 
a significant majority of comparable previous studies (see Table 1). As it was 
recognized in the aftermath of the quantitative findings that the selection criteria 
oriented approach enabled only a limited perspective on the IJV partner selection 
phenomenon, it was decided that another approach was to be taken to comple-
ment the quantitative findings. Therefore, qualitative case studies dealing with the 
decision making processes of four Finnish firms and their partner selection for 
IJVs were conducted in order to widen the perspective on the phenomenon. For 
additional discussion on the choice of a qualitative approach, see further in the 
chapter 4.3. 
Thus, the main reason for applying both quantitative and qualitative data is, fol-
lowing Eisenhardt (1989), to gain a triangulated and synergistic view of evidence 
on IJV partner selection. As described above, the type and interpretation of trian-
gulation in this study is triangulation as seeking complementary information, fol-
lowing the outline by Erzberger and Kelle (2003: 461) who state that “empirical 
research results obtained with different methods are like the pieces of a jigsaw 
puzzle that provide a full image of a certain object if put together in the correct 
way.” 
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4.2 Quantitative study 
The main reasoning for choosing a quantitative approach to study the selection 
criteria, factors affecting its relative importance and its influence on IJV perfor-
mance  was  its  suitability  for  a  study  trying  to  identify  factors  that  influence  an  
outcome, the utility of an intervention, or understanding the best predictors of 
outcomes (Creswell 2003). Most of the previous studies exploring IJV partner 
selection in more detail (see Table 1 in Chapter 2.2) have taken a quantitative 
approach, gathering the data with a survey and in some cases accompanying in-
terviews. For its natural applicability and enabling comparison to previous stud-
ies,  a  quantitative  approach  and  a  survey  research  was  chosen  as  the  method to  
examine the partner selection criteria and its relative importance under differing 
contexts. 
Next, the data collection procedure of the study is discussed, followed by the 
sample description, methods of data analysis, and operationalization of variables 
used in the quantitative study. 
4.2.1 Data collection 
The first  empirical  part  of  the  study  is  based  on  survey  data  relating  to  the  IJV 
partner selection and IJV performance in manufacturing IJVs established by Finn-
ish based firms in OECD and non-OECD countries mainly in between 1988-2001. 
Based on different sources (data collected during a period of over ten years from 
published news regarding new IJVs by Finnish firms, annual reports and www-
sites of the 200 largest Finnish companies, earlier survey information) more than 
130 Finnish companies having made at least one manufacturing IJV were identi-
fied. In total, the companies had established more than 500 IJVs of which approx-
imately 120 were divested before 1999. In those cases where the companies had 
established  several  IJVs,  the  preference  was  given  to  Greenfield  form  of  IJVs  
and/or on IJVs where the ownership share of the Finnish partner was 25-75 % and 
which had been at least two years in operation. These preferences were based on 
the need for an adequate number of Greenfield IJVs in the sample for statistical 
purposes, and the minimum of two years of operation for meaningful inclusion of 
the IJV performance measurement. 
The companies were first contacted by telephone or email in order to confirm the 
interest of the company to participate in the study and to identify the most suitable 
person to answer to the questionnaire planned for the study. As discussed by Ger-
inger (1991), in some studies a key weakness is that the respondents had not been 
directly involved in the partner selection process. While the most knowledgeable 
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people in firms to provide accurate data for the study are those directly involved 
in the IJV establishment and operation (Slater and Atuahene-Gima 2004), it was 
confirmed that the person was in possession of direct knowledge on the partner 
selection process (the respondent’s current relationship with the IJV was also 
asked separately in the end of the questionnaire) during the telephone contact to 
increase the reliability of the results. The four-page questionnaire included also 
other issues than those relating to partner selection, e.g. questions on the later 
development of the IJV, and evaluation of its performance along various 
measures. The questionnaire is carefully designed based on earlier literature and 
surveys in a manner that is intelligent to respondents (John and Phil 1997). 
Managers  from  in  total  47  firms  participated  in  the  study.  The  total  amount  of  
IJVs covered by the survey was 69 as several firms were represented in the sam-
ple via more than one IJV. However, in nine cases the managers did not fully an-
swer to the sections on partner selection or IJV performance on the survey. Thus, 
the final sample size in this study is 60 IJVs. This is favorably comparable to a 
significant  portion  of  prior  studies  on  IJV partner  selection  –  the  sample  size  in  
the previous quantitative studies has been between 42 (Al-Khalifa and Peterson 
1999) to 202 (Hitt  et  al.  2000).  In the case of Al-Khalifa and Peterson the small  
sample size can be explained by small population – in fact, their sample included 
over 80 percent of the population of IJVs in Bahrain. Other IJV partner selection 
studies with quite small sample sizes are those by Glaister (1996), Glaister and 
Buckley (1997) and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000), of which the first two have sam-
ples of 50 and 53 respectively, while the latter has a sample of 39 foreign partners 
and 30 local partners. 
4.2.2 Quantitative sample description 
More than 90 percent of the units were established in 1988-2001 while about half 
were established in 1995 or earlier and the other half in 1996 or later. Approxi-
mately 40 percent of the IJVs were established in OECD countries and approxi-
mately 60 percent in non-OECD countries. Close to 60 percent of the units were 
formed as Greenfield IJVs and 40 percent as partial acquisitions. Over 70 percent 
of the IJVs had two parent firms and approximately 30 percent had three or more 
parents. In the latter cases the empirical analysis is focused on the partner selec-
tion criteria in relation to the main local partner. In every fourth case the IJV 
marked the first one established by the company, whereas in 45 percent of cases 
the company had previous experience from one to three earlier IJVs, and in the 
rest of cases the company had experience from at least four IJVs. Concerning the 
current state of operation and ownership, 75 percent of the units were still operat-
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ing as IJVs in spring 2002, while close to 18 percent of the units had changed into 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Finnish partners and approximately seven per-
cent of the IJVs had been divested (For more details see Table 4). 
Table 4. Characteristics of the sample. 
    n % 
Number  of responses  60 100 
Number of partners in the IJV 1 (in addition to the respondent firm) 42 70 
 > 1 18 30 
Year of investment 1995 or earlier 30 50 
 1996 or later 30 50 
Form of investment Greenfield 37 61,7 
 Acquisition 23 38,3 
Size of the foreign partner (turnover 2001) < 500 MEUR 31 51,7 
 500-1000 MEUR 7 11,7 
 > 1000 MEUR 22 36,7 
Location of the IJV Western Europe 20 33,3 
 Eastern/Central Eastern Europe 22 36,7 
 Asia  15 25 
 Other 3 5 
Share of ownership of the foreign partner > 50 % 22 36,7 
 50-50 % 9 15 
 < 50 % 29 48,3 
Industry of the IJV Metal industry 23 38,3 
 Forest industry 12 20 
 Other (chemical, plastic, foodstuff) 25 41,7 
Initial approach to the IJV Foreign partner initiated IJV talks 43 71,7 
 Local partner or other as initiator 15 25 
Relative partner size Foreign partner > 50 % larger 42 70 
 Other 18 30 
Joint venture survival Still operating as an IJV 45 75 
(Point of view of the foreign partner) Changed into a wholly owned subsidiary 11 18,3 
  Divested/no foreign ownership in 2000/01 4 6,7 
4.2.3 Methods of statistical analysis 
As in several earlier studies the relative importance of the task- and partner-
related selection criteria was examined first on a general level by ranking the cri-
teria based on their mean values. Then factor analysis was employed to derive a 
parsimonious set of selection criteria, following several previous studies in the 
field (e.g. Geringer 1988, Glaister and Buckley 1997, Tatoglu and Glaister 2000). 
The hypotheses were tested by considering differences in means of the im-
portance of the selection criteria. Based on an assumption that the sample was 
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close to normal distribution, it was considered legitimate to use parametric tests 
of the hypotheses. Each of the hypotheses was therefore tested by conducting two 
sample t-tests or ANOVA as appropriate. Because of the nature of the data these 
parametric tests were compared to equivalent non-parametric tests (Mann-
Whitney U and the Kruskal-Wallis Test) as a check on their interpretation follow-
ing Glaister and Buckley (1997) and Nielsen (2003). 
Due to the limited size of the sample the applicable methods for data analysis 
were accordingly limited. Despite their shortcomings in statistical sophistication, 
T-test and ANOVA are considered suitable for studies dealing with limited sam-
ple sizes (Aczel 2005). Also, these tests have appeared useful and considered ap-
propriate in some of the main reference studies (eg. Dong & Glaister 2006, Glais-
ter and Buckley 1997, Tatoglu 2000). 
4.2.4 Operationalization of variables 
Mainly to increase comparability to earlier findings, it was decided here that part-
ner selection criteria were examined and operationalized following Geringer’s 
(1988) task- and partner-related selection criteria. However, minor additions were 
made in accordance to other results – the criterion of trust was added due to their 
high relative importance in several other studies (Glaister 1996, Glaister and 
Buckley 1997, Nielsen 2003, Tatoglu and Glaister 2000). Furthermore, trust was 
examined as two separate criteria – trust in the partner and trust between the 
partners – to allow for consideration on whether firms value nurturing the recip-
rocal nature of the IJV form or merely value the partner’s trustworthiness. 
The 29 selection criteria studied are listed in Table 5. The respondents were asked 
to indicate the importance of each criterion along a five-point Likert-scale (1=not 
at all important … 5=Very important) and the question was formed as follows: 
“In forming this venture, how much importance did your company place on se-
lecting a partner with the following skills or characteristics?” All other variables 
of the quantitative study are described in Table 6. 
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Table 5. The selection criteria applied in the quantitative study. 
Task-related criteria 
  
Enables venture to qualify for subsidies or credits 
Can provide low cost labour to the venture 
Helps comply with government requirements/pressure 
Has access to raw materials or components 
Will provide financing/capital to venture 
Can supply technically skilled personnel 
Can supply general managers to the venture 
Possesses needed licenses, patents, know-how, etc. 
Controls favourable location for production 
Possesses needed manufacturing or R&D facilities 
Has access to marketing or distribution systems 
Has access to post-sales service networks 
Has a valuable trademark 
Has a valuable reputation 
Enhances perceived local or national identity 
Will enable the venture to produce at lowest cost 
Permits faster entry into the target market 
Has knowledge of target market’s economy & customs 
Can provide better access for your company’s products 
Can enhance the venture’s export opportunities 
Enhances venture’s ability to make sales to government/public companies 
  
Partner-related criteria 
  
Seems to have a strong commitment to the venture 
Top management of both firms are compatible 
Has similar national or corporate culture 
Is similar in size or corporate structure 
Prior positive cooperation 
Has related products 
Trust between partners 
Our trust in the partner 
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Table 6. Operationalization of variables for the quantitative study. 
Firm size Total sales of the firm in 2001/2002. Chosen as the most commonly used 
measure of firm size in FDI studies (e.g. Larimo 1993, Tahir 2003). 
 
FDI experience Number of previous FDIs formed by the firm (e.g. Larimo 1993, Tahir 
2003); recoded into “yes” (one or more previous FDIs) and “no” (no previ-
ous FDIs) for testing purposes 
 
IJV experience Number of previous IJVs formed by the firm; recoded into “yes” (one or 
more previous IJVs) and “no” (no previous IJVs) for testing purposes 
 
Target country Previous  business  activity/operations  in  the  target  country  vs.  no  such 
experience activity/operations  
 
Region Western Europe (WE) / Eastern Europe (EE) / Central Eastern Europe 
(CEE) / Africa / Asia / North America / South America. Recoded into WE / 
CEE+EE / Asia, and excluding the other regions due to very small represen-
tation of each within the sample 
 
Cultural distance Measured by a cultural distance index based on Hofstede’s (1980) four 
dimensions of national culture, measuring distance between Finland and the 
target country through the following equation developed by Kogut & Singh 
(1988):   4 
 CDj = ¼  ? { (Iij – Iiu)2 /Vi } /4 
   i=1 
 
Physical distance Distance between Finland and the country of IJV location (in kilometers). 
More specifically: Distance between Helsinki, Finland, and the capital city 
of the host country. Recoded into a two-group variable cut point of over or 
under 2000km for testing purposes. 
 
Level of OECD members vs. non-OECD members. Even though not all non-OECD 
development countries can be labeled as developing/low-developed countries (e.g. Ja-
pan), none of the sample IJVs are located in such countries. Therefore, it is 
an adequate measure to divide host countries into developed countries vs. 
other. 
 
Form of investment Greenfield IJV vs. Partial acquisition (e.g. Hennart 2007) 
 
Type of investment Relatedness of the IJV’s business to the business of the foreign partner; 
Totally related / Partly related / Totally unrelated, as perceived by the re-
spondent 
 
Relative partner size Size of the local partner in relation to the size of the foreign partner as 
measured by total sales in 2001/2002 (Glaister & Buckley 1997) 
 
Initiator to the IJV Foreign partner / local partner / third party as the initiator of the IJV talks 
(Glaister & Buckley 1997) 
 
Investment motives Access to natural resources, access to markets, seeking efficiency, access to 
strategic assets (Following Dunning 1993); importance of each motive 
measured along five-point Likert-scale. 
 
Performance Performance of the IJV is measured subjectively along five-point Likert-
scale based on the foreign partner’s view on the overall performance of the 
IJV (Choi 2001, Schaan 1983). Additionally, other measures used were the 
financial performance of the IJV, and performance of the IJV compared to 
the main competitors in 2000-2001 in similar 5-point Likert-scale format. 
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4.3 Qualitative study 
As the quantitative approach focusing solely on partner selection criteria was 
deemed incapable of describing the whole complexity of the IJV partner selection 
phenomenon, a qualitative approach was taken in order to explore IJV partner 
selection from a process-oriented perspective. Case studies are particularly well-
suited to new research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate (Eisen-
hardt 1989). Even though international joint ventures and partner selection on a 
general level can by no means be described as new research areas, it was argued 
(in Chapter 3) that the existing research does not have an adequate grasp on the 
phenomenon of IJV partner selection, and therefore lacks a holistic perspective on 
how partners are selected under different contexts. Thus, selected companies were 
highlighted in the quantitative data and were contacted for interviews during late 
2009, in order to undertake comparative case studies.  This refers to comparison 
(replication) of the phenomenon (IJV partner selection decision process) studied 
in different cases in a systematic way, exploring different dimensions of the re-
search issues (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2010). 
There are two mains goals for the qualitative study. Firstly, there is a descriptive 
aim, to describe the process of IJV partner selection and the variety of forms it 
may take. Secondly, there is an aim that includes both descriptive and explanatory 
ingredients, that is, to identify the key components both within the decision mak-
ing process as well as the IJV context that shape the IJV partner selection process 
and the paths firms follow in their quest for a suitable IJV partner. Additionally, 
the qualitative study aims to examine to which extent the IJV partner selection 
process can be separated into its own decision making entity within the IJV for-
mation process. 
The case study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynam-
ics present within single settings (Eisenhardt 1989), and can involve either single 
or  multiple  cases,  and  numerous  levels  of  analysis  (Yin  2003).  The  case  study  
method is favored when the research questions are formulated as “why” or “how” 
questions (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2010), thus appropriate for this study and ap-
proach. It is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident (Yin 2003). Its main feature is the intensity of 
the study of the object, individual, group, organization, culture, incident, or situa-
tion (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2010). 
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4.3.1 Case selection 
As one of the key aspects of the process-oriented approach to IJV partner selec-
tion, and thus the ensuing qualitative study, was to present and explain variety in 
how firms identify and choose their IJV partners, four firms were carefully select-
ed from the quantitative data sample by setting a number of preference factors to 
form a sample for comparative case studies. Thus, theoretical sampling was here 
considered a reasonable approach as purposeful, non-probability samples are of-
ten applied in qualitative research (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2010). 
The preference in selecting case companies from the quantitative data first based 
on the following aspects: 
1. The IJV was formed before the year 2004. This preference was set for that 
the IJV had seen enough action for credible performance and other out-
come discussion. 
2. The IJV was formed after the year 1996. This preference was set to avoid 
memory-related reliability problems, as the questions largely dealt with is-
sues taking place in the formation stage of the venture. 
3. The Finnish ownership at the time of the investment was in between 25 to 
75 %. This excluded portfolio investments from the sample, instead pre-
ferring units with truly joint decision making. 
4. The IJV had been in operation for at least five full years as an IJV. Again, 
the importance of credible performance and other outcome discussion was 
underlined, hence the preference for units with a lifespan of at least five 
full years of IJV operation. Also, this excluded those units from the sam-
ple where the original IJV form had briefly existed for any practical rea-
sons and was planned as a temporary step in the investment process from 
the start. 
These preference factors were met by altogether eight IJVs within the quantitative 
sample.  Four of them were formed as Greenfield investments and the other four 
as partial acquisitions. Three were located in Asia (China, Japan), one in Eastern 
Europe (Russia), two in Norway, one in Germany and one in the Netherlands. 
Case selection from within these eight units proceeded to form a convenience 
sample (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2010) according to the following principles that 
were set to enable comparison in regards to some key contextual factors: 
1. Geographic variation (distance, context uncertainty). 
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2. Variation in economic development in the host country. 
3. Variation in form of investment (Greenfield vs. partial acquisition). 
To fulfill the demands of the fore-mentioned principles and to reach a balanced 
sample in regards to them, altogether four case companies were selected. Two of 
the case IJVs are located in China and two in Western Europe, meeting the first 
two principles. Also, two of the case units were formed as Greenfield operations, 
whereas  two  are  partial  acquisitions,  as  the  differing  IJV  form  was  expected  to  
result in differing types of partner selection processes, thus meeting the third 
principle. All four prioritized case companies agreed to participate in the study on 
the condition of anonymity, and thus the cases and case companies are presented 
as Case/Company A, B, C, and D, and the field of business of each is presented 
with varying specificity as required. 
4.3.2 Data collection 
The data was collected by conducting personal interviews with managers with the 
operational responsibility and/or direct knowledge of the IJV formation and part-
ner selection processes. Each interview lasted approximately two hours, was au-
dio-recorded and transcribed in a detailed manner. The suitability of each re-
spondent was carefully examined by discussions with the CEO and/or executives 
of  the  business  division  the  case  IJV  adheres  to,  and  further  discussed  with  the  
respondents by confirming their direct knowledge on the IJV formation decision 
making as well as future operation and development. 
The interviews were conducted according to the following main theme outline 
(for exact outline, see Appendix 1): 
1. Background information on the case firm and the respondent 
2. The Case IJV formation 
3. The IJV partner selection process 
4. Objectives and motives for the IJV 
5. The evaluation of the IJV formation process, as perceived at present time 
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4.3.3 Validity and reliability of the qualitative study 
Because a research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, one 
can also judge the quality of any given design according to certain logical tests, of 
which four have been commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical 
social research (Yin 2003): They are construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability,  and due to being common to all  social  science methods,  
they have been summarized in numerous textbooks (Kidder and Judd 1986). 
Construct validity, referring to establishing correct operational measures for the 
concept being studied (Kidder and Judd 1986), was increased by using multiple 
sources of evidence, and also by having key informants review the drafts of the 
case study reports, following the suggestion by Yin (2003). The sources of evi-
dence, besides the interviews, included the responses of each case firm in a previ-
ous IJV questionnaire (the data primarily used for the quantitative study in this 
dissertation). Also, additional documentation was used, ranging from public doc-
uments, such as annual reports and press releases regarding all four cases, to clas-
sified documents that were available in two of the four cases, such as board meet-
ing agendas and correspondence between the parents prior to IJV formation. 
Internal validity refers to establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain con-
ditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious rela-
tionships (Yin 2003). As it does not concern descriptive or exploratory case stud-
ies (ibid.), the internal validity is here discussed only in regards to the explanatory 
features of the study. More specifically, the second of the two main goals for the 
qualitative study was to identify the key components both within the decision mak-
ing process as well as the IJV context that shape the IJV partner selection process 
and the paths firms follow in their quest for a suitable IJV partner. In other 
words, the qualitative study aims to explain how components of the decision mak-
ing process and the IJV context affect the IJV partner selection process, rendering 
the  goal  into  a  more  explicitly  explanatory  form.  In  attempting  to  improve  the  
internal validity herein, the interviews tried to acknowledge the different elements 
of IJV context as broadly as possible, aiming to address rival explanations. 
External validity concerns the generalization of the study’s findings (Yin 2003). 
To improve external validity the study included four cases selected in a manner 
that the majority of key characteristics (e.g. form of investment, characteristics of 
the target country) were similar in two cases, increasing the replication logic 
within the study. 
To increase the reliability of the study – making sure that a later investigator 
should arrive at the same findings and conclusions if the same procedures as de-
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scribed in this study were followed (Yin 2003) – the interview process followed a 
common list of themes with several more specific questions under each theme. 
All discussion was recorded and written out in the form of the spoken word.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the executives’ recollections of their past strate-
gies are often biased; strategies are often recalled as more rational and consistent 
with current strategies than they really were (Golden 1992). Therefore, the deci-
sion processes were approached in different ways during the interviews, as the 
interviewees were first asked to portray larger decision process entities chrono-
logically, following a dissected approach where different components of the deci-
sion processes were discussed individually. Also, in two of the four cases – the 
two closest to resembling the rational choice model – additional documentation 
(in the form of management board meeting agendas and other such documents) 
was able to verify the sequence of the key elements in the decision processes. 
Additionally to counter against the potential tendency of the respondents to ap-
pear more rational in their decision making than they actually were, the respond-
ents were promised anonymity both on the firm and individual levels. 
Following Björkman’s (1989) lead, among others, the reader is here given the 
opportunity to scrutinize how the cases are analyzed by including frequent quotes, 
citations of responses or comments, by organization members. The quotes used 
here include all three types of quotes as presented by Richardson (1990): Firstly, 
short eye-catching quotations that take little space and signify different perspec-
tives (Creswell 2007) are used. The embedded quotes, briefly quoted phrases 
within the narrative, prepare the reader display a point and allow the reader to 
move on, whereas the longer quotations, limitedly used in this study, are used to 
convey more complex understandings (Richardson 1990). 
To gain an adequate explanation of these individual decision making processes, 
the researcher must obtain in-depth understanding of the context in which the 
investment is made (Pettigrew 1987, Björkman 1989), and obtaining this under-
standing through the use of questionnaires is probably impossible (Björkman 
1989). As it may also be questionable to rely on structured interviews with a sin-
gle respondent (ibid.), the interviews were conducted in a more extensive manner 
and additional documentation was analyzed. As already mentioned, all four cases 
were included in the quantitative data, and thus an extensive amount of structured 
information was available for inclusion in the case analysis. 
 
70      Acta Wasaensia 
5 RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
In this chapter, the results for the quantitative empirical study are presented and 
discussed. First, the relative importance and a factor analysis of the partner selec-
tion criteria are presented. Next, analyses concerning the relationship between 
contextual variables (i.e. foreign partner, location, and investment-specific varia-
bles, the investment motives) and the relative importance of the selection criteria 
are taken under examination. Finally, the focus is placed on the relationship be-
tween the relative importance of the selection criteria and the performance of the 
joint venture, leading to discussion on the limitations and implications of the 
quantitative approach taken here. 
5.1 Relative importance of the partner selection criteria 
The results of the relative importance of various task- and partner-related selec-
tion criteria are presented in Table 7. The respondents were asked to indicate the 
importance of the altogether 29 task- and partner-related selection criteria when 
selecting their IJV partners. Since the five-point Likert type scale was used (1=not 
at all important, 5=very important), the midpoint of the scale (3) is here used as 
the point of comparison. 
The results indicate that among the 21 task-related selection criteria the midpoint 
was exceeded only by two criteria: the criterion of knowledge of the target mar-
ket’s economy and customs (3.18) and the criterion of ability to permit faster en-
try into the target market (3.05). Seven additional criteria were valued between 
2.80 and 2.98. Among the eight partner-related selection criteria three criteria – 
our trust in the partner (3.48), strong commitment to the venture (3.41), and trust 
between partners (3.39) – exceeded the midpoint. Furthermore, two criteria were 
valued between 2.75–2.83, and two criteria below 2.00. It is noteworthy that 
among the 29 criteria used in this study, one was ranked clearly below the others 
at  1.50  –  the  criterion  of  partner is similar in size and/or corporate structure – 
and it was a partner-related criterion. 
As discussed earlier, the comparison of results in previous studies is difficult be-
cause of somewhat different selection criteria used. The results by Geringer 
(1988) indicated that the three most important criteria were: strong commitment to 
the IJV, compatible management teams, and permits faster entry into the market. 
Geringer did not include trust in his selection criteria, whereas others have not 
included a criterion concerning commitment among selection criteria in their 
studies. The other studies have indicated the great importance of such criteria as 
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trust between management teams, relatedness of partner’s business, reputation, 
knowledge of local market, financial status or financial resources, access to dis-
tribution channels, and access to links with major suppliers or buyers. Contrary to 
all others studies including this study, Tomlinson (1970) and later on also Tatoglu 
and Glaister (2000) found that the existence of an earlier relationship was an im-
portant if not even the most important criteria, but according to Tatoglu and 
Glaister only from the local partner’s point of view, not from the foreign partner’s 
point of view. 
Table 7. The relative importance of the partner selection criteria.  
PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA variable mean std. dev. Rank 
Task-related criteria     
(T) Has knowledge of target market’s economy & customs T-LOCKNOW 3,18 1,38 4 
(T) Permits faster entry into the target market T-FASTENTRY 3,05 1,53 5 
(T) Will enable the venture to produce at lowest cost T-LOWCOST 2,98 1,42 6 
(T) Controls favorable location for production T-FAVLOCA 2,97 1,41 7 
(T) Possesses needed manufacturing or R&D facilities T-FACILITY 2,93 1,44 8 
(T) Has a valuable reputation T-REPUTAT 2,92 1,25 9 
(T) Can supply technically skilled personnel T-TECHSKILL 2,92 1,20 9 
(T) Helps comply with government requirements/pressure T-GOVNEGO 2,85 1,51 11 
(T) Has access to marketing or distribution systems T-MARKDIST 2,83 1,63 12 
(T) Can provide better access for your company’s products T-ACCESS 2,75 1,37 14 
(T) Enhances perceived local or national identity T-LOCIDENT 2,70 1,31 16 
(T) Can provide low cost labor to the venture T-LABCHEAP 2,67 1,53 17 
(T) Has access to raw materials or components T-RAWMAT 2,62 1,46 18 
(T) Can supply general managers to the venture T-GENMANAG 2,62 1,24 18 
(T) Has access to post-sales service network T-POSTSALE 2,43 1,42 20 
(T) Can enhance the venture’s export opportunities T-EXPOPPORT 2,36 1,28 21 
(T) Has a valuable trademark T-TRADEMRK 2,23 1,45 22 
(T) Will provide financing/capital to venture T-CAPITAL 2,22 1,15 23 
(T) Possesses needed licenses, patents, know-how, etc. T-LICPATENT 2,08 1,37 24 
(T) Enhances JV’s ability to make sales to gov./public companies T-PUBLSECTR 1,85 1,19 27 
(T) Enables venture to qualify for subsidies or credits T-CREDIT 1,85 1,19 27 
     
Partner-related criteria     
(P) Our trust in the partner P-TRUST 3,48 1,14 1 
(P) Seems to have a strong commitment to the venture P-COMMIT 3,41 1,25 2 
(P) Trust between partners P-MUTRUST 3,39 1,29 3 
(P) Top management of both firms are compatible P-MANCOMPAT 2,83 1,26 12 
(P) Has related products P-RELPROD 2,75 1,34 14 
(P) Prior positive cooperation P-PRIORREL 2,07 1,26 25 
(P) Has similar national or corporate culture P-SIMCULT 1,95 1,06 26 
(P) Is similar in size or corporate structure P-SIMSIZE 1,50 0,89 29 
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5.2 Factor analysis of selection criteria 
The 29 selection criteria represent a number of overlapping perspectives. Because 
of the potential conceptual and statistical overlap an attempt was made to identify 
a smaller number of distinct, non-overlapping selection criteria for the sample 
data by means of exploratory factor analysis. The factor analysis produced eight 
underlying factors (with Eigen-values over one) which explained a total of 75.15 
% of the observed variance. Four of the factors (see Table 8 for factor composi-
tions) are composed of both task- and partner-related selection criteria indicating 
conceptual overlap between these concepts. All of the remaining four factors are 
composed of only task-related selection criteria and thus no factor is composed of 
only partner-related selection criteria. 
As discussed earlier, seven to nine factors were identified in the previous studies, 
explaining 70.9 % (Glaister and Buckley 1997) to 78.6 % (Tatoglu and Glaister 
2000) of the observed variance. Usually three or four factors have been mixed. 
Thus, in these respects the results of this study are quite similar to the findings in 
earlier studies. 
Five individual selection criteria are included in two different factors: Valuable 
reputation appears in factors one and two, Prior positive cooperation in factors 
one and seven, Ability to supply general managers and Ability to supply techni-
cally skilled personnel in factors one and eight, and Ability to enhance the IJV’s 
export opportunities in factors two and seven. All those individual criteria re-
ceived loadings exceeding 0.45 on both factors, and especially in the case of Pri-
or positive cooperation the difference in the loadings was extremely low between 
the two applicable factors. Similar to this study, also in the study by Geringer 
(1988) several selection criteria were included in two or even more factors. 
 Acta Wasaensia     73 
  
Table 8. Factor analysis of the selection criteria. 
FACTOR Load Alpha 
Eigen-
value 
(total) 
% of 
vari-
ance 
Cumula-
tive % 
Factor 1: Trust, top management and commitment  0,8895 7,406 25,538 25,5 
(P) Trust between partners 0,8720     
(P) Our trust in the partner 0,8525     
(P) Top management of both firms are compatible 0,8500     
(P) Seems to have a strong commitment to the venture 0,8483     
(T) Has a valuable reputation 0,5873     
(T) Ability to supply general managers to the venture 0,5446     
(T) Ability to supply technically skilled personnel 0,4733     
(P) Prior positive cooperation 0,4641     
Factor 2: Post sale, marketing systems and trademark  0,8377 3,778 13,028 38,6 
(T) Has access to post-sales service network 0,8514     
(T) Has access to marketing or distribution systems 0,8353     
(T) Has a valuable trademark 0,7005     
(T) Has a valuable reputation 0,5422     
(T) Ability to enhance the venture’s export opportunities 0,4672     
Factor 3: Low labor and production costs  0,7529 2,754 9,497 48,1 
(T) Ability to provide low cost labor to the venture 0,8112     
(T) Will enable the venture to produce at lowest cost 0,7502     
(T) Controls favorable location for production 0,6461     
(T) Helps comply with government requirements/pressure 0,6408     
(T) Has access to raw materials or components 0,5972     
Factor 4: Fast entry and local knowledge  0,8301 2,486 8,572 56,6 
(T) Permits faster entry into the target market 0,8994     
(T) Has knowledge of target market’s economy & customs 0,7288     
(T) Ability to provide better access for your company’s products 0,6580     
Factor 5: Capital and credit  0,5654 1,649 5,687 62,3 
(T) Will provide financing/capital to venture 0,7282     
(T) Enables venture to qualify for subsidies or credits 0,6423     
(P) Has related products -0,5010     
(T) Possesses needed manufacturing or R&D facilities -0,6924     
Factor 6: Relations to public sector and partner similarity  0,5984 1,435 4,949 67,3 
(T) Enhances venture’s ability to make sales to gov./public companies 0,7970     
(P) Is similar in size or corporate structure 0,7080     
(P) Has similar national or corporate culture 0,7028     
Factor 7: Industrial/Intellectual property rights and export oppor-
tunities  0,4726 1,194 4,119 71,4 
(T) Possesses needed licenses, patents, know-how, etc. 0,7441     
(T) Ability to enhance the venture’s export opportunities 0,5506     
(P) Prior positive cooperation 0,4546     
Factor 8: Technical personnel and management  0,6150 1,092 3,767 75,2 
(T) Ability to supply technically skilled personnel 0,6599     
(T) Ability to supply general managers to the venture 0,4534     
(T) Enhances perceived local or national identity -0,4631     
(T) = Task-related.    (P) = Partner-related.      
Principal component analysis.  Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization.    
K-M-O measure of sampling adequacy = 0,518.  Bartlett test of sphericity = 1109,418; p < 0,000.   
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5.3 Selection criteria and foreign-partner-specific 
variables 
In H1 it was expected that the relative importance of selection criteria will vary 
with the foreign partner-specific factors. The size and earlier FDI, IJV and target-
country-specific experience of the foreign partner were selected as the foreign-
partner-specific variables. Results in Table 9 indicate that there were in total only 
two cases where the factors had means which were significantly different: factor 
one based on IJV experience and factor three based on target country specific 
experience. Thus, based on the size of the foreign partner and FDI experience, no 
factor indicated statistically significant difference in mean values. Based on indi-
vidual selection criteria results in total 15 cases indicated statistically significant 
differences. Seven of those cases were related to the extent of IJV-specific and  
Table 9. Selection criteria and foreign-partner-specific variables. 
Factor / Criteria 
Size of the Finnish 
partner 
(total sales 2001) 
FDI experience IJV Experience Target country 
Experience 
>500 
MEURO 
(n=29) 
?500 
MEURO 
(n=31) 
Yes 
(n=52) 
None 
(n=8) 
Yes 
(n=48) 
None 
(n=12) 
Yes 
(n=45) 
None 
(n=15) 
Factor 1 -0,17 0,16 -0,05 0,31 -0,12   0,44 * -0,03 0,15 
P-MUTRUST 3,07   3,68 * 3,27   4,13 * 3,19    4,17 ** 3,36 3,47 
P-TRUST 3,24 3,72 3,40 4,00 3,35   4,00 * 3,43 3,64 
P-MANCOMPAT 2,55   3,10 * 2,79 3,13 2,71 3,33 2,84 2,80 
T-REPUTAT 2,79 3,03 2,87 3,25 2,75    3,58 ** 2,93 2,87 
P-PRIORREL 1,86 2,26 2,12 1,75 2,08 2,00   2,24 * 1,53 
Factor 2 0,08 -0,07 -0,01 0,05 0,01 -0,34 0,03 -0,03 
T-EXPOPPORT 2,17 2,53 2,25 3,00 2,19   3,00 * 2,45 2,07 
Factor 3 -0,12 0,12 -0,03 0,16 0,04 -0,16 -0,15   0,44 * 
T-LABCHEAP 2,34 2,97 2,60 3,13 2,75 2,65 2,38     3,53*** 
T-LOWCOST 2,62   3,32 * 2,94 3,25 3,04 2,75 2,76    3,67 ** 
T-GOVNEGO 2,96 2,74 2,88 2,63 2,85 2,83 2,64   3,47 * 
Factor 4 0,15 -0,15 0,05 -0,28 0,05 -0,17 -0,01 0,02 
Factor 5 0,11 -0,11 0,04 -0,23 -0,09 0,32 0,03 -0,04 
T-CREDIT 2,07 1,67    1,98 ** 1,00 1,85 1,83 1,86 1,80 
Factor 6 0,10 -0,10 -0,01 0,06 -0,03 0,09 -0,05 0,19 
Factor 7 -0,16 0,15 0,03 -0,15 0,03 -0,10 0,12 -0,39 
T-EXPOPPORT 2,17 2,53 2,25 3,00 2,19   3,00 * 2,45 2,07 
P-PRIORREL 1,86 2,26 2,12 1,75 2,08 2,00 2,24 * 1,53 
Factor 8 0,08 -0,08 -0,04 0,26 -0,05 0,18 0,06 -0,11 
* p ? 0,1      ** p ? 0,05      *** p ? 0,01      **** p ? 0,001 
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five to the extent of target country specific experience. It may thus be concluded 
that H1 receives weak support in the cases of IJV- and target country specific 
experience, but no support based on the size and FDI experience of the foreign 
partner. 
Noteworthy here are the very high mean values of the importance of trust (mutual 
trust and our trust on the partner) among the cases in which the Finnish firms had 
no earlier FDI and IJV experience (the only cases where a mean value of four was 
reached or exceeded). Similarly, the results by Nielsen (2003) indicated high im-
portance of trust especially in cases where the reviewed companies did not have 
earlier alliance experience. Other generally important selection criteria independ-
ent of level of alliance experience were partner reputation and relatedness of part-
ner’s business. Furthermore, the results by Nielsen indicated that firms having 
earlier experience laid more weight on the financial status and size of the partner 
than firms having no earlier experience, whereas the latter firms laid more weight 
on favorable past association than the formers. In this study the criteria of finan-
cial status, firm size and prior relationship were not significant selection criteria 
among any of the subgroups. Instead, partner’s reputation was highly appreciated 
by firms without any earlier IJV experience. 
5.4 Selection criteria and location-specific variables  
In H2 it was expected that the relative importance of selection criteria would vary 
along the location of the IJV. The results (see Table 10) indicate an existence of 
altogether eight cases in which the criteria factors were significantly affected by a 
location-specific variable. Especially in relation to factor three, all four measures 
of location indicated statistically significant differences. In addition, statistically 
significant influences of location-specific variables were found on factor two and 
factor eight,  in both cases based on the region of the IJV and level of economic 
development of the target country. 
Among the individual selection criteria statistically significant differences were 
found in 41 cases. Thus, the results give support to the view that the relative im-
portance of the selection criteria really tend to vary with the location of the IJV, 
while the strength of this variance obviously depends on the location-specific 
variable chosen for focus. Significant differences can be noted when comparing 
the impact of the four location-specific variables on the selection criteria – the 
variables concerning the region of the unit and level of economic development of 
the target country clearly had a more significant influence on the selection criteria 
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than the variables concerning cultural and especially physical distance. However, 
in general it can be concluded that the H2 is supported. 
Table 10. Selection criteria and IJV location-specific variables 
Factor / Criteria 
Region 
Cultural 
distance 
Physical 
distance 
Level of 
development 
WE 
(n=20) 
EE/CEE 
(n=22) 
Asia 
(n=15) 
> 1,50 
(n=30) 
? 1,50 
(n=30) 
>2000km 
(n=22) 
?2000km 
(n=38) 
NON-
OECD 
(n=32) 
OECD 
(n=28) 
Factor 1 -0,16 0,18 -0,09 -0,23 0,21 -0,09 0,05 0,19 -0,23 
P-MANCOMPAT 2,80 2,95 2,60 2,53   3,13 * 2,68 2,92 2,94 2,71 
T-REPUTAT   3,40 * 2,77 2,47 2,60    3,23 ** 2,59 3,11 2,69 3,18 
T-GENMANAG 2,25   3,09 * 2,33 2,47 2,77 2,45 2,71 2,81 2,39 
T-TECHSKILL 2,40    3,41 ** 3,20 2,83 3,00 2,77 3,00    3,25 ** 2,54 
P-PRIORREL 1,75 2,14 2,53 2,03 2,10 2,18 2,00    2,44 ** 1,64 
Factor 2    0,55*** -0,31 -0,45 -0,21 0,19 -0,15 0,08 -0,30     0,36 ** 
T-POSTSALE    3,15 ** 2,14 1,93 2,17 2,70 2,27 2,53 2,03    2,89 ** 
T-MARKDIST    3,70*** 2,32 2,33 2,43 3,23 * 2,86 2,82 2,41 3,32 
T-TRADEMRK    3,15*** 1,91 1,60 2,00 2,47 1,77   2,50 * 1,69   2,86**** 
T-REPUTAT   3,40 * 2,77 2,47 2,60    3,23 ** 2,59 3,11 2,69 3,18 
T-EXPOPPORT   2,85 * 2,33 1,87 2,10 2,62 2,09 2,51 2,19 2,56 
Factor 3 -0,55 0,17     0,56***    0,33 ** -0,29     0,48*** -0,28   0,43**** -0,51 
T-LABCHEAP 1,50 3,18   3,33****     3,17*** 2,17    3,32 ** 2,29   3,34**** 1,89 
T-LOWCOST 2,30 3,18    3,67 **    3,40 ** 2,57    3,50 ** 2,68   3,53**** 2,36 
T-FAVLOCA 2,80 2,77 3,47 3,13 2,80    3,45 ** 2,68 3,19 2,71 
T-GOVNEGO 1,95 3,09     3,64***    3,24 ** 2,47     3,52*** 2,47     3,35*** 2,29 
T-RAWMAT 2,30 2,73 3,00 2,47 2,77 2,73 2,55     3,06*** 2,11 
Factor 4 0,08 -0,17 0,00 0,05 -0,04 0,26 -0,15 -0,17 0,21 
T-FASTENTRY 3,40 2,82 2,93 2,97 3,13 3,14 3,00 2,72   3,43 * 
T-ACCESS 3,00 2,59 2,60 2,77 2,73 2,86 2,68 2,41    3,14 ** 
Factor 5 -0,22 0,17 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,06 -0,03 0,11 -0,13 
P-RELPROD    3,40 ** 2,50 2,27 2,33    3,17 ** 2,59 2,84 2,59 2,93 
Factor 6 -0,08 0,07 -0,03 0,05 -0,05 -0,08 0,04 0,04 -0,05 
P-SIMCULT 1,95 2,09 1,73 1,67    2,23 ** 1,77 2,05 2,06 1,82 
Factor 7 0,31 -0,12 0,06 0,01 -0,01 -0,14 0,08 -0,14 0,17 
T-EXPOPPORT   2,85 * 2,33 1,87 2,10 2,62 2,09 2,51 2,19 2,56 
P-PRIORREL 1,75 2,14 2,53 2,03 2,10 2,18 2,00    2,44 ** 1,64 
Factor 8 -0,34   0,41 * 0,11 0,04 -0,04 -0,09 0,05   0,21 * -0,25 
T-TECHSKILL 2,40    3,41 ** 3,20 2,83 3,00 2,77 3,00    3,25 ** 2,54 
T-GENMANAG 2,25   3,09 * 2,33 2,47 2,77 2,45 2,71 2,81 2,39 
* p ? 0,1      ** p ? 0,05      *** p ? 0,01      **** p ? 0,001 
 
Glaister and Buckley (1997) found only very limited support for the assumption 
that the relative importance of the selection criteria tend to vary along the nation-
ality of the partner, whereas Nielsen (2003) found strong support to the respective 
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assumption. The difference between the results of these two studies may at least 
partly be explained by the differing point of view in data collection: The respond-
ents of the first study represented the local partner (UK firms in IJVs located in 
the UK) whereas the respondents of the latter study represented the foreign part-
ner (Danish firms in IJVs located in both OECD and non-OECD countries). Un-
fortunately neither Glaister and Buckley nor Nielsen measured the influence of 
partner nationality or other location-related factors by other measures than re-
gional distribution. 
The results of this study indicate that all selection criteria in factor two (Post-sale, 
marketing systems and trademark) were individually valued significantly higher 
in IJVs established in Western Europe (WE) than in other areas. The high mean 
value for the importance of marketing and distribution systems (3.70) in the WE 
IJVs is especially noteworthy, and goes along the thinking that tight competition 
in the WE markets demands strong marketing and distribution arrangements. 
There is also some support to the assumption that firms without significant inter-
national experience tend to lay more weight on export opportunities, and there-
fore the marketing and distribution systems of the partner not only in the target 
country but also in the neighboring countries may have been considered of im-
portance. 
Also, reputation of the partner and relatedness of the operation were much more 
highly rated in WE IJVs than in IJVs located elsewhere. Technical skills and gen-
eral management were clearly more important in IJVs located in CEE and EE 
than elsewhere, whereas low costs and ability to negotiate with the government 
were appreciated especially in IJVs located in the Asian countries. 
The relative importance of only one partner-related selection criterion, related-
ness of products, had a statistically significant difference depending on the region 
(WE, EE/CEE, Asia), whereas the region had an impact on the relative im-
portance of altogether 14 task-related criteria (66.7% of all task-related criteria). 
Also, regarding physical distance, the differences between physically near and 
distant IJVs (point of separation at 2000 km) concerned only task-related criteria. 
Regarding the location-specific variables, a strong inter-correlation between the 
distance variables (cultural distance, physical distance) and level of economic 
development was noticed – expectedly most non-OECD countries were culturally 
and physically distant from the country of origin of the foreign partner. Almost all 
criteria in factor three (Low labor and production costs) were individually clearly 
more important for IJVs formed in non-OECD and culturally and physically dis-
tant countries. Especially the relative importance of such criteria as low cost la-
78      Acta Wasaensia 
bor, low cost production, and relations to the government/public institutions were 
clearly higher in the distant and/or non-OECD countries, whereas in OECD coun-
tries fast entry to the market and providing better access to the company’s prod-
ucts were clearly more important than in non-OECD countries. Both results coin-
cide with the earlier results (Nielsen 2003). 
Both Glaister and Buckley (1997) and Nielsen (2003) found that the selection 
criteria of access to knowledge of local culture and access to regulatory per-
mits/market and regulatory knowledge were much more important in Asia than in 
other areas. Furthermore, as in this study, the results by Nielsen indicated that the 
criterion of partner’s ability to negotiate with the government was clearly more 
important in Asia than elsewhere, whereas the results by Glaister and Buckley did 
not indicate support for these findings. Furthermore, no statistically significant 
difference was found in the importance of trust as a selection criterion between 
different geographic areas in neither of the two studies. Thus, in this respect the 
results of Glaister and Buckley (1997) as well as Nielsen (2003) were similar to 
the  findings  in  this  study.  In  the  study  by  Glaister  and  Buckley  the  criteria  of  
partner’s reputation was found to be more important in Japan than elsewhere, 
whereas  the  results  by  Nielsen  as  well  as  the  results  in  this  study  indicated  the  
highest importance of reputation in WE. 
5.5 Selection criteria and investment-specific variables 
In Hypothesis 3 it was expected that the relative importance of selection criteria 
would vary with the investment-specific factors. The results (see Table 11) indi-
cate that the selection criteria factors were significantly influenced by an invest-
ment-specific variable in altogether eight cases: three factors were influenced by 
the form of investment, two by the type of investment and relative partner size, 
and one by the initial approach to the IJV. Related to factors six (relations to pub-
lic sector and partner similarity) and seven (industrial/intellectual property rights 
and export opportunities), no statistically significant relationships were found 
along any of the four investment-specific variables. Thus, the diversification of 
differences along the relative importance of the selection criteria was greater than 
in the cases of foreign-partner-specific and IJV location-specific variables. Based 
on individual selection criteria statistically significant differences were found in 
43 cases: six were based on initial approach to the IJV, eight on relative partner 
size, 10 on type of investment and 19 were based on form of investment. Thus, in 
summary it can be concluded that the results give strong support for H3 along the 
form of investment, moderate support along the type of investment and the rela-
tive partner size, and limited support based on the initial to the IJV. 
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Table 11. Selection criteria and investment-specific variables. 
Factor / Criteria 
Form of 
investment 
Type of 
investment Relative partner size Initial approach 
Green-
field 
(n=37) 
Acquisi- 
tion 
(n=23) 
Totally 
related 
(n=39) 
Partly / 
totally 
unrelated 
(n=19) 
Finnish  
partner 
>50% larger 
(n=43) 
Other 
(n=18) 
Finnish 
partner 
(n=43) 
Other 
(n=15) 
Factor 1    0,30 *** -0,45 -0,06 0,21 0,01 -0,03 -0,10 0,28 
P-MUTRUST    3,69 ** 2,91 3,21   3,84 * 3,41 3,33 3,26   3,93 * 
P-TRUST    3,75 ** 3,05 3,35   3,95 * 3,53 3,39 3,34   4,00 * 
P-MANCOMPAT    3,14 ** 2,35 2,74 3,11 2,71 3,11 2,74 3,20 
P-COMMIT    3,81 *** 2,78 3,42 3,53 3,36 3,53 3,17     4,13 *** 
T-REPUTAT 2,84 3,04 2,74   3,32 * 2,88 3,00 2,88 3,17 
T-GENMANAG   3,03**** 1,96 2,38    3,21 ** 2,60 2,67 2,60 2,87 
T-TECHSKILL   3,30**** 2,30 2,64    3,58 *** 2,93 2,89 2,91 3,07 
P-PRIORREL    2,32 ** 1,65 2,08 2,16 1,95 2,33 1,93 2,53 
Factor 2 -0,23    0,35 ** -0,07 0,16 -0,02 0,05 0,03 -0,09 
T-POSTSALE 2,08    3,00 ** 2,38 2,63 2,45 2,39 2,40 2,53 
T-MARKDIST 2,51   3,35 * 2,92 2,79 2,83 2,83 2,72 3,13 
T-TRADEMRK 1,89    2,78 ** 2,08 2,53 2,33 2,00 2,28 2,13 
T-REPUTAT 2,84 3,04 2,74   3,32 * 2,88 3,00 2,88 3,13 
Factor 3   0,37**** -0,56 -0,09 0,30 0,03 -0,08 -0,18    0,49 ** 
T-LABCHEAP   3,19**** 1,83 2,56 3,05 2,83 2,28 2,42   3,27 * 
T-LOWCOST    3,30 ** 2,48 2,90 3,32 3,02 2,89 2,60     3,87 *** 
T-FAVLOCA 3,16 2,65 2,82 3,42 3,02 2,83 2,72    3,67 ** 
T-GOVNEGO    3,31 *** 2,13 2,89 2,95 2,93 2,65 2,64 3,20 
T-RAWMAT    3,03 *** 1,96 2,41    3,21 ** 2,40   3,11 * 2,51 2,87 
Factor 4 -0,05 0,08    0,22 ** -0,36    0,19 ** -0,47 -0,08 0,21 
T-FASTENTRY 2,86 3,35 3,28 2,63   3,29 * 2,50 2,93 3,13 
T-LOCKNOW 3,22 3,13 3,23 3,21    3,45 ** 2,56 3,05 3,47 
T-ACCESS 2,51   3,13 * 2,87 2,58 2,86 2,50 2,70 2,73 
Factor 5 0,17 -0,26 0,05 -0,04 -0,28      0,69**** 0,04 -0,10 
T-CAPITAL   2,59**** 1,61 2,21 2,37 1,90      2,94**** 2,14 2,47 
T-CREDIT 1,89 1,78 1,92 1,79 1,67   2,29 * 1,76 1,80 
P-RELPROD 2,57 3,04 2,69 2,89      3,05 *** 2,06 2,67 2,87 
T-FACILITY 2,95 2,91 2,79 3,26    3,31 **** 2,06 2,79 3,27 
Factor 6 0,00 -0,01 -0,14 0,29 0,01 -0,01 0,01 -0,02 
P-SIMCULT 2,03 1,83 1,79   2,37 * 1,95 1,94 1,91 2,20 
Factor 7 -0,17 0,25 -0,11 0,17 -0,03 0,07 -0,05 0,14 
P-PRIORREL    2,32 ** 1,65 2,08 2,16 1,95 2,33 1,93 2,53 
Factor 8 0,14 -0,22 -0,28    0,52 *** -0,08 0,19 0,12 -0,32 
T-TECHSKILL  3,30 **** 2,30 2,64    3,58 *** 2,93 2,89 2,91 3,07 
T-GENMANAG  3,03 **** 1,96 2,38    3,21 ** 2,60 2,67 2,60 2,87 
T-LOCIDENT 2,81 2,52 2,90 2,32    2,93 ** 2,17 2,56 3,07 
* p ? 0,1      ** p ? 0,05      *** p ? 0,01      **** p ? 0,001 
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The individual mean values of the importance of selection criteria in factor one 
(Trust, top management and commitment), factor three (Low labor and produc-
tion costs)  and factor eight (Technical personnel and management) were clearly 
higher in IJVs established in the form of a Greenfield investment than as partial 
acquisitions (the criterion of reputation of the partner as the only exception). The 
opposite situation – the importance of certain criteria being valued higher in par-
tial  acquisitions  than  in  Greenfields  –  was  found statistically  significant  (on  the  
0.05 level) only in relation to selection criteria in factor two (Post sale, marketing 
systems and trademark). Noteworthy are the exceptionally high mean values of 
commitment and trust among Greenfield IJVs, and also the clearly greater im-
portance of technical skills, general management, low cost labor, and financ-
ing/capital (mean values over 3.00 in the first three cases) compared to the IJVs 
formed by partial acquisition. 
Concerning the relationship between the investment-specific variable of type of 
investment (i.e. relatedness of the IJV operation to the business of the foreign 
partner) and the relative importance of the selection criteria, two findings mainly 
stood  out:  Firstly,  in  all  of  the  cases  where  unrelated  and  related  types  of  IJVs  
differed (with statistical significance) from each other on how relative importance 
was placed on certain individual selection criteria, the higher importance occurred 
without exceptions for the unrelated type of IJVs. Secondly, these differences 
mainly concerned selection criteria in factor one (Trust, top management and 
commitment) and factor eight (Technical personnel and management). Also, es-
pecially of interest are the high mean values laid on trust among unrelated types 
of IJVs, but the significant differences in the importance of such selection criteria 
as technical skills, general management, and access to raw materials or compo-
nents between unrelated and related types of IJVs should also be noticed. Among 
these three criteria the higher importance placed on the first two (technical skills, 
general management)  by  the  unrelated  types  of  IJVs  is  fairly  logical  and  quite  
expected, but the higher importance of the third criteria (access to raw materials 
or components) among the unrelated types of IJVs lacks a clear explanation and 
may call for closer future examination. 
Based on the investment-specific variable relative size of the partner (grouping: 
Foreign (Finnish) partner >50 % larger vs. other) it is noteworthy that neither of 
the groups had a mean value of importance of 3.55 or higher on any of the indi-
vidual selection criteria. The differing levels of relative importance concerns 
mainly the task-related criteria in factor four (Fast entry and local knowledge) 
and factor five (Capital and credit). 
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In the cases in which the Finnish partner was more than 50 % larger than its IJV 
partner the companies had laid more importance on criteria such as local 
knowledge, possession of facilities and on relatedness of products, whereas espe-
cially financing/capital was clearly more important in cases in which the size of 
the partners was closer to equal. Coinciding with these results, Glaister and Buck-
ley (1997) found that access to capital was important when the non-UK partner 
was larger than the UK partner. 
As mentioned above, the investment-specific variable initial approach to the IJV 
(i.e. who/which party initiated the IJV discussions) had a smaller influence than 
the other three investment-specific variables on the relative importance of the 
selection criteria. Statistically significant differences were found in altogether six 
cases, all of these relating to factor one (Trust, top management and commitment) 
and factor three (Low labor and production costs).  In  all  of  those  six  cases  the  
higher mean values were among the IJVs initiated by the other (i.e. non-Finnish) 
partner. 
Noteworthy are firstly the very high mean and difference related to the criteria of 
commitment and trust, which were clearly held in higher importance among IJVs 
initiated by the other partner than in those initiated by the Finnish partner. The 
exceptionally high importance of commitment (4.13) and trust (4.00) in cases in 
which the initiative came from the other partner, and thus the respondent reacted 
to an outside proposal, is rather understandable and may be explained by consid-
eration of potential opportunism in the spirit of transaction cost theory (William-
son 1985, 1988). 
Instead, the clearly higher importance of the three other selection criteria – low 
cost production, control of a favorable location, and low cost labor – is not nec-
essarily as clear. Glaister and Buckley (1997) found only limited support for the 
influence of initiative to partner selection. They found that financial status and 
reputation were more weighed in cases in which the IJV initiative was made by 
the  foreign  partner  and  the  criteria  of  favorable past association was more im-
portant in cases in which the UK partner initiated the IJV. Thus, what concerns 
the general influence of the initiator on partner selection, the results in this study 
and in the study by Glaister and Buckley are rather similar, but the selection crite-
ria in which the differences were found are very different. 
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5.6 Selection criteria and the investment motives 
In H4 it was expected that the relative importance of the partner selection criteria 
will vary with the motives for the establishment of the IJV. Originally the motives 
were divided into five categories following Dunning’s (1993) classification of 
FDI: 1) access to natural resources, 2) access to markets, 3) efficiency seeking, 
and 4) seeking of strategic assets or capabilities. Among the sample cases only 
one company informed that their main investment motive was accessing natural 
resources. Furthermore, only three companies informed that their main motive 
with  the  establishment  was  seeking  efficiency.  Thus,  those  four  units  had  to  be  
excluded from this analysis. The rest of the units were divided into three groups: 
market seeking IJVs (n= 18), strategic asset seeking IJVs (n=10) and several 
equal goal oriented IJVs (n=28). The last group consists of all those firms which 
had several equally important motives for the formation. 
The results of the tests are presented in Table 12. The results indicate that the 
primary motive for investment had a statically significant influence on the relative 
importance of two selection criteria factors (factors one and three). Based on in-
dividual selection criteria statistically significant differences were found in eight 
cases (GENMANAG and TECHSKILL both in factors one and eight). All those 
cases concerned task-related selection criteria. In summary it can be concluded 
that the results give moderate support for the H4. 
The findings on the relationship between motives for the IJV and importance of 
various selection criteria have been mixed in earlier studies, as discussed earlier. 
Glaister and Buckley (1997) did not find any support for the relationship between 
the  purpose  of  the  IJV  and  the  selection  criteria,  but  their  focus  was  simply  on  
differences between IJVs on the manufacturing and tertiary sectors, instead of 
between IJVs with differing investment motives. Glaister (1996) found support 
only for the relationship between motives and the task-related selection criteria, 
but not for the partner-related selection criteria, and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) 
found only moderate support for the relationships. However, Nielsen (2003) 
found strong support for the relationship between motives and the relative im-
portance of selection criteria. As discussed above, the results of this study gave 
moderate support and coincide with the results by Glaister (1996) indicating sup-
port for the relationship with task-related selection criteria, but not for partner-
related selection criteria. This result was expected as the partner-related selection 
criteria – such as trust and commitment – are by nature more universally im-
portant throughout different industries as the task-related criteria in some cases 
(e.g. accessing natural resources, accessing markets) correspond directly to cer-
tain investment motives (see Chapter 2.2). 
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Table 12. Selection criteria and motives for investment. 
Selection criteria Primary motive for investment 
  
Access to markets 
(n=18) 
Seeking of strategic assets 
or capabilities (n=10) 
several equally important 
motives (n=28) 
Factor 1 -0,45    0,44 * 0,10 
T-GENMANAG 2,00 2,40    2,96 ** 
T-TECHSKILL 2,22 3,00    3,25 ** 
Factor 2 0,35 0,03 -0,18 
Factor 3 -0,09 -0,88      0,29 *** 
T-LABCHEAP 2,50 1,50    3,11 ** 
T-LOWCOST 2,83 2,20   3,32 * 
T-GOVNEGO 2,44 2,00   3,21 * 
Factor 4 0,23 -0,35 0,10 
T-ACCESS      3,39 *** 1,70 2,79 
Factor 5 -0,02 -0,01 -0,02 
Factor 6 -0,31 0,00 0,07 
Factor 7 0,10 -0,18 0,13 
Factor 8 -0,43 0,26 0,07 
T-GENMANAG 2,00 2,40    2,96 ** 
T-TECHSKILL 2,22 3,00    3,25 ** 
* p ? 0,1    ** p ? 0,05     *** p ? 0,01     **** p ? 0,001  
 
A more detailed analysis of the results in this study indicates that in seven of the 
eight cases where statistically significant differences were found on the relative 
importance given to the selection criteria the highest mean values were found in 
cases were several motives had been equally important. Those selection criteria 
were the criteria of supply of general managers and technically skilled personnel, 
and low cost labor, low cost production, and relations to the local government. 
The importance of these selection criteria just in this subgroup may be explained 
by the fact that most of these IJVs were established in EE and CEE or Asia – thus 
the location-specific factors (Chapter 5.4) seem to be the key for this result in-
stead of the investment motive per se. 
The only case in which the highest mean importance of a certain criterion was 
scored by other subgroup than the ‘several-goal-oriented’ firms concerned im-
portance of better access to the company’s products – it was rated much more 
important by the market seeking IJVs in comparison to the other types of IJVs, 
which was logically expected. 
84      Acta Wasaensia 
5.7 Selection criteria and performance 
In H5 it was expected that the relative importance of selection criteria (by the 
foreign partner when selecting their IJV partners) varies according to the perfor-
mance of the IJV. The performance of the IJVs was measured along five-point 
Likert-scale based on the foreign partner’s view on three measures of perfor-
mance: the overall performance of the IJV, the financial performance of the IJV, 
and performance of the IJV compared to its main competitors in 2000–2001. The 
selection of these three criteria was based on the survey made – they were ranked 
as the three most important measures of performance, within a set of altogether 10 
performance evaluation criteria. 
In addition to evaluating the importance of performance measures, the respond-
ents were asked to indicate their satisfaction on the performance of the IJV along 
each performance measure on a five-point Likert-scale (1=Very unsatisfied … 
5=Very satisfied). The values for the top three most important performance 
measures were: overall performance 3.49, financial performance 3.51, and per-
formance compared to the main competitors 3.98.  Thus,  based  on  performance 
compared to the main competitors the managers were somewhat more satisfied 
than based on the two other measures.  
The overall performance correlated rather highly with financial performance 
(0.741) and performance compared to competitors (0.693), but the correlation 
between the two other performance measures was clearly lower (0.458). In gen-
eral, the results indicate that the Finnish firms were rather satisfied with their 
IJVs. However, they were not as satisfied as the companies which were analyzed 
in the studies by Nielsen (2003) and Tatoglu and Glaister (2000). 
The results (see Table 13) indicate statistically significant differences in relation 
to the mean values of two selection criteria factors (factors one and six) in four 
cases. Two of those cases relate to overall performance, one case to financial 
performance and one to performance compared to competitors. Based on individ-
ual selection criterion the results indicated statistically significant differences in 
16 cases. What stood out the most was that in all of those cases greater relative 
importance to certain selection criteria was placed by the well-performing IJVs. 
Results based on overall performance and financial performance indicate differ-
ences in the relative importance of selection criteria in several factors, but based 
on performance compared to competitors only in the relative importance of selec-
tion criteria in factor six (Relations to public sector and partner similarity). Based 
on overall and financial performance the criteria of mutual trust, management 
compatibility and cultural similarity were clearly higher valued among the well-
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performing IJVs. Furthermore, based on overall performance, in the well-
performing cases the management had laid more importance on the criteria of 
commitment to  the  IJV,  enabling the IJV for subsidies/credits, and similarity in 
size compared to the medium-to-low-performing cases. Also standing out among 
the results was the fact that only three of the 16 statistically significant cases 
where the relative importance of selection criteria differed based on IJV perfor-
mance concerned task-related criteria. It can be concluded that the results give at 
least weak support for the finding that relative importance given to partner selec-
tion criteria in well-performing IJVs have been different from those in medium-
to-low-performing IJVs. 
 
Table 13. Selection criteria and performance of the IJV. 
 
Factor / Criteria 
Overall performance Financial performance Performance compared to 
main competitors 
Very/mostly 
unsatisfied / 
neutral (n=27) 
Very/mostly    
satisfied  
(n=30) 
Very/mostly 
unsatisfied / 
neutral  (n=25) 
Very/mostly 
satisfied  
(n=28) 
Very/mostly 
unsatisfied / 
neutral  (n=15) 
Very/mostly 
satisfied  
(n=38) 
Factor 1 -0,21   0,28 * -0,26    0,35 ** 0,02 0,13 
P-MUTRUST 3,04    3,83 ** 3,17   3,82 * 3,36 3,58 
P-MANCOMPAT 2,44     3,30 *** 2,56    3,32 ** 2,67 3,08 
P-COMMIT 3,15    3,83 ** 3,29 3,75 3,43 3,58 
P-PRIORREL 1,96 2,20 1,80    2,50 ** 2,00 2,24 
Factor 2 -0,03 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,33 -0,07 
Factor 3 0,04 -0,05 -0,06 0,00 0,22 -0,11 
T-LOCATION 2,96 2,93 2,60   3,25 * 3,00 2,92 
Factor 4 -0,17 0,20 -0,11 0,09 -0,13 0,06 
Factor 5 -0,16 0,10 0,04 0,03 -0,04 0,06 
T-CREDIT 1,44    2,10 ** 1,63 2,04 1,43 2,00 
P-RELPROD 2,59 2,93 2,36    3,11 ** 2,73 2,76 
Factor 6 -0,30   0,15 * -0,10 -0,01 -0,56    0,14 ** 
T-PUBLSECTR 1,70 1,93 1,92 1,82 1,33    2,08 ** 
P-SIMCULT 1,59    2,23 ** 1,48     2,36 *** 1,53   2,11 * 
P-SIMSIZE 1,22    1,70 ** 1,52 1,50 1,13   1,66 * 
Factor 7 0,09 -0,06 0,16 -0,07 0,01 0,02 
P-PRIORREL 1,96 2,20 1,80    2,50 ** 2,00 2,24 
Factor 8 0,19 -0,15 0,13 -0,10 0,12 -0,06 
* p ? 0,1      ** p ? 0,05      *** p ? 0,01      **** p ? 0,001 
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5.8 Summary and conclusions of the quantitative study 
The goals of the quantitative study were to analyze the relative importance of 
partner selection criteria in IJVs and the relationship between the selection criteria 
and IJV performance, in order to examine whether there are clear differences in 
the relative importance given to certain criteria when a partner is selected for a 
successful or a less-than-successful IJV. In addition, the goal was to analyze how 
the relative importance of partner selection criteria is influenced by foreign-
partner-specific, IJV location-specific and investment-specific factors, and the 
motives for the investment. 
Based on the earlier literature five hypotheses were developed for testing. The 
sample of the study was based on 60 manufacturing IJVs established by 47 Finn-
ish companies mainly during the 1990s in OECD and non-OECD-countries. In 
the analysis of results similar methods were used as in comparable earlier studies 
(mean values, ANOVA, Independent sample t-tests). 
The five most important selection criteria used by the Finnish companies from the 
set of altogether 29 criteria were: our trust in the partner, strong commitment to 
the venture, trust between partners, knowledge of the target market’s economy 
and customs and ability to permit faster entry into the target market. The three 
most important criteria of those five – the three mentioned first – are partner-
related and the two others task-related. The results of this study match very well 
with the findings in earlier studies (Geringer 1988, Glaister 1996, Glaister and 
Buckley, 1997, Nielsen 2003, Tatoglu and Glaister 2000). In the case of the top 
three criteria, the results are easily explained by their universally important nature 
in comparison to the task-related criteria mostly derived from specific skills and 
resources obviously not applying to the needs of the whole population. The im-
portance of knowledge of the target market’s economy and customs was also ex-
pected, and furthermore reflective of the share of the culturally more distant coun-
tries within the sample.  
The reviewed 29 selection criteria represent a number of overlapping perspectives 
which were partly confirmed by a correlation matrix of selection criteria, display-
ing a number of low to moderate inter-correlations. In order to identify a smaller 
number of distinct, non-overlapping selection criteria, exploratory factor analysis 
was used. The factor analysis produced eight underlying factors which explained 
a total of 75.15 % of the observed variance. In general the results were rather sim-
ilar to earlier studies, but the factor compositions were in several respects rather 
different from the findings in earlier studies. 
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Concerning hypotheses one to three, the results indicated that the location-
specific variables (especially the variable region referring to the geographic area: 
WE, EE/CEE, or Asia) and the investment-specific variables (especially the vari-
able form of establishment: Greenfield or partial acquisition) had a significant 
influence on the relative importance of the selection criteria. Instead, the foreign-
partner-specific variables seemed to have a very limited influence on the im-
portance of the selection criteria, meaning that the size and experience of the firm 
had a lesser influence on what firms looked for in their prospective IJV partners 
than what was expected. The more detailed results indicate that across the charac-
teristics of the sample the relative importance of selection criteria differed most in 
factor 3 (Low labor and production costs) where a statistically significant differ-
ence (on a level of 0.1) between the reviewed groups was found in connection to 
altogether seven context-related variables (out of a total of 12). 
Regarding the relationship between IJV performance and the relative importance 
of the selection criteria certain findings stood out. The greatest differences be-
tween well-performing and medium-to-low-performing IJVs were found on fac-
tors one and six. Concerning factor one (Trust, top management and commit-
ment), the managers of the well-performing units had laid much more importance 
on the criteria concerning mutual trust, management compatibility and manage-
ment commitment. Concerning factor six (Relations to public sector and partner 
similarity), the greatest difference was noted on the importance of the selection 
criteria of cultural similarity and similarity in size which had been much more 
important among the well-performing than among the medium-to-low-performing 
units. However, these criteria were not exceedingly important even for the suc-
cessful firms, as the mean values of these criteria were much lower than the mean 
values of the criteria in factor one even in well-performing units. Thus, it can be 
concluded that also the fifth hypothesis received moderate support. The results of 
the study are summarized in Table 14. 
Contrary to the results in this study, Glaister and Buckley (1997) found moderate 
support only for the impact of location of the IJV (in the UK vs. abroad) on selec-
tion criteria, but none for the influence of their other reviewed variables (national-
ity of the partner, industry, purpose, initial approach, relative partner size). Fur-
thermore, results by Nielsen (2003) indicated strong support for the influence of 
partner nationality on the relative importance given to various selection criteria. 
His results also suggested that prior alliance experience had influenced the rela-
tive importance given to task-related selection criteria, but not as much the part-
ner-related  criteria.  Thus,  the  results  of  this  study  coincide  rather  well  with  the  
earlier findings by Nielsen, and seem to suggest that firms without prior alliance 
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experience tend to value more criteria that concern partners’ perceived ability to 
cooperate efficiently and effectively – especially trustworthiness and reputation. 
Table 14. Summary of the quantitative results. 
H1: Foreign-
partner-specific 
factors and the 
selection criteria 
Firm size FDI experience IJV experience Target country 
experience 
Not 
supported 
Not 
supported 
Weak 
support 
Weak 
support 
H2: Location-
specific factors 
and the selec-
tion criteria 
Region 
 
Cultural 
distance 
Physical 
distance 
Level of 
development 
Strong 
support 
Weak 
support 
Weak 
support 
Strong 
support 
H3: Investment-
specific factors 
and the selec-
tion criteria 
Form of 
investment 
Type of 
investment 
Relative partner 
size 
Initiative 
to the IJV 
Strong 
support 
Moderate 
support 
Moderate 
support 
Weak 
support 
H4: Investment 
motives and the 
selection criteria 
Moderate support 
H5: Perfor-
mance of the 
IJV and the 
selection criteria 
Overall performance Financial 
performance 
Performance compared to 
main competitors 
Weak support Weak support Weak support 
 
From the managerial point of view the results indicate that partner-related selec-
tion criteria, especially the criteria of trust – both trust in the partner and between 
the partners – and management commitment are the most valued criteria among 
Finnish firms forming IJVs abroad. However, these criteria concern virtually any 
type of cooperation and are thus much more universal by nature in comparison to 
the main bulk of the task-related criteria, such as trademarks, raw materials, or 
access to subsidies or credits, and therefore rank far above the rest of the criteria 
when measured by mean values of their importance for the respondents. Further-
more, differences in the relative importance of selection criteria between well and 
medium-to-low performing IJVs are noteworthy. An additionally interesting find-
ing  was  that  all  of  the  eight  companies  which  were  extremely  satisfied  with  the  
IJV performance stated that the most important selection criteria was a task-
related selection criteria. Thus, as may be expected, trust and commitment alone 
do not guarantee a successful future for the IJV – there has to exist, for example, 
an adequate strategic fit between the partners in order to enhance the resource 
base and competitiveness of the venture and thus create the rationale for the IJV 
partnership (e.g. Child et al. 2005). 
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The quantitative study contributes to the IJV partner selection literature by adding 
to the rather limited amount of research on the topic in general and the relation-
ships between the relative importance of the partner selection criteria and the IJV 
performance as well as the contextual factors affecting the selection criteria. 
Some earlier studies and also the results in this study indicate potential conceptual 
overlap between task-related and partner-related selection criteria. Therefore we 
can fully agree with Glaister and Buckley (1997) that a more fundamental ap-
proach to the identification of the core differences between the two types of crite-
ria is definitely needed. Furthermore, the results indicate that differences seem to 
exist in the relative importance of the selection criteria depending on the foreign-
partner-specific, location-specific and other investment-specific factors as well as 
motives for the IJV formation. The results also indicate variation in the relative 
importance of selection criteria between well and medium-to-low performing 
IJVs. 
However, there are many limitations in the study. The sample was based only on 
IJVs where the foreign partner was a Finnish firm. Furthermore, although the 
sample was of similar size as in most of the comparable studies, the size is still 
limited, and thus excludes the use of several enhanced methods of statistical anal-
ysis. Thus, in future possible avenues for further research would be an expansion 
of the sample by including more Finnish IJVs, but also for example IJVs estab-
lished by other Nordic firms. This would give basis for evaluating the existence of 
differences in partner selection behavior of Finnish and other Nordic companies. 
Also, the influence of strategic motives for the IJV on the relative weights given 
to various selection criteria is an aspect that should be examined in more detail – 
it may well be expected that differences in what firms look for in their prospective 
IJV partners are more likely to occur between firms with different motives for 
choosing a collaborative operation mode, rather than between firms with different 
general motives for the investment. 
What is clear is that there is a definite need for further research of IJV partner 
selection and its relationship with the subsequent IJV performance. Furthermore, 
this study included only the view of the foreign partner regarding the relative im-
portance of various selection criteria, not the view of the local partner. Thus, one 
possible avenue to continue would be to follow Tatoglu and Glaister (2000) by 
also including the view of the local partner concerning the motives and the selec-
tion criteria. Also, more emphasis should be placed on issues related to strategic 
fit and resource fit in IJV partner selection research, beyond merely looking at the 
similarity of the partners’ objectives as a single selection criterion. 
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There is, however, concerns in focusing on direct connections between the partner 
selection criteria and the subsequent performance of the venture.  As pointed out 
by Varis (2004), common managerial wisdom suggests that success and failure is 
more the result of motivated and technically competent managers than coherence 
between static pre-alliance criteria. 
It  is  here  agreed  upon that  explaining  the  success  or  failure  of  IJVs  through the  
relative importance of partner selection criteria is an approach lacking solid foot-
ing. However, by expanding the perspective into a holistic decision process taking 
place when IJV partners are selected, grounds for performance analysis in con-
nection to partner selection is far more well-founded. Therefore, the next chapter 
deals with the results of the qualitative empirical study focusing on the IJV part-
ner selection from a process-oriented perspective. 
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6 RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
Chapter six comprises the results of the qualitative empirical study. There are 
altogether four cases, each entailing an international joint venture with a Finnish 
company as the foreign partner. First, the four cases are described, roughly fol-
lowing the outline below: 
1. Introduction: Description of the foreign partner, its previous international 
activity, the case IJV and the nature of industry/business of the IJV, back-
ground of the interviewee 
2. Pre-partner selection decision making period: Stimuli to the investment, 
the FDI and collaboration motives, the form of investment (i.e. Greenfield 
vs. partial acq.) motives 
3. Partner selection process: Drawing a desired partner profile, identification 
of prospective partners, evaluation of candidates and choice of partner 
4. Development after the IJV formation 
5. Evaluation of the IJV formation process 
Table 15. Basic information on the four cases. 
Finnish partner COMPANY A COMPANY B COMPANY C COMPANY D 
JV name IJV A IJV B IJV C IJV D 
JV country China China Germany Norway 
JV business B-2-B (Industrial 
textiles / paper 
machine clothing) 
B-2-B (Circuit 
boards (for cell 
phones) 
B-2-B (Power 
source solutions) 
Consumer goods 
(Foodstuff) 
Nature of JV 
business re: JV 
formation (at 
the time of the 
investment) 
Very specific, very 
few competitors 
Potentially very 
large volumes, 
increasing com-
petition 
Niche; all even 
remotely significant 
players know each 
other internationally 
Markets of each 
country dominated by 
few large firms; value 
of brands 
Year of inv. 1999 2000 1997 1997 
Original % of 
FIN partner 
60 % 51 % 25 % 30 % 
Current % terminated terminated 25% (unchanged) 30%  (unchanged) 
Form of inv. Greenfield IJV Greenfield IJV Partial acquisition Partial acquisition 
Originally de-
sired % of own-
ership 
Majority Majority (51%) Majority Not really considered 
- potentially major. 
Target country 
experience 
Exports (small-
scale) 
Trading (small-
scale) 
Very limited expor-
ting 
None 
IJV / interna-
tional experi-
ence prior to 
case IJV for-
mation 
WOS in USA, 
Brazil, Portugal 
WOS in France None in manufactu-
ring 
WOS in UK, Estonia; 
sales units in the 
Baltic countries (EST/ 
LAT/LIT), RUS; (IJV 
in Sweden by another 
business sector) 
Size and strate-
gic importance 
Relatively small Relatively large; 
very significant 
Relatively small; 
originally quite 
important, later 
much less so 
Relatively small; 
moderately important 
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The final decision, i.e. authorization of the partnership decision, was in all four 
cases made by the company board after the partner preference was decided upon 
and the partnership negotiations were completed, it is not discussed in this chap-
ter. Here, the IJV formation process is focused upon leading up to the negotiation 
stage. 
Following the individual case descriptions, the cases are compared to each other 
in regards to identifying factors affecting the decision processes and indicating 
explanations for the observed differences. Then, performance outcomes of IJV 
partner selection processes are discussed, and lastly, the study aims to determine 
the boundaries of separability of the IJV partner selection decision making pro-
cess.  
Due to an agreement on anonymity with the respondents, all cases, IJVs and the 
foreign parents will be identified throughout Chapter 6 by the letters A, B, C and 
D. For example, the Case A concerns the IJV A, and in which Company A is the 
foreign (Finnish) partner. 
6.1 Case A description 
6.1.1 Case A introduction 
The Finnish partner (here referred to as Company A): 
One of Finland's oldest companies, Company A is also a major European produc-
er of technical and industrial textiles. The company's core product line focuses on 
producing a full range of paper machine clothing (PMC). The company is listed 
on the Helsinki stock exchange. 
Previous international activity of Company A: 
Company A has been active in the European export market for several decades. 
However, the firm’s international operations have significantly expanded in the 
last 13 years – during the late 90’s the amounts of international and domestic 
sales at the company were almost equal, whereas in 2009 domestic sales represent 
an amount of 25 % of total  sales.  Originally the firm considered Scandinavia as 
its most important export target area, gradually moving on to Western Europe, 
North America, and later to Asia. Also, the later stages of exporting included ex-
ports to a variation of countries in different regions,  such as South America,  but 
only in a limited capacity. 
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Previous FDI operations of Company A: 
Company A started its foreign production operations in the USA during the mid-
1980’s by acquisition. Later, the company chose to build its own factory in the 
USA, but both were shut down after the turn of the millennium. In other markets, 
the company partially acquired a unit in Portugal in 1990, which they later con-
verted into their wholly-owned subsidiary. 
The case IJV description (here referred to as IJV A): 
Representing  the  company’s  PMC division,  the  IJV A was  formed in  1999 as  a  
Greenfield joint venture between Company A and a local partner in Tianjin, Chi-
na. The unit represents both the first international co-operative manufacturing unit 
of Company A as well as its first direct investment in Asia. Production at the new 
facility began the following year (2000) giving Company A entry into the fast-
growing Chinese paper industry. Since the formation of the JV, Company A has 
owned a share of 60 % of the joint venture. In the turn of 2007/2008 all opera-
tions in IJV A were shut down and the JV was made inoperative. Today, Compa-
ny A has its own wholly-owned manufacturing unit in the same region, and it has 
taken over the business of IJV A. 
For Company A, the strategic importance of the venture during the time of the 
investment was solely based on gaining access to the Chinese market and thus 
laying the groundwork on future operations in the area: 
“It was not really all that important for us in regards to its size, total sales 
and such. On the other hand, its importance is much higher when it’s viewed 
as a link in the chain – giving us a point of entry to China and gaining a foot-
hold and knowledge to build on in the future.” 
The nature of the IJV A’s business, industrial textiles and paper machine clothing, 
can be described as very specific and niche-oriented business-to-business opera-
tion. According to the interviewee, there were very few competitors globally, and 
essentially none in China at the time of the investment. 
The interviewee for Case A: 
The interviewee was recruited by Company A for the position of Division Man-
ager in early 1998, and immediately started working on the IJV formation plan-
ning. He also became a member in the executive board in 1998. The interviewee 
was a central piece in Company A’s personnel in regards to IJV A all the way 
from the initial  planning of the IJV formation until  the divestment of the unit  in 
the turn of 2007/2008. Prior to the recruitment to Company A, the interviewee 
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had 15 years of management experience in working for a large Finnish publicly 
listed company, including two years as the Area Manager in Asia with an office 
in Singapore. 
6.1.2 Pre-partner selection decision making period 
In case A, an IJV located in China, the main investment stimuli can be catego-
rized as a strategic opportunity. Company A’s board and management had real-
ized the importance of entering the Asian market due to the expected growth of 
the Asian customer base by following market reports and analyses in their field 
during the late 90’s. At first, the company singled out the Indonesian market with 
the strongest growth potential, although the statement in the company strategy 
more generally referred to Asia. Direct investment was the preferred means of 
entry from the very beginning due to the previously mentioned expected market 
growth, and thus being able to manufacture near the customer. 
After the decision to enter the Asian market via FDI was made, the company ex-
plored several different options, including a wholly-owned Greenfield unit, as 
well as co-operative FDI modes. At a very early stage it was decided that the pre-
ferred  mode  of  operation  was  to  form  a  joint  venture,  as  it  was  seen  to  be  less  
risky and financially less requiring in comparison to a wholly-owned unit. It was 
also clear from the beginning that the IJV was to be formed as a Greenfield in-
vestment rather than partial acquisition, as acquiring a share of an existing com-
pany was seen too risky: 
“It’s a completely different deal to buy a share of an existing Chinese or other 
foreign company than to set up a Greenfield JV – you never know what kinds 
of skeletons you’ll find in the closet, it is definitely not reasonable to take such 
risks.” 
As for the collaboration motive, the interviewee of Company A also highlighted 
the impact of the environment on the decision to enter China via a collaborative 
mode – Asia, particularly China, was seen by Company A as an environment that 
increased the importance of looking for a local partner rather than going in alone: 
“China is certainly one of the toughest markets to enter. Generally speaking, 
the Chinese way of thinking is quite different to that in the Western world. Al-
so, gaining access to existing networks was a factor in the partnering deci-
sion, as was also very much the language.” 
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6.1.3 Partner selection process of Case A 
The IJV formation process, as perceived by the interviewee who was brought in 
to the company to manage the IJV formation process in early 1998, took altogeth-
er approximately 18 months. No strict timetable was set at any point of the pro-
cess, and there seemed to be no time constraints affecting the IJV formation pro-
cess. Therefore, time and its availability was not a factor in investment type deci-
sions, searching for potential candidates, the partnership negotiations or any other 
stage in the process and the IJV formation decision making. 
Drawing a desired partner profile 
In Case A, There was no clear-cut profile created as to what kind of a partner the 
firm is  looking  for.  The  population  of  potential  candidates  was  extremely  small  
due to the specific nature of the niche-like business the firm operated in, thus al-
lowing Company A to scan the whole existing population in its search. 
Knowledge of local customs, culture and language was a clear pre-requisite and 
one of the key motivational factors to choosing a collaborative operation mode in 
the first place, reflecting Company A’s lack of experience in doing business in 
Asia. 
Certain features from the task-related point of view, as adequate knowledge of 
manufacturing products in Company A’s field, ability to provide appropriate per-
sonnel for the venture, and adequate size of the firm were highlighted, as was also 
the importance of good reputation, representing the partner-related point of view. 
Technical skills and know-how of the partner prospects weren’t held in much of 
importance in regards to creating competitive edge for the IJV. Instead, Company 
A was merely looking for adequacy in this regard – a partner capable of enabling 
the IJV to absorb the know-how brought in from Finland and to operate on this 
basis.  As stated by the interviewee of Company A: 
“We didn’t really specify the profile of a desired partner candidate. Basically, 
besides a good reputation, we were looking for someone with adequate 
knowledge of manufacturing products in our field. Actually, we didn’t really 
need their know-how after all, as all the necessary know-how was brought in 
to the IJV from Finland. What we mainly needed from the partner was for 
them to find and recruit appropriate personnel for the venture so that we 
wouldn’t need to start developing them all the way from scratch. Still there 
existed only a handful of potential candidates, and obviously we weren’t in-
terested in the tiniest players in the market, meaning those whose yearly pro-
duction capacity nears something that a major player produces within a day.” 
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Identification of candidates 
Due to the specific nature of the business there existed a very limited number of 
companies operating in the Chinese market. This clearly affected the identifica-
tion process: 
“I don’t exactly remember where, or through which information channel, the-
se candidates were identified. Basically, if we didn’t know about a certain 
company, we weren’t interested in it – in that case it would’ve been a too 
small and insignificant player. In our business the potential candidates must 
be known throughout, and in case a company surfaces that isn’t known by the 
key players in the business, cooperation with it should clearly be avoided.” 
Very soon after Company A had decided to pursue IJV formation in Asia, four 
Asian firms in their industry, one in Korea and three in China, were identified, 
and the representatives of the company visited each of the candidates. Immediate-
ly as the firm started to look into potential candidates, a preference for the JV 
partner existed, largely due to previous cooperation. Therefore, no other partner 
candidate was considered equally or close to equally enticing at any point of the 
IJV formation process. In this case it is clear that evaluation of candidates inter-
twined along the process of identification of the candidates as the top preference 
existed from the beginning of the identification process. The Korean partner can-
didate was seen throughout the process as the secondary candidate and one that 
was considered acceptable as an IJV partner, although clearly ranked behind the 
preferred candidate: 
 “In case the joint venture negotiations would have, for some reason, fallen 
through, we would have very likely gone forward with our next option, the 
Korean company. Even if we didn’t rank the candidates systematically by us-
ing some sort of numeric evaluation system, we certainly had the main candi-
dates ranked in order.” 
Evaluation and choice of partner 
As previously described, the specificity of Company A’s field of business was a 
significant factor in the IJV formation process, showing through the small popula-
tion of prospective partners, and Company A’s general awareness of each identi-
fied firm. Knowledge of local customs, culture and language was a pre-requisite 
for the candidates, and also knowledge of manufacturing products in Company 
A’s field, ability to provide appropriate personnel for the venture, and adequate 
size of the firm were demanded, as was good reputation. 
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The company ended up forming the JV with a Chinese partner which was the only 
one of the known partner candidates that it had previously dealt with; the Chinese 
partner had acquired technology know-how from the Finnish company some 
years prior to the IJV formation. Besides for the fact the partner was perceived as 
one that has a good reputation as one of the frontline companies within the mar-
ket, the respondent underlined the importance of previous business relations: 
“Knowing one another and having previously dealt with each other was cer-
tainly one of the most important factors in choosing to partner with this spe-
cific company.” 
Not only was there a connection on the company-level, the interviewee stresses 
the fact that certain key personnel were personally known by the Finnish compa-
ny’s management, as the Finnish managers had visited the Chinese partner and 
certain employees of the Chinese partner had been trained in Finland as a part of 
the know-how transfer deal prior to the IJV formation. 
An essential factor in deciding to partner with chosen partner candidate was the 
fact that the candidate had to offer adequate and well-located production facilities 
as well as the needed machinery. This obviously lowered the financial investment 
needed in setting up the venture. However, the readily available manufacturing 
facilities  and  machinery  were  even  more  so  a  factor  in  deciding  whether  to  go  
alone or to set up a joint venture, than merely a factor in comparing different 
partner candidates. This is highlighted by the fact that the secondary candidate, 
the Korean firm, was also in possession of facilities suitable for the potential joint 
venture operation. 
Regarding the compatibility of partners’ motives and objectives for the IJV, 
Company A perceived the situation to reflect a stereotypical joint venture be-
tween a Western European and a Chinese firm, where the Finnish partner was 
clearly driven by the motive of gaining access to a growing market and being able 
to manufacture near the customer, and looking for a partner to provide knowledge 
of local customs, culture and language. According to the interviewee working for 
Company A, there was no open discussion between the partners on each others’ 
motives in entering the IJV partnership at any point. Still, a clear and straightfor-
ward thinking by Company A’s management regarding Chinese firms in general 
existed in the form of the Chinese firms’ quest of acquiring high technology from 
the Western world. Also, the interviewee clearly brought the issue forward as a 
potential source of conflict, yet it was regarded as a non-avoidable circumstance 
when collaborating with the Chinese. Furthermore, this aspect had already been 
present in the partners’ previous collaboration, as the Chinese partner was per-
ceived as having sold forward the technology obtained in the know-how transfer 
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between the firms. As Company A still valued the previous relationship when 
choosing an IJV partner, it clearly had reached acceptance in regards to this non-
avoidable circumstance: 
“Obviously the main agenda of the Chinese is to gain access to high technol-
ogy, get it inside the country borders, which they obviously succeed in. How-
ever, who then owns the technology, that’s another question … In fact, while 
we dealt with this partner prior to the joint venture, transferring know-how, 
we were aware that the partner had already sold this know-how forward with-
in China. That’s not exactly a part of the Western way of doing business but 
something that you have to accept when dealing with the Chinese.” 
The fact that the preferred and eventually selected Chinese partner operated in the 
same business as the IJV was a concern, and the management views clearly re-
flect the uncertainty of Company A in regards to the partner’s potentially oppor-
tunistic future behavior: 
“There was a concern among us regarding knowledge management – more 
specifically the fact that the partner operates in the same business as the IJV, 
and there were discussions among our management whether we should be 
concerned that the people they bring in to the IJV might move right back to 
the partner company. As far as we know, this did not happen – but obviously 
there was someone transferring knowledge to the Chinese partner, who knows 
if one could actually benefit financially from doing so.” 
Because of this concern, it was strictly driven through in the negotiations that the 
scope of the production in the IJV didn’t include the whole manufacturing pro-
cess. Instead, the process was divided in two, where the first part took place in 
Finland, and the product was then finalized in the IJV facilities in China. 
The decision to start the manufacturing process in Finland, thus limiting the part-
ner’s access to the complete process was, however, not only driven by the need to 
protect  the  technology  know-how,  but  also  by  cost  efficiency.  The  original  de-
mand and customer base were not sufficient to rationalize the costs of acquiring 
the machinery needed for the IJV to accommodate the full manufacturing process.  
However, there was a plan agreed upon during the IJV partnership negotiations 
which implied that the partners were to increase their investment in the IJV, and 
the whole manufacturing process was to be transferred to the IJV after approxi-
mately five years of operation and gaining a foothold within the Chinese markets. 
By late 1999, the IJV agreement was completed, thus making the length of the 
formation process approximately 18 months. Although time was not a constraint 
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to the IJV formation decision making, the information available to the Finnish 
company limited the depth of evaluation of partner candidates, especially in re-
gards to the financial resources of each candidate: 
“We didn’t really compare the financial resources of the candidates due to 
this information, the financial reports, not being available to us. Practically 
that information didn’t seem to exist. All that the candidates told us were the 
amounts of sales and total production, but all those numbers seemed to be 
somewhat heavily rounded estimates and nothing was shown on paper. “ 
6.1.4 Development after the IJV formation 
The original feasibility study included an expansion plan according to which sig-
nificant investment in the IJV was to take place after four to five years of opera-
tion, yet after five years of operation the Chinese partner was unwilling to invest 
as originally planned. As Company A was still intent on expanding the unit and 
its operation, things even got to a point where Company A suggested that it would 
purchase all the necessary machinery from the partner. However, Company A still 
had no interest in acquiring the partner company due to still being concerned 
about what it might find in the books. As the discussion in regards to expanding 
the IJV and then buying the machinery took place from 2003 to 2005, and as it 
became  clear  the  Chinese  partner  was  unwilling  to  invest  in  the  IJV  as  well  as  
dealing the machinery, the Finnish company started planning its own wholly 
owned manufacturing unit in China. This wholly owned unit was eventually built 
and became operational in early 2008. 
As to why the Chinese partner turned reluctant to additional investment in the 
IJV, even though it was originally agreed upon in the feasibility study during the 
IJV formation negotiations, the interviewee clearly points out the changes in per-
sonnel as a key issue, and a major factor in causing the downfall in communica-
tion and cooperation between the partners: 
“We of course still believe that the partner was sincerely on board when the 
original feasibility study was drafted and the expansion plan of the unit was 
agreed upon. Naturally we have no proof of that, but our belief is that the in-
tent was there all along. This should of course be asked from the Chinese yet 
there’s not much point in that as the key personnel relating to the IJV has 
changed three times – which very much explains why things changed.” 
Trust and commitment in the partnership notably weakened towards the end of 
the operation. Several changes in key personnel on both sides were a major factor 
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also in this regard. Naturally, trust between the partners deteriorated significantly 
as the Chinese partner was made known about the plans of Company A to build 
its own unit in China. The process of setting up that wholly-owned unit started in 
2005. Now, after the IJV was made inoperative, the partner itself manufactures 
and sells several similar products as the IJV manufactured. 
“We obviously have noticed that the partner manufactures a significant por-
tion of the IJV’s products. Clearly they were able to take in the know-how 
which was why we originally decided to limit their access to the whole manu-
facturing process. Somehow they have learned the whole process, although 
it’s hard to say how well they have succeeded, but in any case their sales rep-
resentatives are nowadays often right against ours.” 
6.1.5 Evaluation of the IJV formation process 
When looking back to the decisions made and actions taken when forming the 
venture, the interviewee believes that nothing could have been done differently in 
the formation process that would have changed the outcome of the IJV operation 
and the complications that eventually caused the termination of the IJV. Even 
though the IJV did not follow the plan portrayed in the feasibility study, along the 
planned expansion after four to five years of operation, the Finnish company con-
siders it reached its most essential objective – gaining access and a foothold in the 
Chinese market. Also, its decision to enter China via a collaborative operation 
mode is still today perceived as the right decision per the interviewee: 
“As we now have invested in our own wholly-owned unit in China that has 
taken over the business of the IJV, it is clear that even with the current ca-
pacity the unit is now running – which is not even close to what we have 
planned for it to reach in the near future – it would have made no sense busi-
nesswise ten years ago when we formed the IJV. Without the market share and 
customer base that was gained through the IJV the wholly-owned unit would 
have caused significant losses for several years.” 
As the choice of entry mode was perceived optimal in later evaluation, Company 
A considers the partner selection process a success even though the relationship 
and cooperation deteriorated in less than five years of operation. As previously 
described, Company A connects the cooperation failures directly to changes in 
personnel on both sides, and considers these changes unforeseeable prior to the 
IJV formation. As also already mentioned, another adequate partner candidate 
was had been identified, but clearly ranked secondary to the Chinese partner. Af-
ter the IJV cooperation started deteriorating before five full years of the IJV oper-
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ation, the resource need of Company A had diminished and the market growth 
had met expectations, creating rationale for a wholly-owned manufacturing unit: 
“After about 4 years of operation we would not have even looked for [a part-
ner]. At that time the market share and customer base was becoming sufficient 
for a wholly-owned operation.” 
Still,  even  though Company A considered  the  circumstances  right  for  a  wholly-
owned operation in China at that time, the interviewee believes that the IJV would 
have stayed operational if the partnership had followed the original expansion 
plan and the relationship had maintained the necessary conditions for effective 
cooperation. The result – moving on to a wholly-owned operation – is now per-
ceived as a potentially better outcome than continuing the IJV partnership: 
“Well, had the partner been willing to invest in the IJV expansion as original-
ly agreed upon we probably would have continued the IJV operation as 
planned – the original plan was for 30 years, nonetheless – but in the end it 
was probably better for us that things ended up as they did.” 
Considering the pre-formation uncertainty in regards to the potentially opportun-
istic behavior of the Chinese partner it is relevant to evaluate the IJV relationship 
also from this respect. Company A perceives that the IJV operation spawned a 
competitor in the Chinese market through know-how flow to the Chinese partner, 
yet the former IJV partner is not considered a major threat at present time: 
 “Competition in this business isn’t really all about being able to manufacture 
the product. It’s also very much about thorough knowledge of the application 
and service as a larger entity with regard to a specific customer. As already 
mentioned, the former IJV partner has been right there against us in some in-
stances yet we don’t really consider them a significant competitor at this 
point. Still, you can say that a new competitor, at least on some level, was 
born due to the IJV.” 
Therefore, Company A finds justification to its decision to limit the partner’s ac-
cess to production know-how, even though the partner at least on some level suc-
ceeded in acquiring the needed know-how: 
“Obviously what happened with regard to the know-how flow into the partner 
company justifies our pre-IJV formation decision to limit the partner’s access 
to the whole production process. If nothing else, we were able to make it 
harder and more time-consuming for the partner to acquire all necessary 
know-how for being able to operate alone in the same business.” 
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The IJV formation process of Case A, based on the interview data and additional 
documentation, is presented in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. IJV formation process in Case A. 
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6.2 Case B description 
6.2.1 Case B introduction 
The Finnish partner (Company B): 
Company B provides services for the design and manufacturing of high-tech 
printed circuit boards. Its products are used in telecommunications networks, 
handheld devices, automobiles and several types of industrial applications. Com-
pany B was created during the late 90’s when a long-standing Finnish multi-
industry enterprise was split in two, and it mainly focuses on the high-end prod-
ucts in its field. The company is listed on the Helsinki stock exchange. 
Previous international activity of Company B: 
Company B started to aim for international markets in the late 90’s. Before be-
coming active on the FDI front in 1998 the international aspect of Company B’s 
operations was limited to certain international customers and suppliers of both 
machinery and materials. No significant exporting took place. 
Previous FDI operations of Company B: 
The first foreign direct investment operation by Company B took place in the end 
of the 90’s as Company B acquired a full ownership of a manufacturing unit in 
France. This was later followed by a minority-share manufacturing joint venture 
investment in Thailand. 
The case IJV description (here referred to as IJV B): 
IJV B was formed in 2001 as a Greenfield joint venture between Company B and 
a Taiwanese partner. Even though the partner was not local it had an extensive 
background of operating with the Chinese and in China, and considered the local 
customs and culture familiar. IJV B was the second foreign direct investment by 
Company B in Asia, after the minority-share manufacturing joint venture invest-
ment in Thailand, and thus also its second international co-operative manufactur-
ing unit. The minority-owned investment was completed as a partial acquisition, 
at the time the IJV B partner selection process was well under way and the pre-
ferred candidate already identified. The unit was majority-owned (51 %) by 
Company B, who several years later raised its ownership share temporarily into 
70 %. Later, Company B transferred its ownership of IJV B under a separate 
holding company, and sold a share of 80 % of the holding company to a Hong 
Kong based firm. 
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IJV B’s field of business, circuit boards for cellular phones, is naturally a busi-
ness-to-business operation. The key features of the industry at the time of the in-
vestment were, firstly, the extremely large potential concerning sales or manufac-
turing volumes, and secondly, the rapidly increasing competition both globally 
and locally at the target country at the time of the investment. 
The interviewee for Case B: 
At the time of the IJV formation, the interviewee had already worked as the Fi-
nancial Director of Company B for several years. He continued at the same posi-
tion until his retirement in 2008. The interviewee was directly involved in the 
planning and implementation of the IJV formation as a member of the executive 
board  of  the  firm which  was  in  charge  of  pushing  the  IJV process  forward.  His  
prior involvement in foreign direct investment decision making comprised the 
fore-mentioned previous FDIs by Company B – the acquisition of the French 
manufacturing unit and the minority-share joint venture in Thailand in the late 
90’s. 
6.2.2 Pre-partner selection decision making period 
Similar to Case A, there were motives most naturally categorized under strategic 
opportunities in Case B. However, the original stimulus could arguably be also 
perceived as a problem – in this case, the threat of not being able to cater to the 
main customer’s needs. The business and the growth of Company B have histori-
cally been tightly linked to its main customer, a major player in global electronic 
industry. Thus, it is very central in Case B to note that the main driver for interna-
tionalization towards Asia was to grow and expand following the footsteps of the 
company’s main customer. Here, the original stimulus for entering China can thus 
be labeled as following the main customer, also centrally motivated by entering a 
growing market, similar to Case A. 
A collaborative mode was preferred from the beginning, as Company B was fi-
nancially limited to enter the Far East market via a wholly-owned FDI. Company 
B also wanted a partner to divide the financial risk involved, and due to its lack of 
target-country-related experience, Company B needed a local partner, or a partner 
able to operate like a local, to access knowledge of local customs, language and 
networks: 
“Already right in the beginning of the strategic planning process it was un-
derstood that the Far East comprised a challenging environment for a West-
ern firm to establish operations in. Focusing on China, the environment was a 
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key reason for why we were looking for a Chinese or a Taiwanese partner 
with thorough knowledge of the local culture and language.” 
Two years prior to forming IJV B – when Company B hadn’t yet become an in-
dependent  entity  due  to  the  split  of  the  long-standing  Finnish  MNE  –  and  also  
prior to acquiring a French manufacturing unit, the management of Company B 
stated in a draft of its strategy outline that the next geographical direction for 
growth is strongly indicated as Asia by its customer base (mainly the main cus-
tomer). Still, due to inexperience in international operations, the board of the 
MNE considered it more sensible to start internationalizing within Europe before 
expanding to more distant and what were considered more uncertain environ-
ments: 
“The management suggested entering the Asian market via a manufacturing 
investment, as was wished by the main customer of the company. However, 
the company board rejected this suggestion – because the company was lim-
ited in its internationalization experience certain members of the board felt 
that the company should train internationalization by expanding its opera-
tions within Europe before going further out. They simply seemed to lack 
courage, which resulted in delay in entering the Asian market.” 
As  the  original  strategy  outline  spoke  of  Asia  as  the  geographical  direction  of  
expansion, ‘Asia’ implied the Far East all along according to the interviewee. The 
country choice, China, was not separately made prior to identifying the preferred 
partner candidate, yet it was the main Geographical focus ever since the original 
investment stimulus coming from the main customer. 
6.2.3 Partner selection process of Case B 
The  decision  process  essentially  took  off  following  the  split  of  the  MNE  and  
Company B becoming independent. In a management meeting in July 1999 it was 
planned that Company B should pursue investing in the Far East markets, without 
explicitly specifying a country or a more detailed area. According to documenta-
tion, the key aspects discussed were the reasoning for entering the Far East mar-
kets, the criteria for identifying potential candidates, setting a deadline for finding 
a potential partner, and naming the person in charge of the project planning. The 
meeting thus resulted in a decision to prepare material for the company board for 
its decision to invest in the Far East. A deadline for finding a suitable partner was 
set  as the end of 1999, giving the team altogether six months for the search and 
selection process. 
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The head of a manufacturing unit of Company B in Finland had previously spent 
approximately a month in Asia gathering market information and laying ground-
work for a potential investment operation. Also, the management compiled a con-
cise view of the main actors within the market, including their production capaci-
ties and future plans, by using reports of market research institutes and compa-
nies.  Following a desktop research, the first group to start traveling around Asia 
and visiting local actors in the circuit board manufacturing industry consisted of 
the CEO, the technology manager and the person named in charge of the project 
planning, largely due to his experience in visiting the Far East circuit board facto-
ries knowledge of the market. 
Drawing a desired partner profile 
As mentioned above, certain criteria for what Company B was to look for when 
identifying prospective IJV partners were set in the initial management team 
meeting.  At  this  point,  all  that  was  stated,  firstly,  was  that  Company  B  was  to  
look for a local partner who is also looking for a partner, thus indicating that 
Company B considered it important that the partner was already strategically 
aligned for inter-firm collaboration. Also, it was stated that the local partner 
should be of smaller size than Company B. 
The key reasons for why to enter the Far East markets were stated in a rather 
broad manner. At that point, the reasoning referred to aspects such as globaliza-
tion, low cost production, market potential, technology, developing competitive-
ness in Europe, and increasing capacity. 
Identification of candidates 
Initially the management of Company B had set very broad criteria for short list-
ing potential partner candidates. They were looking for a local partner who is also 
looking for a partner, and was smaller than Company B. 
The process of identification and screening started as desktop research based on 
reports by market research institutes and firms focusing on the electronic industry 
and more specifically on the circuit board industry. The reports included the most 
essential information as perceived by the Finnish firm, including names of the 
local firms and numbers such as turnovers, volumes, and personnel. Through the-
se publications, Company B’s trade show connections and knowledge gained on 
the longstanding Chinese trading business Company B was able to compile a long 
list of candidates that consisted of several dozens of local firms. Screening the 
long list started out slowly and quite informally inside the management team: 
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“First of all, everyone had entered names to the long list using these different 
sources of information. The long list was then discussed within the manage-
ment team on a name-by-name basis. We were basically asking each other 
‘What’s your view on this one?’ and stating our opinion early on in a way 
such as ‘This one’s definitely out of question’. Certain prominent names were 
marked on the list. This is basically how we started to proceed towards the 
short list.” 
Also, the Shanghai office of a global consulting firm was engaged in the process 
in December 1999, at the time Company B was preparing its own short list, with 
an agenda to screen potential candidates and provide additional information on 
selected local companies. The CEO of Company B then visited the partner candi-
dates suggested by the consulting firm to inquire their interest and possible terms 
in entering a potential partnership. However, these candidates were not of interest 
for Company B due to requirements for large financial investment. 
“The Shanghai people did their own search while our people did our own, 
travelling around Far East. In the end, none of the candidates that came from 
the Shanghai people interested us – they were simply too greedy, requiring 
significant financial investment, or would have more or less wanted to sell 
their whole company. We weren’t looking for that. Our firm would have gen-
erated the kind of goodwill buying such a company that our financial result 
would not have been able to take it.” 
Company B had no previous units in China. Its target-country-specific experience 
was solely limited to its trading business that started in the late 1980’s – Company 
B sourced lower-end products for its Finnish customers from Chinese manufac-
turers, while its own production was focused on high-end products. While locat-
ing Chinese circuit board manufacturers with adequate quality systems in place 
with regard to producing for Western customers, Company B gained initial 
knowledge of local markets and manufacturers.  
Company B had no previous business relationship with its eventual local IJV 
partner. However, the managers of the two firms had met each other; the first con-
tact between the firms took place in an international trade show meeting in Ger-
many in 1998, two years prior to starting the IJV partnership negotiation. In this 
discussion in informal settings the firms had briefly explored the idea of cooperat-
ing somehow, in no specific and detailed form or mode. This discussion seems to 
have affected the investment decision process of Company B: 
“During an evening at the German trade show the representatives of our firm 
and the Taiwanese firm had engaged in unofficial discussion on different pos-
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sibilities of how the two could cooperate. Although this did not directly lead to 
taking action, it can be seen as the initial step in our cooperation.” 
Evaluation and choice of the partner 
After Company B had listed the first draft of candidates in its long list it started to 
eliminate the candidates and move towards a short list. The main bulk of the long 
list was eliminated due to such directly visible factors as the size and the origin of 
the firm. A factor here was also that the eventually chosen firm was publicly 
listed and thus raised the issue of availability of information: 
“As we stated in the initial management meeting, we were looking for a local 
Far East partner that was smaller than us. Obviously several firms fit into 
those criteria. Still, the one we ended up choosing was just the kind what we 
desired – its turnover in US dollars was approximately equal to our turnover 
in Euros. Moreover, as it was a publicly listed company much of the key in-
formation was openly available, even right up on their website, thus there was 
no need to go into procedures and issues relating to confidentiality.” 
What was also centrally in play was the level of technological knowledge of the 
firm. It was, besides ideal size of the firm, one of the key factors to raise the cho-
sen partner above the other top candidates: 
“What really interested us there with this candidate was their technological 
competence – they already had very smart factories in Taiwan. We knew very 
well that when your strategy is to go after the large multinational customers 
you don’t play around with just anyone, they certainly require your partners 
to be of the sort who are capable and take care of their business.” 
In the beginning of the year 2000 the preferred partner prospect was very clear, 
after selected potential candidates were thoroughly looked upon by the Shanghai 
office  of  a  global  consulting  firm  Company  B  had  hired  to  complement  its  
knowledge, and none of these were deemed interesting by Company B in compar-
ison to its already identified leading candidate and eventual partner. This prospec-
tive partner was at this point recognized superior to other candidates mainly due 
to its technological competence, ideal size, and perceived reliability boosted by its 
status as a publicly listed company. As to what additionally motivated Company 
B to target this specific candidate was its preferably located production facility 
available for the JV. 
Instead of bringing up the significant distance in national cultures between Fin-
land and Taiwan, the interviewee stresses the importance of a good cultural fit in 
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regards to the corporate cultures of the firms. The organizational culture fit 
seemed apparent for both parents, positively affecting the chemistry between the 
two management teams: 
“When we started to put the thing together the people at the Taiwanese firm 
had been operating the circuit board industry for more than twenty years, 
they knew what they were doing and they knew the market. Our people were 
the same, experts in the circuit board industry. It was obvious that our cul-
tures fit together, between the teams that were setting up this venture. It was 
more about industry professionals working together instead of financial ex-
perts working on the numbers.” 
There was no clear second choice, a viable backup plan, in case the partnership 
negotiation fell through with the preferred candidate. When considering how 
Company B would have proceeded in case the JV partnership couldn’t have hap-
pened with the preferred option, the interviewee believes they would have first 
gone back to short list evaluation. In Case B, the partner selection process was 
clearly separate from the IJV formation process – it seems that Company B would 
have been ready to reconsider their original founding criterion that required the 
partner to be a local Far East company: 
“Of course it’s pure speculation in this case, but it can be assumed that we 
would have moved back to take a closer look on the other options on our short 
list. Also, there was a competitor from Europe who had just started to set up 
their own manufacturing unit in the Shanghai area – we very well might have 
considered pursuing the option of joining forces with a European firm who 
had already taken care of the permits and other legal issues in setting up a 
venture there. Still, the first move would likely have been to really go into the 
details of the other local firms on our list. The chosen partner was thought of 
as an ideal partner in such an early stage, that no other candidate was really 
seriously considered as a possibility down the line.” 
The preparation team started its work on the partnership immediately. Due to ex-
tensive financial reconfiguration within Company B during the spring of 2000 the 
financing of the IJV investment was secured in May 2000. After securing the fi-
nancing, another consult, a global investment bank, ran its own screening of po-
tential candidates, yet no candidates were found that would have challenged the 
preferred Taiwanese candidate and warranted a deeper look. In fact, the inter-
viewee considered this move more as a basis for the company board to justify that 
it had all bases covered, so to say, due to the relative size and strategic importance 
of the venture: 
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“It seems that the board always wants to cover its back, meaning that they 
want the long lists and outside opinions to show that every stone was turned 
during the process, so that no one is able to point fingers at them later on. 
Therefore it can be surely said that the groundwork was done quite thorough-
ly.” 
This was followed by a visit of the preparation team of Company B, consisting of 
the CEO, technology manager and another member of the team with previous 
experience in dealing with the Chinese, at the headquarters of the Taiwanese 
partner during early summer of 2000, leading to a meeting between the partners in 
Finland in August 2000. Simultaneously, during the summertime, a due diligence 
process of the Chinese operations of the partner candidate was outsourced and 
undertaken by lawyers of a global consulting firm. No other candidates were con-
sidered seriously enough to warrant a thorough intelligence. 
The Taiwanese partner made it quickly clear that it was, in principle, willing to 
enter in a joint venture with Company B. For the basis of the partnership discus-
sions, the Taiwanese prepared a document titled “Joint venture proposition”, de-
picting the reasoning for the joint venture formation from the point of view of 
both partners, the multitude of motivations of the partners in regards to the joint 
venture formation, the strategy of the Taiwanese partner and its future plans, and 
an extensive list of pros and cons for the IJV setup. By discussing this document 
early on during the IJV negotiation both partners had a good understanding as to 
why each  of  them were  to  benefit  of  the  joint  venture,  and  built  trust  and  com-
mitment early on through open communication. 
“When you look at that document you’re able to see everything the Taiwanese 
partner was after – for example, they were very open with the fact that they 
wanted to learn our technology … The management people from both sides 
who were involved in the discussions during that time, they were so committed 
in the project that they seemed ready to take the joint venture operation to the 
end of the world.” 
As described in the quote above, the Taiwanese partner was essentially motivated 
to enter an IJV partnership with a Western firm by its desire to gain access to and 
learn from the advanced technology provided to the JV by the Western partner. In 
addition to acquiring Western technology, also motivating the Taiwanese partner 
were the prospects of creating a higher-end market, reducing risk in entering a 
relatively risky environment, and expanding market share. The preferably located 
production facility available for the JV that was in possession of the Taiwanese 
partner –one of the factors increasing Company B’s interest in it – also worked 
the other way around; the Taiwanese firm was motivated to find a partner to help 
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it utilize its land and people more efficiently. Lastly, what motivated the Taiwan-
ese firm to partner with Company B was its desire to broaden its customer base, 
more specifically through the existing ties between Company B and certain key 
players in the global electronic industry. 
When the partners had gained a good mutual understanding of the benefits and 
strategy of the joint venture, the shares of ownership were discussed. Both part-
ners were seeking a 50-50 joint venture agreement, but as Company B wanted to 
consolidate the JV into its numbers, it ended up possessing a share of 51 % in the 
JV. According to the interviewee there was no disagreement whatsoever when 
negotiating the share of ownership. The joint venture agreement was drafted and 
negotiated during a two-month period in September-November 2000. According 
to the interviewee the agreement negotiation was extremely smooth without any 
notable complications or disagreement, reflecting the concise joint venture propo-
sition document guiding the discussion process preceding the negotiations. The 
agreement was later signed on the first of January 2001. 
6.2.4 Development after the IJV formation 
The performance of the venture did not meet expectations of Company B at any 
point of the IJV’s existence. Main reasons for the lagging performance during the 
early years of the venture were caused by the general atmosphere in the industry 
at the time – the venture suffered from price erosion and overcapacity in the Chi-
nese market: 
“The performance in the early years didn’t follow the models we drafted in 
the beginning as price erosion was affecting the markets – the component 
prices were falling due to increased capacity. The amount of capacity in the 
current Chinese market is amazingly big.” 
The strategic thinking in the management of Company B leaned on pursuing 
long-term partnerships with massive global players in the electronic industry. 
After three to four years since the JV agreement was done the main customer of 
Company B, the same one that gave the original impulse to invest in the Far East, 
was rapidly taking a larger and larger share of the production capacity of the joint 
venture. This didn’t fit the customer strategy and risk management thinking of the 
Taiwanese partner: 
“As our main customer was starting to form a clear majority of the joint ven-
ture’s total sales it started to be a problem for our Taiwanese partner – their 
strategy was outlined in a way that no customer should form more than 10 
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percent of total sales. At that point the Taiwanese started to draw the line and 
things got more complicated between the partners.” 
Another issue causing conflict was the Taiwanese partner’s unwillingness to ex-
pand the production capacity of the unit within the same property as was strongly 
suggested by Company B. As the venture had reached its first positive result in 
2003, and had just significantly improved in 2004, Company B had a strong de-
sire to expand the production capacity of IJV B whereas the Taiwanese leaned on 
a calmer approach and suggested to push back the expansion for a couple of 
years. This, according to the interviewee, was also the point that started the dete-
rioration of mutual trust in the partnership, and pursuing compromises and mutu-
ally satisfactory solutions to problems was no longer central to the partnership 
management: 
“At that point they simply stated that if we want to expand the operation, we 
should just go ahead and build a facility right there next to the old one, they 
just didn’t want any part of it.” 
Soon after disagreeing in regards to customer strategy and the expansion of the 
IJV’s production capacity the Taiwanese partner informed Company B that it was 
planning its own manufacturing unit in the vicinity of the joint venture location as 
they weren’t satisfied with the way the IJV was operated. In hindsight, the inter-
viewee sees the customer strategy driven by Company B, and thus their soft take 
on risk management, as the ultimate keys to the downfall of the venture: 
“In August 2005 they informed us that they are planning to build their own 
factory just 30 kilometers away from the joint venture, so that they would be 
able to operate it the way they wanted to. And they built it. They saw what was 
happening to our company – we had to close one of our main production 
units, one that was almost exclusively producing for our main customer. It 
seems that they had a better grip of risk management than we did, and we 
overvalued our importance for our main customer. That’s what started to 
drag things down – the share of the single customer was simply much too 
large and it was linked to our inability to attract other customers.” 
According to the interviewee, most of the issues that begun to complicate the in-
ter-partner cooperation were amplified by problems in certain inter-personal rela-
tionships  between the  personnel  of  the  partner  firms.  Similar  to  Case  A,  also  in  
Case B the major trigger for the downfall of cooperation, as recognized by the 
foreign partner,  was change in personnel.  Thus,  the situation took a turn for the 
worse as new personnel representing both parents entered the venture manage-
ment after a few years of operation. As the original management teams got along 
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very well and shared the vision of the joint venture and its development, the ide-
ology based on the shared vision didn’t always carry on to the newcomers: 
“I think all that disagreement and conflict was most often caused by interper-
sonal issues and chemistry – although the background for the conflict was 
very much built upon differences in strategic thinking. Personnel change, a 
new generation, always tends to lead into a change in culture. When a new 
generation enters the game it doesn’t always care to learn about the history 
and the old documents … they get their own ideas and suddenly the dynamics 
of a 51 % vs. 49 % joint venture decision making change. Obviously it didn’t 
bode well within the partnership.” 
6.2.5 Evaluation of the IJV formation process 
When looking back to the process of the IJV formation the Company B repre-
sentative considers it success by any measures – even though the eventual per-
formance was not satisfying and the partnership deteriorated due to strategic and 
interpersonal conflicts. All of the negative outcomes were, as perceived by the 
interviewee, unforeseeable and developed after the venture was formed. 
“We truly did – and still do – consider the joint venture formation process 
very systematic. We felt that every stage was undertaken with precision and 
the process as a whole was carefully planned. It was the largest project ever 
for our firm, and this definitely showed in how much effort was put into it.” 
As previously stated, the “JV proposition” document drafted by the Taiwanese 
partner during the negotiations included a detailed description of the motives and 
objectives of each partner with regard to the proposed joint venture. This docu-
ment was considered precise by all members of the management teams involved 
in the IJV discussion and negotiation process all along the joint venture timeline: 
“I still think today that the JV proposition document, drafted by the Taiwan-
ese and discussed during the IJV formation discussions, is completely valid. 
Everyone involved in the negotiation process surely saw the same big picture, 
thanks to it. The proposition document, in addition to the JV agreement, acted 
as a guideline, a kind of a bible, so to say, on how to coexist and cooperate, 
and which type of action is to be taken in different situations.” 
Opposite to Case A, in Case B the local partner’s unwillingness to expand the IJV 
was not against the original IJV design as agreed upon during the IJV formation 
discussion. Company B’s aggressiveness in pursuing expansion was a change in 
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strategy, and one that may be considered a mistake on its part, as indicated by the 
interviewee: 
“It’s a shame things ended up the way they did. If we think about the original 
design, having tripled the capacity in the facility without rushing things, we 
would have created quite a significant market player out of the IJV. We cer-
tainly could have expanded our cooperation into deeper levels, beyond the 
joint venture, but this one ended up in the financial history books.” 
Regarding the strategic stance of Company B on its customer strategy – focusing 
strongly on very few and large global players in the industry – the interviewee of 
Company B describes it  as fitting well  to the still-standing perception on global 
circuit board markets by Company B’s current management: 
“Regarding our strategy – the management of the company is still under a 
strong impression that the massive multinational enterprises in the electronic 
industry are still aiming to form partnerships with few selected global circuit 
board providers.” 
The IJV formation process of Case B, based on the interview material and addi-
tional documentation, is depicted in Figure 6 on the following page. 
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Figure 6. IJV formation process in Case B. 
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6.3 Case C description 
6.3.1 Case C introduction 
The Finnish partner (Company C): 
Company C has operated in the power solutions industry since the 1970’s. It pro-
vides power solutions for companies within sectors that use electronics such as 
ICT and industrial electronics. Its products and services comprise custom-
designed power supplies, DC power systems, manufacturing of demanding elec-
tronics and related service and maintenance. Today, Company C has international 
operations – ranging from manufacturing units to product development and ser-
vice centers – in Europe, Asia and North America. It employs globally nearly 600 
people. 
Previous international activity of Company C: 
Company C started to become active in international markets in the first half of 
1990’s. Prior to the partial acquisition of its first foreign manufacturing unit (the 
case IJV) the Company C had already established exporting operations in several 
European countries. Also, Company C had set up several sales units in Europe in 
the early-to-mid-1990’s. 
The Case IJV description (here referred to as IJV C): 
In 1997 Company C acquired a share of 25 % of a German firm in the power 
source and solution business. It marked the first international manufacturing in-
vestment of Company C. At the time of data collection (November 2009), Com-
pany C still owned the share of 25 % in the unit. It was at the time the only non-
wholly owned foreign direct investment by Company C. 
IJV C, likewise to IJV A and B in the prior two presented case studies, operates in 
the business-to-business market. The interviewee describes the field of business, 
power source solutions, as a very specific niche business, where all even remotely 
significant players know each other internationally. 
Similarly to Case B, the general driver for Company C’s internationalization was 
to follow the main customer, a globally renowned firm operating in the electron-
ics industry. In the late 90’s the main customer accounted for more than 50 % of 
Company  C’s  total  sales.  Such  moves  –  following  the  main  customer  –  were  
made in the US, and in China in the beginning of the 2000’s. However, in the 
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case of IJV C, the driver of following the main customer did not apply (more on 
the matter below). 
The interviewee for Case C: 
At the time of IJV C formation, the interviewee was a member of the board of 
Company C. Although not directly involved first-hand in the partial acquisition 
process other than authorizing the deal as a member of the board, the interviewee 
considers himself fully informed of all decision making concerning the IJV C 
formation. Later, the interviewee took the CEO position at Company C, and had 
worked as the CEO for almost four years at the time of the interview (November 
2009), therefore being directly related to the later development of the IJV C oper-
ation and management. 
6.3.2 Pre-partner selection decision making period 
The stimulus for the IJV decision process in Case C, an IJV formed in 1997 in 
Germany via partial  acquisition,  originated as the board and the management of 
Company C outlined its strategy based on, as presented by the interviewee, “a 
desire to become a European player”.  In the first  half  of the 1990’s Company C 
had already strategically aligned itself to enter the international markets. Its strat-
egy was to first enter the European market before going further, into Asia and 
North America. By investing in IJV C the firm was looking to open new avenues 
both technology-wise and market-wise. Company C was determined to reach a 
status it labeled as “a European player”: 
“If you want to become a European player, you have to be present at the 
German-speaking part of Europe.” 
Similar to Company B in Case B, Company C’s general driver for internationali-
zation was to follow its main customer, a global player in the electronics industry. 
In the late 90’s the main customer accounted for more than 50 % of Company C’s 
total sales. However, the strategic thinking in the case of IJV C was to balance the 
customer base and thus to reduce the relative importance of the main customer: 
“Generally, the basis for our internationalization had been built around fol-
lowing our main customer. This time the move, going to a new market and ac-
quiring a share in this company, was to counter against our dependence on 
the main customer.” 
Company C expected it could gain access for its products into the German market 
through the IJV. Meanwhile, the Germans were interested in accessing certain 
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significant customers through Company C, and get its products into new markets 
as sold by Company C. 
Therefore, in this case stimuli categorized as both problems (overreliance on a 
single customer / need to balance customer base) and opportunities (entering new 
and large market) can be clearly recognized. 
There was no separate decision concerning the choice of a collaborative mode in 
entering the German market. An IJV investment instead of a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary took place plainly due to the fact that no WOS opportunities were identi-
fied as Company C scanned potential investment targets on the German market. A 
Greenfield IJV, or a wholly-owned Greenfield unit for that matter, was not per-
ceived as an option when weighing possibilities in entering the German market. 
The key reason for this decision was time, as Company C considered the process 
of setting up its own unit as much too slow: 
 “We didn’t think about setting up our own unit, and then go on growing its 
operations, at any point. Money was not a factor – it would have been expen-
sive to go there in any way. It simply takes too much time to set up a new unit 
and start from there. Acquiring an existing firm, or a share of it, was a way to 
get in there right away.” 
6.3.3 Partner selection process of Case C 
The starting point for the process of selecting a partner – or in this case, the pro-
cess of identifying potential acquisition targets – was a situation where Company 
C was intent to reinforce its presence in the European market and was scanning 
the German speaking countries, looking for potential investment opportunities: 
“Our business is very much a niche business – it is relatively easy for some-
one like us to find all potentially interesting players in the market. For exam-
ple, you’ll need the fingers of one hand to count all players in the Finnish 
market. Therefore the European players know each other fairly well, and for a 
large part also personally, as a lot of business was done during international 
trade shows, such as the European Power Manufacturers’ organization. So, 
these connections already existed, and more or less serious talks had been go-
ing on about our firm potentially joining forces with another European play-
er. We were keeping our eyes and ears open and actively looking for opportu-
nities.” 
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The identification and screening of candidates was very straightforward due to the 
fact that Company C was already aware of all potential targets and knew the play-
ers very well. It then quickly listed less than ten potential acquisition targets 
mainly on the basis of firm size and its perceived strategic compatibility with 
Company C: 
“As our business is very niche-oriented, and the CEO had been in the busi-
ness for more than twenty years, he knew every single firm we might have 
been interested in. You could say that the long list included a couple of dozens 
of candidates, but majority of them were scratched off to begin with, for some 
obvious reason such as being too large and thus way out of our reach. It was 
basically then that we had the list of potential targets, and it included a bit 
less than ten firms.” 
After Company C had identified the potential targets it made inquiries about the 
firms’ willingness to sell and/or to enter in a partnership. Discussions took place 
with several firms on the list, and also several of the target firms declined Com-
pany C’s suggestion. From this point on the attitude of Company C leaned strong-
er  than  previously  towards  acquiring  whatever  was  available  on  its  list  –  a  ten-
dency the interviewee defined as opportunism: 
“When the team went through the list of interesting targets in Germany, and 
several of them declined the offer, that’s where the process turned opportunis-
tic – we just took what we could get. There was no thorough evaluation of the-
se firms, no defined list of criteria being used, no third party analysis or 
things like that.” 
However, several CEO’s and managers of the targeted candidates visited Compa-
ny C in Finland. The representatives of Company C also traveled to visit a num-
ber of the targeted firms in Germany – indicating that there was a real effort to 
pursue discussions with several of the candidates. Still, according to the inter-
viewee of Company C, the systematic approach was neglected and overshadowed 
by the strategic drivers for the investment: 
“There was no analysis for example of how their products fit the global mar-
kets and how ours fit their home market.  There was just the principle that we 
get a new sales channel into the German market, and we are able to balance 
our customer base and also our technological portfolio. Obviously we lacked 
in systematic approach.” 
The beginning of discussions about Company C acquiring a share in IJV C took 
place in another trade show meeting in Europe. It turned out that the German firm 
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was in a difficult financial situation, and thus forced to look for a partner to either 
invest in the firm or to provide financial resources to the firm in another manner, 
such as a loan. Meanwhile, the financial situation of Company C was relatively 
strong compared to the German firm and it was already looking for potential ac-
quisition targets in the German speaking area. After one year since the meeting 
between  the  two  firms,  Company  C  acquired  a  quarter  of  the  German  firm  and  
also provided a loan for IJV C to enable the continuation of its operations. 
Company C would have preferred to acquire a majority share of the venture. The 
only reason for ending up with a share of 25 percent, according to the interview-
ee, was its availability – a larger share was not available. However, while negoti-
ating the partnership agreement and the loan given by Company C to the IJV, 
Company C worked in certain options which could have eventually enabled it to 
convert its share into majority, and even purchase the sole ownership of the ven-
ture. 
The process leading to the partnership agreement was strongly driven by the 
CEOs of both parties. Even though the team of Company C centrally involved in 
the investment process comprised the financial manager and the sales manager 
besides the CEO, according to the interviewee it was clear that the CEO dominat-
ed the decision making process: 
“The CEOs were really the force in the process. They knew each other per-
sonally from the trade show meetings throughout the years, and they seemed 
to build a strong friendship bond when the partnership discussions gained 
steam.” 
Meanwhile, the technological personnel of Company C were not convinced of a 
good fit in the partnership, and on the other hand the sales personnel saw the po-
tential of a new distribution channel in a new large market area. As perceived by 
the interviewee who at the time was sitting on the board of Company C, the CEO 
drove the investment decision through regardless of the resistance of the techno-
logical personnel. This also reflected on the negotiation process for the IJV – the 
interviewee points out the partnership agreement documentation as a reference for 
the complications the partnership negotiations suffered from: 
“I’ve seen more than ten different drafts of the partnership agreement, which 
alone tells you that it wasn’t easily put together.” 
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6.3.4 Development after the IJV formation 
As previously stated, Company C expected it could get its products into the Ger-
man market as sold by IJV C. Meanwhile, the Germans were interested in access-
ing certain significant customers through Company C, and get its products into 
new markets as sold by Company C. However, the partnership in this regard did 
not produce the expected results. The main reason for the dissatisfying perfor-
mance was eventually recognized as the incompatibility of the partners’ products 
and customer base: 
“Eventually it became clear that the German products did not fit the needs of 
our customer base, as our business plan was built on customized solutions 
and the Germans were mostly operating with standardized products. The 
transformation of the standardized German products into customized solu-
tions did not produce competitive products – meaning that we could not get 
them sold. They were made to meet the German needs, not for the interna-
tional market.  At the same time, our products did not get sold in the German 
market. However, it took us quite a while to realize that they simply were just 
wrong for the market.” 
The red flags raised by the technological personnel of Company C, largely ig-
nored by the management during the investment decision process, seemed valid in 
hindsight as the technological incompatibility negatively reflected upon the part-
nership and the general drive for technological integration. Also, even though the 
technological personnel weren’t adequately incorporated in the investment deci-
sion process, they seemed to have a significant influence on the management who 
in turn weren’t strong enough to manage the technological integration, as per-
ceived by the interviewee: 
“The fact that both of the firms were very technological factored in to what 
became a ‘not invented here’ situation – a phenomenon where both firms 
claimed that the other’s technology is useless. The technology people in both 
ends had a strong influence on the management, and the management seemed 
to be too weak to control the technology people and to prevent the phenome-
non from interfering with the cooperation.” 
Following the mutual realization of the technological incompatibility, and each 
party pointing its finger towards the other when locating the causes, the partner-
ship reached a state where the communication and cooperation were practically 
deadlocked: 
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“In the beginning of 2000’s our role and status were simply that as stated by 
the ownership share – a 25 % owner. Meanwhile, we couldn’t take advantage 
of the actual business potential there. Soon later we moved production to our 
facility in Estonia, but that was again not good enough for the Germans. We 
entered a situation where the German management was becoming very un-
willing to cooperate with us in any way.” 
In conjunction to the technological disagreement and incompatibility, Company C 
felt that the difficulty of managing the partnership was also boosted by cultural 
differences, seemingly in relation to organizational cultures and the standards of 
activity. Also, the inexperience of the firms in such cooperation and the shortcom-
ings in their strategies were perceived to affect the partnership management by 
the interviewee:   
“It was obvious that, even though we were in Europe, the cultures and the 
general ways of doing things were quite hard to fit together. The individuals 
in both camps seemed to have their own interests… Both firms were quite 
small, and strategies in both firms at the time were a bit of a mess.” 
Eventually,  Company C was  forced  to  admit  a  fundamental  reason  as  to  why it  
couldn’t meet its goals concerning the German market entry via the IJV. After 
setting up their own sales unit in Germany and its disappointing performance it 
became obvious that Company C’s products simply didn’t meet the needs of the 
German customers, as was earlier suggested by the German partner: 
“In the end, they didn’t sell our products nearly at all, while we sold a very 
limited amount of theirs. You could say that really none of what we expected 
to gain here was reached. We didn’t get our products out in the German mar-
ket. Later we set up our own sales unit in Germany, but that was closed down 
in a couple of years as well. They seemed to be right when saying that our 
products just won’t do it in there. The Germans wanted the sort of customized 
solutions that we just could not provide.” 
Early on, as Company C failed to accumulate sales for its  own products in Ger-
many through IJV C, and Company C was simultaneously unable to generate 
sales for IJV C’s products outside the IJV home market, Company C was clearly 
strongly unsatisfied in the performance of the venture. The lagging performance 
continued all the way until past 2005 when the unit started to recover financially 
and the partners found a way to coexist in the IJV, leading Company C to evalu-
ate its performance as at least satisfactory. As the technology clash between the 
partners watered down any efficient cooperation towards enhancing the strategic 
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compatibility in the partnership during the first several years of operation, it took 
much longer to find the fit than expected: 
“In 2005 we still considered the IJV worthless. Now [in the end of 2009] it is 
doing at least satisfactory, its debts have been paid and its financial status is 
good. In a way, the IJV now uses our firm as the backbone.  It is too small to 
meet the needs of many larger customers but a way has been found for them 
to use our company to fill in some gaps. It uses our brand as a sort of guaran-
tee there – many customers overlook the risk factors of such a small service 
provider when they very much make it visible that our firm is right there to 
back them up. “ 
The possibility of converting its ownership into a majority share – its original 
goal – became reality for Company C only after a couple of years’ operation. 
However, Company C did not choose to pick up the buying option as the IJV was 
not performing well and was suffering very much due to the falling telecommuni-
cations industry in the beginning of 2000’s. Now, the interviewee considers the 
decision not to pick up the buying option clearly a mistake, even though Compa-
ny C considered to depreciate the value of the investment in its books down to 
zero, as lately as in 2005: 
“Now when you look back at that situation, and as you now know the IJV 
eventually began to perform better, we obviously should have converted the 
ownership option. We did have a long-term plan to take over the IJV, but as 
we noticed in the first three years of operation that the venture was not devel-
oping the way we expected, our management and the board considered that it 
wasn’t worth for investing in – just rather let it burn out the way it was. The 
board even made a decision in 2005 to depreciate the value of the IJV down 
to zero. It was that hard in the telecommunications industry in the first half of 
the 2000’s.” 
There has been significant change in how strategically important IJV C has been 
perceived by Company C throughout the years. Like trust and commitment be-
tween the partners, the perception of strategic importance of the unit by Company 
C can also be described by a U-shaped curve. As the partnership negotiations took 
place and the agreement was completed Company C considered the venture stra-
tegically very important – it provided access to the German market, and Company 
C envisioned a possibility to access certain technologies through IJV C and thus 
to take advantage of them in global markets. Only after a couple of years the per-
ception of the unit’s strategic importance plummeted when it became clear to 
Company C that the IJV and its products did not have global potential and both 
the products and customers were too marginal to offer any solid strategic benefit 
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for Company C. Now, as the unit has performed better and gained back its finan-
cial ground, it again holds potential to offer strategic benefits as seen by Company 
C: 
“As the unit, along the telecommunications industry, started to climb out of its 
hole it started to attract some significant customers in its home market in 
Germany, firms such as Deutsche Telekom. This was naturally something our 
firm was interested in – gaining access to major European customers through 
the IJV – and it obviously raises the strategic importance of the venture up 
several notches. Now we are in a situation where the IJV could become a 
good point of entry for our firm to access the most significant customers in the 
German speaking area.” 
After the performance started improving, coinciding with the recovering tele-
communications industry, the partnership started to regain its formerly lost mutu-
al trust and commitment. It is notable that trust between the partners was per-
ceived as reaching minimal levels during the most difficult times in the IJV op-
eration: 
“The trust between the partners and the mutual commitment in the IJV opera-
tion is nowadays good, although the relationship has been through its own ice 
age. Its development could be described by a U-shaped curve along our part-
nership, starting high, going through the cold era, and later regaining the 
trust. During the cold times, in the early 2000’s, neither partner really wanted 
to keep up the communications. Now, during the past three or four years, 
things have taken a significant turn for the better.” 
6.3.5 Evaluation of the IJV formation process 
After IJV C has now seen over 12 years of operation the interviewee at Company 
C considers the decision to invest in IJV C a good one and its strategic drivers 
valid. For what comes to implementation during the formation process, the inter-
viewee recognizes elements that should have been handled differently and with 
more detail, such as engaging the technological personnel into the process to 
evaluate the technological fit between the partners: 
“The basic idea of going to Germany, through an acquisition, that was the 
right call. If we were in the same situation now we would still do the same. On 
the other hand, how to implement on the decision, both in-house and in the 
negotiations, that would surely change. We dug too many holes for our future 
operation there.” 
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Also, Company C held fast market entry in high importance and the limited 
timeframe was visible in several aspects of the formation process. However, there 
was  no  specific  reason  or  strategic  rationale  as  to  why  Company  C  was  under  
such time constraints other than reacting to the offer made by the German firm. In 
the end the perception of limited time available factored in to the decision making 
but didn’t alone lead Company C to choose a partial acquisition over a Greenfield 
operation as the operation mode for entering Germany: 
“Although time – the fast market entry – was a factor we underlined when 
starting to work through the acquisition process there was really no solid rea-
son to hurry things up. It was very much self-generated, to react to the oppor-
tunity that presented itself. Our perception of how important it was to act fast 
weighed in as to why the investment process wasn’t as systematic as it should 
have been. Still, even now as we know that, it wouldn’t be enough to make us 
choose to set up our own unit there from scratch, that’s just too big and long 
of a process, even if you know you’re not in a real hurry.” 
Furthermore, the interviewee from Company C considers the decision not to take 
over the majority of IJV C when it had the option to do so in the early 2000’s a 
mistake that was clouded by the downfall period of the telecommunications in-
dustry and the difficult financial situation of IJV C: 
“Obviously we should have purchased that unit when we had the chance. IJV 
C had a good brand in Germany, it also had several longstanding customer 
relationships. We focused too much on its financial situation at the time and 
did not look at the long term. About the process as a whole, you could say that 
the path we chose in the beginning was right whereas the implementation was 
in many ways wrong.” 
When looking back to the very beginning of the investment decision process, the 
interviewee considers the strategic foundation of the investment decision com-
pletely valid and systematically thought out. However, as a whole, rather than 
calling the decision process leading to the partial acquisition systematic, the inter-
viewee in Company C describes the process as opportunistic: 
“What was systematic there was the strategic alignment prior to the acquisi-
tion. Wanting to become a European player, and then recognizing the im-
portance of being present at the German speaking area as soon as possible – 
all that was based on some type of calculations of the European markets and 
so on. On the other hand, with whom to go there, there was no systematic 
screening and evaluation of candidates and options.” 
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The interviewee in Company C notes that the problems in the relationship be-
tween the IJV partners were not purely caused by technology but also interper-
sonal relationships between certain key members in the organizations and the 
chemistry between them: However, even though not directly implied, it seems 
that the bad technological fit was the stimulus for the cooperative downfall, ac-
celerated by other issues, leading to breakdown in communication and coopera-
tive thinking. As perceived by the interviewee who at the time was sitting in the 
board of Company C, the fact that the CEO drove the investment decision through 
regardless of the resistance of the technological personnel, leading to issues in 
technological compatibility, was simultaneously a key factor in personnel com-
mitment to the operation and its development: 
“Now that we’ve evaluated the development in the IJV it seems that a major 
factor here was chemistry between certain strong individuals in both camps. 
That accelerated our way towards a locked-down situation in regards to the 
partnership, in the early 2000’s … We certainly should have taken the techno-
logical personnel into the investment process and carefully listened to their 
arguments on the matter of technological fit between the partners. Practically 
they weren’t in it at all – you just can not ignore such an important part of 
your staff when making such decisions. That’s what led to the ‘not invented 
here’ phenomenon.” 
To clarify, the lack of a good pre-IJV technological fit between the partners was 
not the dooming factor for the partnership in itself. Instead, the interviewee per-
ceives a similarly critical mistake in that the technology personnel weren’t ade-
quately involved and listened to during the IJV decision process. This, in the in-
terviewee’s opinion, reflected on the commitment of the technological personnel 
in building a successful operation and partnership: 
“The line of communication was just not good enough to really go deep into 
looking at potential adaptation of the German products into the global mar-
kets. These discussions did take place, initiated by the technology personnel of 
our firm, suggesting that the products should be re-designed. The German 
technology people resisted as they considered our products badly designed 
and theirs just fine. Once again, all this was caused by the fact that the tech-
nology people were not let in into the IJV decision process and the partner-
ship negotiations. That is why they never bought it, the rationale for the coop-
eration.” 
The interviewee from Company considers it clear that the lack of experience in 
FDI decision making was seen throughout the acquisition process. On the other 
hand, the experience gained from the process of forming IJV C has been valuable 
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in subsequent decision making in regards to other foreign direct investment by 
Company C. Also, the interviewee suggests that experienced individuals could 
have helped if engaged into the process: 
“There’s no doubt that this process has influenced our later investment be-
havior. That sort of unprofessional approach hasn’t been taken after the turn 
of the millennium and after seeing how things developed in Germany at that 
early stage. Maybe we should have brought in some experienced individuals 
into the process, for example in the role of third party consulting because an 
experienced professional surely would have known better than excluding the 
technological specialists from the process. These are aspects that are of 
course important to consider but a first-timer is not always completely up to 
the task.” 
Even though the interviewee considers the decision process having been full of 
flaws and very much lacking a systematic approach, the eventual state of the ven-
ture is still viable for Company C to pursue its long-term goals. Its original pref-
erence for a wholly-owned manufacturing unit is again a potential future devel-
opment in regards to IJV C: 
“It’s again a possibility that we eventually get another chance at acquiring 
the venture as we originally envisioned. You could say, in a nutshell, that even 
though we have gone a long way off the envisioned path and away from the 
starting point, the strategic foundation, the goals and the general settings 
were right all along, and we just might soon be back at the starting point after 
fully acquiring that unit.” 
Overall, the understanding within Company C today is that even though the deci-
sion process was not completed in a systematic fashion and was implemented 
through an arguably limited approach, the process could have very well led to the 
identical decision in acquiring the available share in IJV C. What it likely would 
have changed instead, according to the interviewee, is the technological integra-
tion and strategy development following the IJV formation, due to stronger coop-
eration and personnel commitment: 
“The fact that there really was no systematic analysis and research on the po-
tential partner candidates, or systematic approach in the process in general, 
would not necessarily have changed the outcome of investing in this specific 
firm. What it could have done is provided arguments to get all personnel on 
board with the process and the eventual operation, instead of becoming very 
much one-man driven by our CEO. The organization as a whole never bought 
into it. Whether a systematically driven process would have changed the deci-
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sion to invest or not, it would have nevertheless certainly improved the part-
nership.” 
The IJV formation process of Case C, based on the interview material and addi-
tional documentation, is depicted in Figure 7 below. 
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6.4 Case D description 
6.4.1 Case D introduction 
The Finnish partner (here referred to as Company D): 
Company D is an old family-owned firm with roots in the 19th century. During 
the first decades of its existence Company D operated in wholesales and limitedly 
in shipping. Later, in early 20th century, it expanded into the food industry. Even-
tually Company D became a broad-based food and beverage industry player, and 
later gave up its activities in wholesales. 
Previous international activity of Company D: 
Throughout its history and all the way until the 1980’s Company D had been 
strongly focused on domestic markets and had no significant exporting in any of 
its business sectors. In the mid-1980’s Company D made strategic alignments to 
concentrate on only two product categories, both within the food and beverage 
industry. During the same era Company D also made the decision to pursue oper-
ations in the international markets. 
Previous FDI operations of Company D: 
The first foreign direct investment by Company D was a wholly-owned acquisi-
tion in the UK in the mid-1980’s. It was eventually sold in the late 1990’s after 
the performance of the unit had never met the performance expectations set by 
Company D. Prior to acquiring a share in the case IJV, Company D had experi-
ence of setting up two joint ventures in one of its  business sectors – one in Fin-
land with a Finnish partner in the late 1980’s, and another as a minority owner (20 
%) with a Swedish partner in the early 1990’s. The first of the two was short-lived 
as Company D decided to sell its share to the partner after only a couple of years 
of operation, while the latter is still operational and now majority-owned by 
Company D. Today, Company D is especially strongly placed in the Nordic coun-
tries, the Baltic countries and Russia, and in one product category it is the leading 
producer in Europe. 
The Case IJV description (here referred to as IJV D): 
The IJV between Company D and two Norwegian partners was formed in 1997 as 
Company D acquired 30 % of the share in IJV D. Its main partner was a Norwe-
gian firm mainly operating nowadays in the real estate business and also, prior to 
forming IJV D, wholesales. The unit represents the first cooperative manufactur-
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ing unit of the specific business sector, a sector that has historically been the cor-
nerstone of Company D, and the second in the history of the whole company. It  
also marks the entry of Company D into the Norwegian market. The third partner 
in the venture is the owner of a retail chain comprising almost 200 grocery stores 
in Norway. There was no previous relationship between Company D and either its 
Norwegian partners. The board of IJV D comprised three persons – one from each 
parent firm, the chairman representing the Norwegian majority owner. The own-
ers and their shares in IJV D have remained the same ever since the partnership 
was formed. 
Different from the other three cases, IJV D operates in consumer goods market. 
Thus, there are features that make its field of business significantly different to 
that of the other Case IJVs (IJV A, B and C). According to the interviewee, cera-
tin product categories within the foodstuff industry are dominated by very firms 
in each country. Also, the interviewee stresses that the value and importance of 
strong brands is at the very forefront in relation to succeeding in foodstuff mar-
kets. 
Interviewee for Case D: 
The interviewee had an extensive history working for Company D and besides 
being centrally and directly involved in the IJV D formation, he had also been 
directly involved in all prior investment decision processes of Company D. Four 
years prior to the IJV D formation the interviewee became the divisional business 
director and simultaneously a member in the corporate management team. 
6.4.2 Pre-partner selection decision making period 
The original stimulus for Company D’s decision to pursue FDI in the Scandinavi-
an markets is clearly categorized under strategic opportunities, as Company D 
recognized the appealing potential of the Norwegian and Swedish markets. This, 
however, did not directly lead to a continuous process up to the formation of IJV 
D, and it may be here arguable that the stimuli starting the decision process con-
cerning specifically IJV D are separable from those creating the original FDI in-
terest, which is described below. 
As mentioned, the stimulus for investing in the Scandinavian market arose from 
the recognition of appealing potential of the Norwegian market. During the mid-
nineties Company D had started to reconsider its internationalization strategy for 
one of its two business sectors, including previous wholly-owned FDI units in UK 
and Estonia and sales units in three Baltic countries.  After keying in on Central  
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Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries as the focus of strategic research, the 
firm came to the conclusion that markets in certain Nordic countries, specifically 
Sweden and Norway, were appealing due to their sales potential in relation to 
existing competitive situation, whereas the Central Eastern European countries 
were already dominated by certain global players in the business, and the profita-
bility of the current firms operating in the region was not encouraging. 
When the two Nordic countries of interest were agreed upon, Company D quickly 
determined that acquisition was the means to enter the market as the value of pos-
sessing existing strong brands in the market was deemed a key success factor for 
the operation. Therefore,  strict  criterion (possession of a top brand) set  by Com-
pany D made the population of potential acquisition targets extremely limited: 
“We knew that there were good markets in the Nordic countries – Finland, 
Sweden and Norway. We also knew that each of those markets were already 
shared between a couple of main players, and if you wished to change the 
competitive environment and the market shares, that could only be done via 
acquisitions, acquiring one of the leading firms.” 
 Regarding motives to collaborate, there was no specific choice made to enter the 
Norwegian market via an IJV rather than a wholly-owned subsidiary. Instead, 
Company D preferred to acquire a share as high as possible in any of its acquisi-
tion targets. However, none were willing to sell a share. This process led Compa-
ny D into a state of readiness for acquiring an existing player in the market in case 
one became available. 
During the same period of time in the late 90’s, the top executives of both family-
owned firms  –  Company D and  its  eventual  Norwegian  partner  in  IJV D –  met  
during an international business event. During this meeting the Norwegian firm 
suggested Company D to acquire a minority share in the Norwegian unit. This 
eventually led to Company D acquiring a share of 30 percent. 
This Norwegian firm was family-owned, mainly operating in real estate and 
wholesales industries, and looking to cut its wholesales operations. Within its 
wholesales operations, the Norwegian firm owned a small-scale manufacturing 
unit in foodstuff industry, selling its products to the wholesale customer base. In 
its structural reorganization discussions the Norwegian firm intended to cut its 
wholesales operations while still holding on to the manufacturing unit – incorpo-
rating and expanding its business by looking for a partner with specific 
knowledge and experience in the business. 
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Even though the Norwegian firm did not meet the original criteria Company D 
had set for acquisition targets – being a smaller player in the market than what 
was preferred – acquiring a share of it was considered a good opportunity to gain 
experience and learn about the Norwegian market in case a major player became 
later available for acquisition. Thus, the original stimuli for FDI in Scandinavia 
can be described as recognition of appealing market potential, and the main FDI 
motivation as learning about the local markets on a limited financial risk: 
“Acquiring a share in IJV D was not a goal here – the goal was to become 
player in the Nordic market, gaining information and learning of the Norwe-
gian market from within. This was the key, and we felt that IJV D was a good 
way of reaching that goal, as it required relatively small financial investment 
and did not involve significant risks.” 
As quoted above, the interviewee clearly portrays the investment in IJV D as a 
vessel for gaining market knowledge. The investment in IJV D was therefore 
more considered as a stepping stone in becoming a major player in the Norwegian 
market through more significant acquisitions, and acquiring a share of it was not 
considered to alter Company D’s state of readiness concerning acquisitions of any 
of its originally targeted firms in the market: 
“We knew at the time, and it is still relevant, that there still exists manufactur-
ing in our business in Norway that isn’t yet in the hands of the large multina-
tional enterprises, and thus it significantly raises the likelihood of units be-
coming for sale. We had our eyes on certain key players that we considered 
potential future sellers and we certainly were interested in those potential op-
portunities. We considered that by acquiring the minority share in IJV D we 
would learn about the Norwegian market and gain valuable market infor-
mation that could help us in the decision making regarding such potential fu-
ture investment.” 
6.4.3 Partner selection process of Case D 
As described on the previous page, Company D considered the viability of an 
operation in its field of business in any particular market dependent on the pos-
session of a top brand in the market. Therefore, drawing a desired partner profile 
or identifying potential candidates were not distinct functions in Case D, as Com-
pany D merely looked at the very top firms in both Sweden and Norway, ones 
that were already well known, and proceeded to inquire the willingness of those 
firms to sell. 
 Acta Wasaensia     133 
  
Company D had a very clear idea and specific criteria on what sort of candidates 
it was targeting at in the Nordic countries. Firstly, it was interested in the com-
petitive position of the candidates – anything outside the top three in either the 
Swedish or Norwegian market was not on the acquisition target watch list. As 
already described, the reasoning here was that the business relies heavily on the 
value of brands, and reaching a significant competitive position in either market 
required to acquire a firm in possession of a strong brand. Secondly, only family-
owned firms were targeted as Company D perceived that the multinational firms, 
in general,  were not willing to sell  their  units because they fit  their  strategy and 
were profitable. 
“Big, strong players in Norway and Sweden with strong brands – obviously 
they were very easy to identify. The other significant players were owned by 
multinational corporations with strategies that dictate the firms to hold their 
share in their units and are not interested in selling. Those that we really saw 
ideal were the number two’s in each country, privately owned firms. Those 
could have been significant strategic moves and they would have really been 
carefully thought of – assessing the risks and the financial investment in rela-
tion to our resources, and so on. This one we ended up investing in, it was a 
much lighter version of something like that, very limited risk and so on.” 
Most significantly here, in comparison to the other three cases, is the fact that 
Company D ended up partnering with a firm that wasn’t identified as a prospec-
tive partner or an acquisition target in the first place. As previously described, IJV 
D was rather considered as means, instead of ends, for Company D to reach its 
strategic goals in the Norwegian market, by gaining market knowledge to help in 
future acquisitions and operating in the market. 
In this case there was no genuine weighing of alternative partners. After the Nor-
wegians made the proposition to set up the venture, the partner decision for Com-
pany D was purely entwined – either investing in Norway by accepting the propo-
sition, or declining and staying put, waiting for another investment opportunity to 
present itself. Company D was staying alert in regards to buying opportunities in 
enticing firms, yet it was not actively pursuing partnerships or acquisitions in the 
market. The main reason here is the fact that Company D considered only very 
few firms interesting – the market leaders in both Norway and Sweden – and 
those had no intention to sell. 
All in all, the IJV D formation process following the initiation by the Norwegian 
firm was considered smooth and simple by Company D. Also, it was apparent 
that the relatively small size of the investment factored into the effort and detail 
Company D incorporated into its decision process concerning the IJV formation: 
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“Two heads of family-owned firms met each other, recognized mutual bene-
fits, and the chemistry between the two seemed well in synch. It was all quite 
simple – as the financial investment was relatively small – no heavy due dili-
gence processes or such were undertaken.” 
What Company D brought into IJV D, and what made it enticing for its Norwe-
gian partner, was its experience and expertise in the business. Mainly this concen-
trated in two factors: First of all, Company D took care of raw material procure-
ment  operations,  enabling  IJV  D  to  benefit  of  the  Finnish  firm’s  volumes  and  
trading partnerships, leading to better differentials (cost of raw materials relative 
to global market price) and quality. Secondly, Company D provided the 
knowledge of technology and manufacturing processes to increase the efficiency 
of the manufacturing process: 
“Even though they had been manufacturing in small-scale for quite a while, 
their technological knowledge and skills in manufacturing were still weak. 
Our production manager was able to tune up their machinery and significant-
ly increase its efficiency. We could also positively influence their packaging 
technology. Another thing was that through our knowledge the IJV avoided 
unnecessary machinery investment – the locals seemed to suggest investing in 
new machinery every time a problem had to be solved, whereas our manager 
suggested changing the processes and ways things are done. Those were great 
examples of beneficial cooperation.” 
Company D would have preferred a majority share in the venture if given the op-
portunity. However, the interviewee indicates that the decision process preceding 
the partial acquisition would have been undertaken in a more detailed and analyti-
cal fashion due to the larger financial contribution: 
“I suppose we would rather have acquired a majority share in the IJV, but 
then we would have also looked at this decision much more carefully. Also, 
the thinking in our firm was that we could increase our ownership along the 
way, by for example buying out the other minority owner in the venture.” 
Even though Company D held a minority share in the venture, it was satisfied in 
the shared decision making in IJV D and its influence on all matters it considered 
important. The interviewee seems to be satisfied in the compatibility of strategies, 
assets and expertise of each partner in IJV D, indicating a successful partnership 
design from this point of view: 
“Even though we clearly held a minority share there, the partnership agree-
ment gave us a lot of security in being able to affect the decision making. Cer-
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tain decisions, such as expansion, acquisitions, financial agreements and sta-
bility, and so on – they were strictly controlled by the partnership agreement 
and the majority owner could not just go ahead and do as it wished. We were 
very much heard in all decision making, and obviously our knowledge was 
especially valued in aspects such as procurement, manufacturing and packag-
ing technology. We felt all along that decisions were being made for the good 
of the firm, and different partners contributed on different aspects.” 
6.4.4 Development after the IJV formation 
In the beginning, for several years, the operation was developing well and the unit 
was profitable, which seemed to be the case with most players in the Norwegian 
market at the time. The situation changed dramatically as Lidl, a global discount 
supermarket chain, entered the Norwegian market in 2004. The price competition 
in the market, as created by the newcomer who changed the market dynamics, 
was difficult for IJV D: 
“Our key reseller was one of the main competitors of Lidl in Norway. Lidl en-
tered the Norwegian market like it did in other markets, by aggressively chal-
lenging the existing competition. They were spearheaded by their own private 
labels in our product group as in other groups as well. This resulted in drasti-
cally lower price level throughout the market. As our reseller reacted by low-
ering its prices and forced us to act accordingly, the profitability of our low-
er-end product line was shattered. It was significant as the lower-end line had 
positively accounted for a major proportion of our volume and thus the finan-
cial result.” 
The disappointing development eventually led to personnel changes in top man-
agement. As the IJV agreement dictated that the chairman of the board was 
named by the majority partner, managerial moves by the Norwegians directly 
influenced the IJV management as another member of the Norwegian owner fam-
ily  stepped  in  as  the  new  chairman  of  the  board.  Also,  the  CEO  of  IJV  B  was  
changed twice in a short period of time, the second change being due to the 
CEO’s own decision. 
After 2007 the performance of IJV D has improved due to reorganization and 
Lidl’s retreat from the market – in fact all 50 Lidl stores in Norway were sold in 
2008 to REMA 1000 which sells the products of IJV D – yet the same strategic 
obstacle remains – the existence of a minority shareholder that owns a grocery 
store chain, and the deep-rooted relationship between REMA 1000 and the main 
partner which was well known in the Norwegian market. 
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“In the past couple of years the management has been able to turn things 
around a bit, and even returned the unit back to profitability, by cutting costs 
and trimming the sales organization. Still, the same old strategic problem – 
how to expand distribution in Norway – has not been solved and will not like-
ly be solved as long as there’s a grocery store chain involved in the owner-
ship.” 
The Norwegian unit is fairly small in the context of Company D’s business in 
general, the total sales or production capacity of Company D. The financial in-
vestment required for entering the venture was considered very small and thus no 
real financial risks were noted. Therefore the unit was strategically important only 
as a vessel for gaining market information – and as such its strategic importance 
has declined in later years when Company D feels that it has gained the 
knowledge it needed. 
After 13 years of operation and much fluctuation in the performance of the Nor-
wegian venture, Company D is fairly satisfied in the overall performance and 
outcomes of the operation as a whole when reflected upon its  original goals and 
strategic motivation: 
“As we realized that this is not the platform that enables us to gain significant 
ground on the Norwegian market the strategic importance of the venture ob-
viously decreased. Nevertheless, through this operation we know the Norwe-
gian market and its competitive situation very well – that puts the firm in a 
much better position to make strategic decisions regarding operations there 
for the future. After all, that was the key reason we chose to enter this specific 
partnership in the first place.” 
Although meeting its main goal, gaining knowledge of the Norwegian market, the 
interviewee of Company D does not consider the IJV operation a success, which 
the interviewee defines as a larger market share through strengthened distribution 
network and valuable brands. Also, reaching the main goal and gaining the an-
swers that Company D was looking for as it chose to acquire the share in the IJV 
causes the interviewee to raise the question of the future of IJV D: 
“Still, we can’t call the operation a success – that would have been the case if 
we were able to expand the distribution and the brand was as strong as we 
believed it was. This operation has given us the answer for the questions we 
originally had, and therefore you could that say it has fulfilled its purpose. 
Because of this it could now make sense to sell the share in the IJV.” 
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6.4.5 Evaluation of the IJV formation process 
All three parents in IJV D were family-owned. The interviewee of Company D 
considers this as an influence on some aspects of the joint venture operation, as 
well as on business and internationalization in general. In this case, and in con-
junction to the relatively small investment and thus strategic importance, it shows 
as limited attention to detail and analysis to back the decision making: 
“There’s a thing about family-owned firms – emotions are more often part of 
decision making and making moves. Here we had a goal of going to Norway 
to learn things through a minority investment – the numbers weren’t crunched 
throughout and the proposed joint venture wasn’t analyzed to death. It was 
more about a general vision suggesting that this partnership was a good idea. 
And that’s what it was, before the fall, and the eventual comeback.” 
The strong sense of history as a family-owned firm, and the organizational culture 
to match it, is thus a clear factor influencing decision making in Company D. The 
willingness to explore and push forward without a high degree of certitude of 
future events based on calculations and analyses seems to be a built-in aspect of 
the management culture in Company D: 
“Our organizational culture, in regards to decision making, was such that we 
are systematic to a certain point, but then you also have to be brave, go for-
ward, and believe in it – and not about extensively searching for reasons for 
why not to do something. After all, if you really want to prove something, any-
thing, by numbers, you can get it done.” 
Besides the problems regarding potential to expand distribution in the Norwegian 
market, the importance of strong brands in the food and beverage industry seemed 
to constitute an even more founding strategic obstacle. The brands of IJV D were 
not as strong in the Norwegian market as Company D expected at the time of the 
investment. In hindsight, the interviewee considers the brand strength analysis 
done when assessing the decision to acquire a share in IJV D inadequate, reflect-
ing the lack of target-country-related experience and more specifically the lacking 
knowledge of local market conditions: 
“We should have gone deeper when looking at the strength of the brand.  We 
didn’t really question the brand strength in regards to how the partner evalu-
ated it … Obviously it now seems that we overvalued its potential on national 
level, and that really creates the ceiling for the whole unit’s growth poten-
tial.” 
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The key role of brand strength is further underlined by the interviewee’s percep-
tion that connects it to the other strategic obstacle confronting IJV D – the limited 
distribution. If the brands were strong, that could have significantly helped to re-
move the strategic obstacle regarding the expansion of distribution, according to 
the interviewee: 
“In Finland certain leading store chains were trying to secure the position of 
their own labels in our product groups and declined taking our products for 
sale – all the way until the 80’s and 90’s when the our brand strength practi-
cally forced them to take our products in due to customer demand and prefer-
ences. It took until 1998 for us to be treated equally, regarding activities and 
promotional campaigns, on a national level in all chains.” 
Lastly, to underline how brand strength was the main underlying obstacle for 
growth, the interviewee in Company D comes back to one of their top acquisition 
targets  prior  to  acquiring  the  share  in  IJV  D,  one  that  Company  D  targeted  for  
several years regardless of the IJV D acquisition: 
“Now, if that production company we really looked at and listed as maybe the 
most probable acquisition target suddenly became available, what would our 
company do? My best guess is nothing. There is no brand to build on. We 
could have expanded our distribution, ended up acquiring market capacity, 
but in the end still lost out to the leading brands.” 
The IJV formation process of Case D, based on the interview material and addi-
tional documentation, is depicted in Figure 8 on the following page. 
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Figure 8. IJV formation process in Case D. 
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6.5 Case comparison and analysis 
In this chapter the four case studies are compared to each other and analyzed in 
relation to earlier models and typologies in the literature. The chapter closes with 
a summary of contextual effect on the partner selection decision process and 
analysis of its performance outcomes. 
As expected, in accordance to earlier literature (Björkman 1989, Larimo 1987, 
Woodside and Pitts 1998), the stimuli for the IJV formation seems to relate to 
strategic  opportunities  rather  than  problems  or  crises.  No  crisis-related  stimuli  
could be identified in any of the four case companies’ IJV decision processes; 
however, in Case C, the local partner appeared to be driven by financial crisis, 
forcing it to seek investors to survive by gaining capital. In all of the four cases 
certain common key elements of the decision processes were visible, and the sug-
gestion in previous literature stressing that partner selection can be distinguished 
into  at  least  two  separate  parts  (Williamson  and  Lilley  1993,  Wong  and  Ellis  
2002) – partner identification and evaluation – gains support here, even though 
they clearly seem to overlap in all four cases. 
6.5.1 Rationality of decision processes 
Both Woodside and Pitts (1998) and Björkman (1989) found decision making 
patterns indicating differences concerning development of alternative solutions, 
and its lack thereof, in contrast to the rational choice model. Björkman (1989) 
found that FDI decision making of the Finnish firms studied consisted of devel-
opment of only one single FDI alternative at a time – including decisions on the 
country, specific location, and the specific firm to acquire. Woodside and Pitts 
(1998) found that the decision processes in both of their two studied IJVs includ-
ed no search for alternative IJV partners, yet as they also point out, this result is 
very likely due to the fact that each of the firms studied represented the most well 
known and successful enterprises in their respective industries within their respec-
tive domestic markets. The results here are not completely in line with these two 
previous studies – first of all, in each of the four cases a separate decision regard-
ing the firms’ intent to enter a certain country or area was made prior to searching 
for potential cooperators or acquisition targets. Secondly, development of alterna-
tives in the form of searching and considering more than one potential partner at a 
time seemed prevalent especially in the Greenfield IJV cases (Case A and B). 
However, there were also indications of extending search for alternatives for justi-
fication purposes (Case B) as what was considered an ideal partner was identified 
fairly early on. The partial acquisition cases differed also in this regard; In case C 
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the search for a partner seemed resembling a short selection mode, as the foreign 
partner was contacting adequate targets one by one, whereas in Case D the identi-
fication became irrelevant due to the strict criteria applied by Company D. 
According to March and Sevón (1988) traditional rational choice models presume 
the decision maker possesses: (1) knowledge of alternatives, (2) knowledge of 
consequences, (3) knowledge of preferences, and (4) rules by which a decision 
maker can select the best alternative based on its consequences for his/her prefer-
ences. In each of the four cases the foreign partner considered itself well aware of 
alternatives concerning prospective partners. In Case A this was due to the speci-
ficity of the industry and thus a very limited population of potential candidates. In 
Case B the alternatives were sought out by a thorough search process involving 
two third party consults. In Case C, the niche-oriented nature of its industry lim-
ited its acquisition target population, and all potential candidates were considered 
known. In Case D, the strict criteria for acquisition targets limited the population, 
and a separate search process became thus irrelevant as all candidates were well 
known. 
All four cases applied certain criteria to screen and evaluate the prospective part-
ners. However, the specificity of these criteria and the systematicity of the evalua-
tion and screening varied strongly. In Case A, the foreign partner did not explicit-
ly formulate a defined set of criteria for screening and evaluating prospective 
partners but consensus within the management team existed regarding the main 
features it would focus on when looking for the partner (size, reputation, ability to 
provide personnel, production knowledge). The eventual choice was influenced 
by the candidate’s possession of a suitable manufacturing facility, which was not 
originally defined as a criterion for partner choice, but its apparent cost benefits 
made  it  a  significant  factor.  Out  of  all  four  cases,  Case  A  was  the  only  one  in  
which the foreign partner had ranked several – three to be exact – adequate candi-
dates in order, and seemed aware of its further moves in case the IJV proposition 
with the preferred candidate fell through. 
In Case B, certain very broad screening criteria were explicitly laid out before 
advancing to long-listing partner candidates, and further movement towards a 
short list was largely based on technological competence. In Case C, the limited 
population and good awareness of existing candidates again was a factor for the 
lack of defined selection criteria. In Case D the population was limited due to 
strict criteria, therefore forming a simple and systematic process until the idenfi-
cation and evaluation of candidates, yet following the Norwegian partner’s initia-
tive a re-started simple and less-than-thorough decision process took place, build-
ing around a decision to either reject or accept the offer. 
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Regarding the distinction between the maximizing and the satisficing strategy 
(Simon 1957), both were present in the case data. The Greenfield cases (A and 
B), and particularly Case B, resembled the maximizing strategy; in Case B, the 
interviewee even used the word “ideal” to portray how the eventual partner was 
perceived during the formation process. A satisficing strategy appeared in both of 
the two partial acquisition cases (C and D); in Case C the foreign partner’s will-
ingness, as described by the interviewee, “to become a European player” was the 
overriding factor to invest in the German market even if the most desired acquisi-
tion targets weren’t available; again as described by the interviewee, “we simply 
took what we could get”. Similarly, in Case D, the desired acquisition targets 
weren’t available, and the foreign partner later chose to accept an offer made by a 
firm that did not meet the original criteria. 
The  amount  of  time available  or  allocated  for  the  IJV formation  was  not  recog-
nized as an influencing factor in any other case than Case C. Even in Case C, the 
limited time for the IJV formation mainly factored into the decision to enter Ger-
many via acquisition rather than a Greenfield operation, although the interviewee 
also indicates the perceived hurry as a factor to a limited evaluation of the part-
nership rationale. In the Greenfield cases (A and B), the foreign partners did have 
a set timetable for the IJV formation and partner selection but considered it gen-
erous and of no effect on the decision process. In Case D time was not considered 
a significant factor at any point and no timetable existed. 
The availability of information was a factor on each of the four cases. In identify-
ing partner candidates, availability of information was mainly a factor in Case B, 
as the other three cases focused on limited candidate populations as already de-
scribed. In Case B, the foreign partner’s lack of international and target-country-
specific experience reflected on partner identification by, firstly, through bringing 
in a project coordinator with specific market knowledge, and secondly, by the use 
of external consults. However, the use of the consult agencies is more directly 
linked to the high strategic importance and the large relative size of the invest-
ment according to the interviewee. In evaluating the prospective partners, the 
availability of accurate and detailed financial information was considered im-
portant in both of the Chinese Greenfield cases (A and B). This was highlighted 
by the status of Company B’s partner selection of a publicly listed company, sep-
arately brought up by the interviewee as a clearly positive factor. Also, the per-
ceivably and physically distant market environment combined with the foreign 
partners’ lack of target-country-specific experience factored into highlighting the 
importance of accessing information about local customs and culture. 
 Acta Wasaensia     143 
  
Limited financial resources expectedly and logically affected the IJV formation 
process. Financial limitations were noted to be a key factor for the choice of a 
collaborative mode over a wholly-owned subsidiary in cases A and B. When spe-
cifically focusing on partner selection, limited financial resources seemed less of 
a factor, mainly in play as the selectors in cases A and B valued partner’s posses-
sion of suitable manufacturing facilities. In cases C and D the financial limitations 
seemed not to significantly affect any major part of the IJV decision process. 
6.5.2 Reflections on the Das and Teng typology 
The strategic decision making process typology by Das and Teng (1999), based 
on a synthesis of previous categorizations, was presented in Table three (p. 36). 
The five decision process modes included in the typology were the rational mode, 
the avoidance mode, the logical incrementalist mode, the political mode and the 
garbage can mode. These five modes are next discussed in accordance to the four 
case studies. 
First, the rational mode, founding on the argument that human behavior is either 
rational or boundedly rational, is characterized by its comprehensiveness, and 
decision makers enter decision situations with known objectives, gather extensive 
information, develop alternatives, and objectively select the optimal candidate 
(Das and Teng 1999). All four case firms had a clear understanding of the motiva-
tion and general drivers for the FDI, and less explicitly so for the partner selection 
decision process, or in Cases C and D, the acquisition target selection process. 
Gathering information varied strongly within the case firms, largely due to differ-
ing types of industry/business specifications and therefore the amount of market 
information, as two of the cases (A and C) operated on niche-oriented markets, 
and one case (Case D) based the strategic rationale for the investment on acquir-
ing a firm with a top two brand in its possession. Therefore, the limited popula-
tion of alternatives as perceived by these three case firms caused a lesser need to 
identify alternative partner options. In Case B, the large perceivably large popula-
tion of potential actors raised the need for gathering information on the alterna-
tives. All four case firms developed alternatives, meaning consideration or pursuit 
of different partners or acquisition targets, and aimed for objective selection of 
the optimal alternative, yet only one (Case B) actually managed to select a partner 
it considered optimal, and another (Case A) was able to make a selection from 
within more than one candidate perceived adequate. In cases C and B, the eventu-
al partner represented the single available option. 
Second, the avoidance mode, based on the notion that strategic decision making 
processes often lead to a resistance to strategic change, practically depicts a deci-
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sion situation where the decision maker purely creates rationale for maintaining 
the  status  quo  in  order  to  avoid  uncertainty  (Das  and  Teng  1999).  None  of  the  
four cases clearly indicate that the avoidance mode is relevant in an IJV partner 
selection context. The only weak reference towards maintaining a status quo can 
be identified in Case A, where the selector clearly valued its prior relationship 
with the eventually selected partner, and even though it identified a second and a 
third alternative, it seemed to hold a preference ever since the original decision to 
pursue an IJV operation in China. However, in such situation where a firm de-
cides to pursue its first FDI in a given market, meaning a new strategic approach 
in the given market, partner selection based on avoiding strategic change would 
clearly be paradoxical. 
Third, the logical incrementalist mode refers  to  a  step-by-step  process  that  con-
sistently moves towards a broader goal, and in which the decision maker gathers 
incremental information and feedback and thus avoids making dramatic decisions 
at any point, due to an unstable environment and his/her limited cognitive capa-
bilities (Das and Teng 1999). References of different levels to this particular 
mode can be found in Cases B and C. In Case B, the identification and screening 
of potential candidates and the evaluation of the candidates clearly overlap, and 
the selector goes back to the identification routine in several points of the process 
by applying third party consult services. However, none of these additional 
searches changed the original preference of partner, and the interviewee in Case B 
clearly indicates that the strategic importance and size of the investment drove the 
firm, as described by the interviewee, “to make sure that no stone was left un-
turned”, thus suggesting that a motivating factor for the additional searches was 
on justifying the partner choice and the rationality involved. Another reference to 
the  logical  incrementalist  mode  in  Case  B  was  the  fact  that  the  firm  had  not  
ranked other potential candidates in a preference order except for the eventually 
selected partner, and would have moved back to evaluate the other candidates in 
case the IJV proposition fell through. In Case C, on the other hand, the logical 
incrementalism showed in how the foreign partner contacted the identified candi-
dates one by one, discussed potential IJV designs and the candidates’ willingness 
to sell  a share of their  firm, moving on when rejected,  until  a willing seller was 
identified. 
Fourth, the political mode reflects a decision process where groups of organiza-
tional members with competing interests fight for a favorable decision, leading to 
a power struggle resulting in a win by the most powerful people (Das and Teng 
1999). References to the political mode can be recognized only in Case C within 
the qualitative data whereas the management teams of the other remaining three 
case firms seemed to operate under a clear consensus. In Case C, the technologi-
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cal personnel clearly opposed the rationale for the partial acquisition in the case 
IJV, whereas it was strongly supported by the sales personnel. In the end, accord-
ing to the interviewee, the CEO-driven management team chose to neglect the 
views of the technological personnel, leading to eventual compatibility issues. 
Lastly, the garbage can mode represents the least rationally-driven decision pro-
cess mode within the typology, referring to a disorderly and anarchical process 
without on apparent structure, where organizations are viewed as ‘organized an-
archies’ without a particular rationale for making a strategic choice (Das and 
Teng 1999). Also, in the garbage can mode, organizations are viewed as contexts 
into which streams of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities 
are poured (Björkman 1989). Features of the garbage can mode were very limit-
edly visible within the four cases, as all processes seemed to be objective-driven. 
In Case D, however, the decision process to acquire a share in the case IJV was 
triggered by the initiative made by the Norwegian firm, and the motivation to 
accept the offer differed from the original FDI motivation that had led the firm 
into the state of readiness, waiting for the opportunity to present itself. Still, even 
in Case D the reference to the garbage can mode is limited to the solution-
problem –level, and the eventual decision process, according to the case inter-
view, indicates certain structure and consideration of the IJV rationale. 
6.5.3 Reflections on the Viljamaa typology 
In  chapter  3.5  four  alternative  modes  (Evaluation of alternatives, Default selec-
tion, Entwined selection, Short selection) of partner selection were presented. The 
presentation based on Viljamaa’s (2007) findings on external expert service pro-
vider selection. Next, the case study findings are reflected on these four modes. 
None of the four cases is a perfect fit for the Evaluation of alternatives mode, or 
follow the rational choice model, even though both Case A and Case B do show 
resemblance in that direction as discussed in Chapter 6.5.2. In these cases the de-
cision to form an IJV in a certain target area or country existed prior to moving on 
to a separate process of selecting partners. Also, in both cases certain selection 
criteria were first set before moving on to a search for potential candidates. How-
ever, there was no clear distinction between searching, evaluating and choosing 
the partner – the firms in both cases were active in evaluating prospective partners 
throughout the identification process, and a preference for a certain candidate 
existed very early on in both Case A and B. 
Concerning Case A, the major factor was the niche-oriented nature of its industry 
as it was relatively well aware of each one of the limited potential candidate 
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population, making the search process fairly irrelevant and explaining the prefer-
ence for partner choice early on. A previous relationship also seemed to clearly 
affect the early preference, even to a level where the preference was present all 
along and other candidates were measured upon the original preference and the 
eventual chosen partner. In Case B, the criteria set for screening potential candi-
dates was fairly generous (a local firm, smaller than Company B, also searching 
for a partner) and several sources of information were used, leading to an exten-
sive long list, thus resembling the rational choice model in this account. However, 
it had an early preference for partner choice, and conducted additional third party 
search and evaluation processes largely to justify the relatively large financial 
investment and the significant strategic importance of the process. Still, Company 
B never thoroughly evaluated and considered a partner candidate other than the 
selected one, and the interviewee indicated that in case the IJV formation could 
not have been completed with the preferred candidate Company B would likely 
have moved back to its short list and considered other options without an already-
known second choice – thus limitedly resembling the short selection mode in this 
account. 
The mode of default selection did not appear in any of the four cases, as expected 
and speculated in Chapter 3 based on the generally significantly greater strategic 
importance and size of financial investment in IJV partner selection in compari-
son to Viljamaa’s (2007) original setting (external expert service provider selec-
tion). As the mode in essence requires the selector to have previous activities in 
the target country so that the ‘obvious’ partner choice can exist, three of the four 
cases were out of the default selection mode boundaries due to lack of experience 
in the target country. 
Case D, the only one of the four cases where the foreign partner did not initiate 
the IJV discussion, is closest to the entwined partner selection mode in Vilja-
maa’s (2007) typology. However, certain distinctions appear – firstly, a decision 
to pursue acquisitions in the target country did exist prior to the initiative made by 
the local partner, and secondly, a decision to reject this offer would have led 
Company D to remain in its state of readiness, keeping itself ready for potential 
acquisition opportunities, instead of pulling the plug on the FDI plan. Both of 
these distinctions clearly relate to the fact that in Case D the partial acquisition 
was considered a stepping stone and a vessel to gain market information before a 
larger, and a strategically more significant acquisition to serve the original FDI 
motivation of Company D. Therefore, the strategic context seems to separate the 
process of Case D from the Viljamaa (2007) typology. 
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6.5.4 Summary of context influence 
As two of the cases (Cases C and D) were formed by partial acquisition of an ex-
isting firm and the other two as Greenfield ventures (Cases A and B) the data en-
ables comparison of decision processes between the two different types. The case 
data clearly indicates certain distinctive features between the two. Overall, the 
Greenfield cases resembled the rational choice model and the previous partner 
selection process models (Hamill and Hunt 1998, Ellram 1991, Mitsuhashi 2002, 
Young et al. 1989) much more than the partial acquisition cases. As the inter-
viewee of Company C described its partner selection decision process opportunis-
tic, the opportunism was visible on Case D as well – Company D stayed alert, the 
FDI process on hold, waiting for an acquisition opportunity to appear within its 
narrowly defined watch list of potential acquisition targets, and advanced into 
partially acquiring a firm as an opportunity presented itself. Also, neither of the 
partial acquisition cases turned out as collaborative ventures by choice – both 
Company C and D merely acquired the share available without specifically aim-
ing for collaboration, and neither were driven by motives requiring the existence 
of shared decision making. In both of the Greenfield cases clear collaborative 
motives existed as both Company A and B considered their firms incapable of 
entering the target country via a wholly-owned investment, both because of their 
limited financial resources and knowledge about local customs, culture and lan-
guage. Furthermore, in the partial acquisition cases the foreign partners were 
much more interested in the competitive position of the prospective partners in 
comparison to the Greenfield cases, who instead were clearly more focused on 
skills and know-how on the task-related front, and trust and commitment in the 
partner-related front. 
Besides a two-versus-two distinction based on the form of investment, the cases 
were divided in two based on the IJV location. Two of the cases (A and B) con-
cerned IJVs formed in China, representing both physically and culturally distant 
environment and economically an emerging market, especially notably so at the 
time of the investment (1999, 2001). The two other cases (C and D), instead, fea-
tured IJVs formed in Western European countries, obviously dealing with far 
lesser distance and context uncertainty in comparison to the Chinese cases. 
As expected, the greater distance reflected on the importance given to accessing 
knowledge on local customs, culture and language. As neither Company A or B, 
representing the distant cases, had significant previous operations in the target 
country, the lack of experience seemed to amplify the importance of accessing 
local knowledge, in line with common logic. 
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There are certain indications of selection uncertainty relating to greater distance. 
In Case A, the interviewee clearly states his awareness of potential opportunistic 
behavior of the Chinese, and refers to aspects of contextual uncertainty in relation 
to the decision of a Greenfield form over acquiring an existing firm (“…you never 
know what kinds of skeletons you’ll find in the closet, it is definitely not reasona-
ble to take such risks”) and the evaluation of prospective partners, where limited 
access to detailed financial information was noted as a clear cause for concern. In 
Case B, accessing detailed financial information was similarly valued, and there-
fore the eventual partner’s status as a publicly listed company was considered 
important. 
Regarding cultural distance, some additional findings were made. Organizational 
culture seemed to be a factor in two of the cases; in Case B, the interviewee re-
ferred to a good culture fit due to fact that both management teams were techno-
logically driven (“It was more about industry professionals working together in-
stead of financial experts working on the numbers”) while the interviewee in 
Case D referred to the fit arising from the partners’ roots as family-owned firms. 
Bad fit  of organizational cultures seemed to negatively affect  IJV C as well  (“It 
was obvious that, even though we were in Europe, the cultures and the general 
ways of doing things were quite hard to fit together”) yet it became a factor after 
the IJV was formed and therefore had no role in the IJV formation decision pro-
cess. 
Experience in the target country was also perceived to have an influence on how 
firms proceeded in their quest for suitable partners. There are clear indications in 
the qualitative data for the importance given to prior relationship and cooperation 
when selecting IJV partners, therefore supporting Mitsuhashi’s (2002) suggestion 
for firms’ tendency to apply the relational mechanism (i.e. valuing existing rela-
tionships) in order to reduce selection uncertainty. There were also indications of 
trying to overcome the lack of target-country-related experience by the use of 
third party services and recruitment of target-country-experienced personnel. 
Lack of experience – international, collaborative or target-country-related – did 
not seem to translate into lesser rationalism within the IJV formation process, as 
the two perceivably most rational formation processes were undertaken by firms 
forming their first collaborative direct investment. 
As brought up in several instances, the perceived strategic importance and the 
relative size of the investment were clearly factors in how firms approached and 
proceeded in the process of forming the IJV and selecting its partner. Decision 
making in Case B clearly reflects the significant importance and relative size of 
the investment through a systematic and comprehensive process, whereas the 
 Acta Wasaensia     149 
  
relatively small size and importance of Case D comprises a justification for a less-
than-precise evaluation by Company D, according to the interviewee.  
6.5.5 Partner selection process and performance 
Regarding the IJV performance of the four cases, two features were common in 
all of them. Firstly, in all four cases the foreign partner considered the eventual 
IJV performance lower than what was originally expected during the IJV for-
mation. Secondly, performance of the venture fluctuated strongly in all four cases, 
therefore indicating that the timing of performance measurement may cause sig-
nificant change in results in survey studies. In Case B, IJV performance was con-
sidered adequate during the first couple of years of operation, yet rapidly falling 
worse as driven by the downfall of the IT sector and disagreement largely caused 
by later personnel change on both sides. In Case C, the performance was for sev-
eral years considered extremely unsatisfying – at worst the venture was consid-
ered practically worthless – yet a decade after the IJV formation performance is 
on significant rise. Also in Case D, performance took a drastic downturn after 
changes in the competitive dynamics of the markets caused by an aggressive 
newcomer, again becoming better during the later years. 
Also common to all cases is the fact that the main changes in IJV performance 
were mostly caused by aspects unforeseeable during the IJV formation. The only 
clear linkage between the pre-formation period and later performance was noted 
in Case C, where neglecting the views of the technological personnel led to a ven-
ture comprising bad technological fit, causing unsatisfying IJV performance for 
several years. Still, the partners were able to reconfigure their strategies and now 
consider the IJV to have good potential and are satisfied in its current perfor-
mance. In Case D the foreign partner overvalued the brand of the prospective 
partner, causing a discrepancy between the expected performance and the actual 
performance of the IJV, yet the IJV still enabled the foreign partner to meet its 
main goal, which was to gain market experience and information. All in all, case 
data suggests that the eventual negative performance discrepancy regarding the 
IJV was caused by developments either within the partnership due to such things 
as personnel changes during the IJV operation or by changes in the external envi-
ronment, and such developments can not be directly linked to partner selection 
decision making. 
Summarized information and details of the four case studies are presented in Ta-
ble 16 and Table 17 on the following pages. 
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Table 16. The case study summary (1/2). 
Finnish partner COMPANY A COMPANY B COMPANY C COMPANY D 
JV name IJV A IJV B IJV C IJV D 
JV country China China Germany Norway 
JV business B-2-B (Industrial 
textiles / paper ma-
chine clothing) 
B-2-B (Circuit boards 
(for cell phones) 
B-2-B (Power 
source solutions) 
Consumer goods 
(Foodstuff) 
Nature of JV 
business re: JV 
formation (at the 
time of the in-
vestment) 
Very specific, very few 
competitors 
Potentially very large 
volumes, increasing 
competition 
Niche; all even 
remotely significant 
players know each 
other globally 
Markets of each country 
dominated by few large 
firms; value of brands 
Year of inv. 1999 2000 1997 1997 
Original % of FIN 
partner 
60 % 51 % 25 % 30 % 
Current % terminated 20 % 25% (unchanged) 30%  (unchanged) 
Form of inv. Greenfield IJV Greenfield IJV Partial acquisition Partial acquisition 
Originally desired 
% of ownership 
Majority Majority (51%) Majority Not considered - poten-
tially majority 
Target country 
experience 
Exports (small-scale) Trading (small-scale) Exporting (very 
limited) 
None 
IJV / international 
experience prior 
to case IJV for-
mation 
WOS in USA, Brazil, 
Portugal 
WOS in France None in manufactu-
ring 
WOS in UK, Estonia; 
sales units in the Baltic 
countries (EST/ 
LAT/LIT), RUS; (IJV in 
Sweden by another 
business sector) 
Contact initiator / 
1st move 
Case firm 
(Company A) 
Case firm 
(Company B) 
Case firm 
(Company C) 
Local partner 
Previous 
relationship with 
partner 
Technology transfer; 
top managers knew 
each other ? signi-
gicant effect on the 
process 
Business wise none / 
top managers of firms 
knew each other from 
trade show meetings 
(unofficial settings) 
Top managers 
knew each other ? 
effect on the 
process 
None 
Impulse Market growth 
forecasts 
Following the main 
customer 
Desire to become a 
'European player' 
Recognition of appealing 
market potential 
FDI Motivation Entering a growing 
market, manufacturing 
near the customer 
Entering a growing 
market 
Entering a large 
market / balancing 
the business 
customer wise 
Learning about the 
Norwegian market; 
entering a new market 
Collaboration 
Motivation 
Dividing risk; financial 
limitations; accessing 
knowledge of local 
customs, language 
and market 
Dividing risk; financial 
limitations; accessing 
knowledge of local 
customs, language 
and market 
None good WOS 
acq opportunities 
found; WOS GF 
too slow to set up; 
"the opportunity 
presented itself" 
Access to brand, distribu-
tion; gaining knowledge 
of local market; top acq 
choices not willing to sell 
Perception of 
partner's motiva-
tion 
To obtain advanced 
technology (Note: 
Company A  tried to 
limit partner's access 
to manufacturing kno-
how); no clear under-
standing of partner's 
motives (not dis-
cussed between 
partners) 
To obtain advanced 
technology; more 
efficient utilization of 
land & personnel; 
developing a higher-
end market; expand-
ing market share & 
broaden global cus-
tomer base (openly 
discussed when 
forming the IJV) 
Forced to sell due 
to financial reasons 
Access to (and learning 
from) partner's manufac-
turing knowledge 
IJV Formation 
process descrip-
tion 
Target Area (Asia) ? 
GF JV form ? 
shortlist of 4 (ranked 
in order), of which one 
preferred from the 
start ? due diligence 
? negotiations ? 
signing. 1.5 years.  
Target Area (Far East) 
? JV form ? GF form 
? screening criteria 
? desktop search ? 
longlist (approx 50) ? 
1st shortlist (under 10) 
? consult's shortlist 
(3) ? discussions & 
visits ? negotiation ? 
signing. 1.5 years. 
Target area (CE) 
? Acq form ? 
listing (appr. 10) ? 
contacts & discus-
sions ? finding a 
willing seller ? 
negotiations ? 
signing. Approx. 1 
year. 
Target area (NOR/SWE) 
? Acq form ? identifying 
screening criteria and 
candidates (very specific)  
? none willing to sell ? 
state of readiness ? 
Reacted to an offer made 
by NOR firm ? negotia-
tions ? signing. 
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Table 17. The case study summary (2/2). 
Finnish partner COMPANY A COMPANY B COMPANY C COMPANY D 
JV name IJV A IJV B IJV C IJV D 
JV country China China Germany Norway 
JV business B-2-B (Industrial 
textiles / paper ma-
chine clothing) 
B-2-B (Circuit boards 
(for cell phones) 
B-2-B (Power source 
solutions) 
Consumer goods 
(Foodstuff) 
Later develop-
ment and the main 
reasons for de-
velopment 
Partners' disagree-
ment with strategy 
development and 
additional investment 
(expanding) in the IJV; 
changes in personnel 
caused changes in 
strategic thinking, 
leading to complica-
tions in cooperation 
Price ero-
sion/overcapacity in 
the market; partners' 
disagreement on 
customer strategy 
(balance) and JV 
expansion; amplified 
by interpersonal 
issues (which were 
fueled by personnel 
change) 
Tech. incompatibility in 
early stages; perceived 
value of IJV C has taken 
a U-shaped development 
due to long-term com-
mitment in developing 
the IJV in later stages - 
currently perceived  as 
having 'strong potential' 
Share of ownership 
unchanged; perfor-
mance does not meet 
expectations mainly 
due to limited distribu-
tion network access 
Size and strategic 
importance of IJV 
Relatively small Very significant Important at the time of 
inv., later much less so 
Relatively small 
Partner search No clearly stated pre-
criteria; ca. 20 com-
panies operating in 
the business; ca. 5 
potential candidates - 
"all potential partners 
in the market were 
known by the compa-
ny"; a clear top 3 
comprised the final list 
Pre-criteria clearly 
stated prior to search; 
>50 partner candi-
dates in the long list; 
several sources of 
information used 
(reports, visits, con-
sulting agency) - "very 
thorough" 
No clear pre-criteria; ca. 
10 partner candidates 
identified /operating in 
the business; no system-
atic approach in place; all 
identified targets were 
contacted 
Were only interested 
in top firms in the 
business in each of 
the two target coun-
tries (SWE/NOR); had 
identified those and 
waited for a share to 
become available; the 
IJV D partner was not 
among these identi-
fied 
Partner choice Selected partner was 
preferred from a very 
early stage; no thor-
ough evaluation/due 
diligence took place 
on other candidates 
Selected partner was 
preferred from a very 
early stage; still 
several others were 
evaluated (also using 
third party examina-
tion) 
Several candidates 
refused on the offer for 
IJV; main reason for 
choosing the partner was 
basically its willingness 
to sell the share of 25% 
Accepted an offer 
Speculation: If 
this partner had 
not agreed to IJV, 
what then? 
Another identified 
shortlist partner would 
have been chosen; 
there was a clear 
order on top 3 candi-
dates 
Not clear; no other 
candidate was up to 
the "ideal" level; would 
have gone back to 
short list evaluation 
Not clear; would have 
moved on in the short list 
evaluation 
Would have stayed 
put, waiting for other 
opportunity 
General percep-
tion of the IJV 
negotiation stage 
No major complica-
tions or problems; 
outsourced lawyer 
and his experience 
valuable in preparing 
exact paperwork; 
lasted 6 months 
Very easy, strong 
mutual understanding, 
no complications; 
lasted 2 months 
Quite difficult; the 
agreement documents 
are very complex; e.g. 
the resales agreement 
was agreed upon after a 
lengthy process, yet no 
final documents were 
completed - causing 
issues later 
Very easy, rapid 
mutual trust and 
understanding 
Issues in IJV 
formation (as 
identified after-
wards) 
Lack of understanding 
of partners' prod-
uct/customer strate-
gies; Not finishing the 
resales discussion & 
agreement in negotia-
tion stage 
None - described as 
"very smooth" 
Process was opportunis-
tic rather than systemat-
ic. Main source of prob-
lems was neglecting the 
technological personnel 
when forming the IJV ? 
led to "not invented here" 
Process was very 
smooth - Should have 
paid more attention to 
evaluating brand 
strength and potential 
for expanding distribu-
tion 
Time constraints 
for IJV formation 
No strictly set timeta-
ble for the formation 
process; according to 
the interviewee there 
were no time con-
straints that would 
have effected the IJV 
formation decision 
making 
Fast entry to market 
was important due to 
being able to service 
the main customer; A 
timeframe (considered 
very generous) for 
selecting a partner 
was set at a very early 
stage. 
Time (fast entry to 
market) was deemed 
important (leading to 
ACQ over GF), but for 
unclear reasons. The 
formation process was 
hurried because of the 
presented opportunity 
(share was available) 
None, other than the 
partner who made the 
initiation obviously 
wanting a decision 
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To begin the seventh chapter, the study is briefly summarized. Following the 
summary, conclusions of the study are presented, combining findings of the two 
differing perspectives on IJV partner selection and their respective quantitative 
and qualitative empirical studies. Then, the limitations of the study are presented, 
and finally, some future research avenues are discussed. 
7.1 Summary of the study 
In the first chapter of the study the research gap, research questions, scope and 
structure of the study were presented. The main research question of the disserta-
tion was outlined as “How do firms select their IJV partners and how does part-
ner selection influence subsequent IJV performance?” and further detailed into 
three sub-questions for additional breakdown of the research agenda. The three 
sub-questions dealt with the influence of IJV context and bounded rationality on 
partner selection, and the key factors and decisions separating firms in regards to 
how they select their IJV partners. 
The second chapter – the first theoretical part of the study – was built upon the 
grounds of the main bulk of IJV partner selection criteria research following the 
lead of Geringer (1988). Together with the first empirical part (Chapter 5), the 
main goal there was to expand upon the knowledge on contextual influence on the 
relative importance of partner selection criteria, as well as to examine the rela-
tionship between the selection criteria and IJV performance. Following the main-
stream of IJV partner selection criteria studies, it was aimed to define the limits of 
the selection criteria approach in explaining the IJV partner selection phenome-
non. The main theoretical grounds of the selection criteria approach relied upon 
the resource-based view of the firm, the resource dependency theory and transac-
tion cost theory. In Chapter 2, a set of hypotheses regarding the contextual effect 
on partner selection criteria and its relationship with IJV performance were stated 
for later empirical examination in Chapter 5. 
The third chapter – the second theoretical part of the study – the phenomenon of 
IJV partner selection was examined from a process-oriented point of view. The 
main goal of the chapter was to examine how firms differ with regard to the paths 
they take in selecting their IJV partners, adding to the process descriptions of pre-
vious research by proposing alternative process modes. The theoretical backbone 
of Chapter 3 was built upon a behavioral theory approach, comprising models and 
typologies drawn from the strategic decision making literature and partnering 
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models drawn from the purchasing literature. It was emphasized that the IJV con-
text, dissected into factors relating to the foreign partner, the IJV location, the 
specific investment and the strategic contingencies, has an impact on both the 
relative importance of selection criteria, and the mode and level of rationality a 
partner selection process may undergo. 
Three aspects of the literature were essentially pointed out as IJV partner selec-
tion is perceived from a process-oriented perspective: Firstly, a rational choice 
model does not portray the complex reality of IJV partner selection decision pro-
cesses; instead, the processes tend to be completed under the constraints of 
bounded rationality – the scarcity of information, time and/or resources – essen-
tially affecting the path a firm follows in its  quest  for an IJV partner.  Secondly,  
decision processes can be broken down to several phases and/or routines in vary-
ing ways, yet some broad-viewed consistency can be recognized, and thus the 
inspection of an IJV partner selection decision process would logically focus on 
(1) pre-partner selection decision process period, including the IJV trigger/stimuli 
and general readiness for the IJV, (2) partner search/identification, and (3) partner 
evaluation and choice. Thirdly, previous typologies of decision processes have 
been synthesized fairly effectively, leading to general level decision process ty-
pologies (e.g. Das and Teng 1999) by which different modes of decision process-
es can be presented in order of rationality of each process mode. Also, applying 
other types of partnering models, such as those presented in the purchasing litera-
ture (e.g. Ellram 1996, Viljamaa 2007) would seem useful in the IJV partner se-
lection research context. These models also seem to suggest that the process of 
selecting an IJV partner can not always be regarded as an independent decision 
making process separate to the IJV formation decision process entity, as in sever-
al cases the decision to form an IJV is entwined with the choice of a specific part-
ner. Furthermore, examining whether the partner selection decision making pro-
cess is truly a separable entity demands inspection regarding the whole IJV for-
mation  process,  especially  key  decisions  such  as  decision  on  the  target  coun-
try/area, decision on direct investment, decision to invest on a collaborative ven-
ture, and a decision on the form of investment. 
To  close  the  third  chapter,  and  to  conclude  the  theoretical  parts  of  the  study,  a  
summary of the theoretical framework was presented. Thus, the two-fold theoreti-
cal part spawned a theoretical framework illustrating how IJV partner selection – 
perceived both as a set of selection criteria and as a decision process – is influ-
enced by four different types of contextual and situational factors, and suggested 
an influence of IJV partner selection on the subsequent performance of the ven-
ture. 
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The methodological choices of the study were presented and discussed in the 
fourth chapter. The decision to take a mixed-method approach – applying both 
quantitative and qualitative data – was based on gaining a triangulated and syner-
gistic view of evidence on IJV partner selection, following Eisenhardt (1989). For 
its natural applicability and enabling comparison to previous studies, a quantita-
tive approach and a survey research was chosen as the method to examine the 
partner selection criteria and its relative importance under differing contexts. As 
the quantitative approach focusing solely on partner selection criteria was deemed 
incapable of describing the whole complexity of the IJV partner selection phe-
nomenon, a qualitative approach was taken in order to explore IJV partner selec-
tion from a process-oriented perspective. Thus, selected companies were high-
lighted in the quantitative data and were contacted for interviews during late 2009 
in order to undertake comparative case studies. 
In the fifth chapter, the results for the quantitative empirical study were presented 
and discussed. First, the relative importance and a factor analysis of the partner 
selection criteria were presented, resulting in highlighted relative importance of 
trust and commitment as selection criteria, and a factor composition comprising 
eight selection criteria factors. Next, analyses concerning the relationship between 
contextual variables (i.e. foreign partner, location, and investment-specific varia-
bles, the investment motives) and the relative importance of the selection criteria 
were examined, leading to a finding that the relative importance of the criteria 
was most strongly influenced by the region of the IJV, the level of development 
of the IJV host country, and the form of investment. Finally, the focus was placed 
on the relationship between the relative importance of the selection criteria and 
the performance of the joint venture, and the results seemed to indicate that the 
well-performing IJVs had placed an especially strong importance on certain part-
ner-related criteria such as trust, commitment and management compatibility. 
In the sixth chapter, a qualitative approach was taken to examine the processes of 
four case IJVs formed in 1997–2000 with a Finnish firm acting as the foreign 
partner, thus forming the second empirical part of the study. In addition to de-
scribing the selection process, Chapter 6 focused on the context effect on partner 
selection decision making and performance implications of choosing specific 
paths in the IJV formation. The results seemed to indicate that the IJV context had 
a significant effect on different components of the IJV formation process and the 
process mode a firm followed, and suggested that the linkage between the partner 
selection process and the eventual IJV performance is less clear than what was 
indicated by the criteria-oriented perspective. Lastly, Chapter 6 examined the ex-
tent to which the IJV partner selection process can be seen as its own separate 
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decision making entity within the IJV formation process, leading to findings indi-
cating its limited separability. 
After  the  summary  of  the  study,  the  seventh  chapter  next  comprises  the  conclu-
sions and contribution of the study. Finally, limitations of the study and further 
research avenues are discussed. 
7.2 Conclusions of the study 
To begin, some general conclusions regarding the study can be made. Firstly, as 
expected, firms vary significantly in regards to the paths they follow on their 
quest for suitable IJV partners. Differences are apparent both in the relative im-
portance of selection criteria as well as the structure and the rationality of the 
partner selection decision process. Thus, the call for more holistic explanation for 
the IJV partner selection process is clearly justified, and neither the economic 
theory approach nor the behavioral theory approach alone is capable of complete-
ly grasping the phenomenon. 
Secondly, although the selection criteria approach suggests the dominance of 
trust, commitment and management compatibility as the key traits that firms val-
ue when selecting IJV partners, the case studies indicate that the strategic ra-
tionale is more central to partner selection. The fore-mentioned partner-related 
aspects are relatively highly valued throughout the selector population, even by 
those firms that were not satisfied with IJV performance, indicating a tendency to 
perceive trust, commitment and management compatibility as general pre-
requisites of forming an IJV partnership. Also, it should be noted that those firms 
within the quantitative data sample, gathered ex-post, who were satisfied with the 
IJV performance and the cooperation within the IJV partnership, may possibly 
overvalue the importance given to trust, commitment and managerial compatibil-
ity prior to the IJV formation due to their later high levels. 
In light of a presented research gap, the main research question of the dissertation 
was stated as follows: How do firms select their IJV partners and how does part-
ner selection influence subsequent performance of the IJV? As the study and the 
approach call for more holistic approaches to studying the IJV partner selection 
phenomenon in the midst of a stream of literature focusing on a single selection 
process component, the main research question was formulated as general and 
broad by nature to reflect this ideology. Next, the study proceeds following the 
three sub-questions set to further break down the main research question. 
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Sub-question 1: What kind of influence do contextual factors (i.e. firm-specific, 
location-specific and investment-specific factors as well as features of the strate-
gic context of the firm) have on IJV partner selection? 
The first of the three sub-questions concerned the contextual effects on how firms 
select their joint venture partners. The contextual factors were grouped to refer 
either to the firm-specific context (in this study, due to the empirical focus, the 
foreign-partner-specific context), location-specific context, the investment-
specific context and the strategic context of the firm. As the quantitative and qual-
itative results on the matter were already separately discussed in chapters five and 
six, brief combined conclusions on the different contextual effects are next pre-
sented. 
Regarding the foreign-partner-specific context, firm size logically influences the 
resources available for the IJV formation process and therefore should affect the 
boundaries of rationality in decision processes. However, in comparative analysis, 
the case studies did not indicate differences in selection process rationality in rela-
tion to firm size, largely because firm size varied fairly little within the cases as 
no small firms nor large multinationals were present in the qualitative study sam-
ple. As firm size also seemed to have, at best, a very limited influence on the se-
lection criteria, it may be concluded that the size of the firm is not a key factor 
within the IJV context determining how firms select their IJV partners. Regarding 
experience, the results give some support to earlier findings on the familiarity or 
novelty of a strategic decision and the speed and relative ease a firm repeats a 
similar type of decision process,  thus referring to the IJV experience of the firm 
and its management. Even though FDI experience and target-country-related 
experience weren’t significant factors relating to the relative importance of the 
selection criteria, influence of experience was more apparent from the process-
oriented perspective. Concerning target-country-specific experience, firms seem 
to value previous cooperation, even in cases where (minor) complications have 
occurred within those previous relations. It clearly is also a factor in the resource 
need of the firm concerning access to knowledge of local customs, culture and 
language. Lacking IJV or target-country-related experience seemed to affect both 
the identification of prospective partners as well as the evaluation of candidates. 
Additionally, the qualitative results clearly highlight the effect of the nature of 
industry/business of the IJV which was not included as a variable in the quantita-
tive study. Especially the stage of identifying prospective partners is likely to sig-
nificantly differ between firms operating in niche businesses involving small pop-
ulations and limited competition. In summary, the foreign-partner-specific context 
seemed to have a fairly limited influence on partner selection, mainly visible from 
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the process-oriented perspective through the influence of experience and the type 
of industry/business the firm operates in. 
The location-specific context, mainly concerning context uncertainty and socio-
cultural distance, seem to have the most visible contextual effect on IJV partner 
selection. Criteria-wise, the IJV partners in Asia are selected by valuing low-cost 
labor and production costs, as well as access to raw materials and ability to nego-
tiate with the local government – all in line with vast previous literature on FDI 
by Western Firms in Asia. Also, as mentioned above, firms seem likely to use the 
relational mechanism (Mitsuhashi 2002), i.e. valuing existing ties, to reduce se-
lection uncertainty, and the case studies indicated its highlighted importance 
when operating in unfamiliar an distant environment. Regarding knowledge of 
local customs, culture and language, its importance seems central in contexts of 
high uncertainty and distance, yet it also seems to be a pre-requisite for partner 
prospects and thus more directly involved in the motivating factors for firms to 
pursue a collaborative operation mode in the first place. Also, importance of local 
knowledge may well be apparent in socio-culturally close environments in the 
form of market knowledge, as indicated by the qualitative study. 
Certain aspects of the investment-specific context seem to significantly affect 
how IJV partners are selected. Within all contextual elements analyzed in this 
study the most significant singular influencing factor was the form of investment. 
It can be concluded that partner selection, both from the process-oriented and the 
selection criteria-oriented points of view, differs significantly between Greenfield 
IJVs and partial acquisitions. A vast majority of selection criteria dependent on 
the form of investment were valued more when partners were selected for Green-
field IJVs. The strongest counterpoints were criteria concerning valuable trade-
marks or brands, access to marketing or distribution systems, and access to post-
sale networks were valued more in the cases of partial acquisitions. From the pro-
cess-oriented perspective, the selection processes were drastically different be-
tween the Greenfield cases and the partial acquisition cases; the Greenfield cases 
resembled much more the traditional partner selection mode, and the partial ac-
quisition cases were more opportunistic by nature. Instead of looking for a part-
nership per se, the partial acquirers were scanning for potential acquisition tar-
gets, both partial and whole. Combining the quantitative and qualitative findings, 
firms looking to acquire a share in an existing company instead of starting one 
from scratch focus on the strategic positioning of the candidate within its market, 
and/or the value of its brands/trademarks, whereas those forming Greenfield IJVs 
tend to value different skills and abilities, financial resources as well as determi-
nants perceived important for effective cooperation in the IJV partnership signifi-
cantly more than the other firms. 
158      Acta Wasaensia 
The role of the initiator, i.e. whether the firm is active or reactive in initial IJV 
partnership contact, seems to have only a limited influence on what criteria firms 
value when selecting partners. Being reactive seems to increase the importance of 
trust and commitment as was expected based on uncertainty concerning the po-
tential opportunistic behavior of the initiating firm. However, the role of the initi-
ator is a more relevant determinant for partner selection when perceived from a 
process-oriented perspective, as reactive firms may tend to neglect identifying 
alternative solutions (i.e. candidates), leading to a selection process where the 
decision to form an IJV is entwined with the decision to form an IJV partnership 
with a specific firm. Lastly, among the investment-specific context, relative part-
ner size seems to have a limited influence on the relative importance of selection 
criteria; the only significant, yet strong, difference concerned the importance giv-
en to financial resources of the partner, significantly more highly valued by the 
smaller firms. The qualitative study is not able to add to the examination of the 
relationship between partner selection and relative partner size by case compari-
son analysis, as the foreign partner was significantly larger than the local partner 
in all four cases. Instead of the relative size of partners, the qualitative study indi-
cates that the relative size of the IJV (to the size of the foreign partner) may factor 
into the resources put into the formation process and thus the boundaries of ra-
tionality in the selection process, in lieu to the perceived strategic importance of 
the IJV. 
Finally, within the strategic context of the firm, the FDI stimuli and motivation 
may be more relevant factors concerning the ownership strategy and form of in-
vestment decisions than the actual partner selection decision process. The results 
indicate that the collaboration motivation is, on the other hand, more relevant to 
how firms choose their IJV partners. Lastly, the perceived strategic importance of 
the  IJV was  clearly  a  factor  in  all  four  cases  within  the  qualitative  studies.  The  
results indicate that a high perceived strategic importance may, at least partially, 
compensate for the negative effect of firm size on resource contributions, and 
seems a more relevant antecedent for IJV formation decision making than the size 
of the firm. 
Sub-question 2: Do firms that select their IJV partners under lesser limitations in 
regards to time, information and financial and/or other resources end up with 
more suitable partners and a higher satisfaction on IJV performance in compari-
son to the more limited firms? 
One of the key aspects in focus in this study is the relationship between IJV per-
formance and partner selection. The quantitative study, focusing on the differ-
ences between well-performing and medium-to-low performing firms in regards 
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to the relative importance of the selection criteria, indicated that firms satisfied in 
the performance of the IJV tended to value certain partner-related criteria (trust, 
commitment, compatibility) more than those who were not satisfied. The qualita-
tive data, on the other hand, enables a more holistic perspective on this relation-
ship than the criteria-oriented results of the quantitative study, yet the relationship 
between performance and partner selection becomes expectedly less clear. 
Even though certain criteria seem to be valued more highly by those firms which 
were more satisfied to the IJV performance, this study indicates, in accordance to 
Varis (2004), that it may be naïve to directly connect the pre-formation selection 
criteria and the subsequent performance of the venture. According to the case 
studies (most notably Case B), firms may appear to have succeeded in selecting 
partners, yet post-formation development, IJV management and operation may 
include complications deteriorating the subsequent IJV performance such as 
changes in management personnel leading to changes in strategy. These compli-
cations are arguably often independent of – or at least unforeseeable at – the for-
mation stage of the IJV. 
Sub-question 3: What are the key factors and decisions within the IJV formation 
process that differentiate firms in regards to how they select their IJV partners? 
The third sub-question concerned the process-oriented approach in the study, aim-
ing to explain the diversity of paths firms may take on their quest for IJV partners, 
and more specifically, to identify those points (i.e. decisions) within the processes 
and the contextual factors that most significantly divide the selection process 
modes from each other. It was also targeted at explaining the extent to which the 
process of selecting IJV partners is truly separable from the IJV formation deci-
sion making process entity. 
Certain aspects of the IJV context appeared to be especially visibly in play in re-
gards to the process modes firms followed in selecting partners. As each were 
separately discussed in relation to the first sub-question, each will be very briefly 
discussed here. First, the form of investment was a significant divider, also relat-
ing to the strategic context of the firm as the partial acquirers lacked a specific 
collaborative motivation prior to scanning the market opportunities, and therefore 
the stage of identification of prospective partners can more adequately be de-
scribed as identification of potential acquisition targets. Second, the perceived 
strategic importance and the relative size of the IJV clearly seem to affect the 
partner selection decision process and its systematicity, adding to the willingness 
of firms to contribute resources and the management’s need for justification be-
fore making the final partner decision. Third, lack of target-country-related expe-
rience limits firms’ options in valuing previous cooperation when looking for 
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local partners, thus affecting both the identification and evaluation mechanisms. 
However, lack of target-country-specific experience in combination with a high 
perceived strategic importance may well drive the firm more strongly towards a 
highly-rational selection process,  as the existence of prior relationships seems to 
be likely to create early preferences and limit the extent to which the alternatives 
are evaluated and considered. Although selection processes seem to strongly dif-
fer according to their resemblance of the rational choice model, even in the least 
rational cases firms are likely to pursue developing alternatives. Likely factoring 
into this phenomenon, again, is the strategic importance of the IJV and the partner 
decision.  
Regarding the components in the partner selection process, there seems to be a 
visible distinction of the mechanisms of identification and evaluation/choice of 
partner, supporting earlier literature. Also supporting earlier literature concerning 
FDI decision making (e.g. Björkman 1989, Woodside and Pitts 1998), these 
mechanisms are not clearly in chronological order as evaluation often takes off in 
early stages of the identification process, thus causing overlapping of the two 
components. In line with this finding, a distinct stage of “choice” is not apparent-
ly clearly visible and separable from evaluation of candidates as firms seem to 
rank candidates fairly early on. Regarding the four alternative modes of partner 
selection, modified from Viljamaa (2007), the default selection mode does not 
seem to be directly applicable in the IJV partner selection context, whereas key 
traits of the other three modes were apparent within the qualitative sample.  The 
most logical explanation for the non-applicability of the default selection mode 
would be the drastic difference in the strategic importance of the decision in 
Viljamaa’s original setting in comparison to IJV partner selection. Similarly, the 
different decision process modes within the Das and Teng (1999) typology were 
partially fitting to the findings of this study, yet the garbage can mode and the 
political mode did not seem helpful in explaining how partners were selected. 
Regarding the garbage can mode, the results coincide with those of Björkman’s 
(1989), and the lack of explanatory power of the two modes in this context may 
again reflect the strategic importance of this type of decision and the manage-
ment’s strive for thoroughness and consensus regarding decisions of this kind of 
amplitude. 
In relation to the third sub-question the study also aimed to expand on the percep-
tion that the process of selecting IJV partners forms a separable and thus an inde-
pendent decision making entity within the IJV formation process. The results in-
dicate that the IJV partner selection process can only limitedly be considered in-
dependent and separable from the larger IJV formation process entity. The case 
studies support the expectations of its limited separability, suggesting that partner 
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selection is often entwined to the decision to form the joint venture, most often in 
cases where the firm is reactive to an outside proposal to form an IJV. Also, the 
case study results indicate that partial acquisitions may not be intended to be par-
tial, thus resulting in joint ventures, but instead are chosen due to the presented 
opportunity and availability. In this case, the decision to collaborate is entwined 
to the partner decision. Therefore, it can be argued that entwined partner selection 
may be expanded to reflect entwining also to other IJV formation process deci-
sions than the final decision to form the joint  venture – such as country/location 
decision, collaborative decision and/or the form of investment decision. 
7.3 Contribution of the study 
Theoretically, the key contribution of this study arises from the behavioral ap-
proach to the partner selection phenomenon. Even though the strategic decision 
process literature is extensive, and even in the FDI front the amount of research 
focusing on the underlying decision processes has accumulated ever since the 
1960’s, a further focus into the partner selection has not been applied from this 
perspective. Overall, the combination of the two theoretical approaches, and fo-
cusing on IJV partner selection criteria as well as the underlying process, clearly 
produces a more holistic perspective into the phenomenon. 
The present study contributes to the prior theoretical knowledge on IJV partner 
selection by, firstly, expanding our understanding of how different components of 
IJV partner selection are affected by the different dimensions of the IJV context 
and the strategic contingencies, therefore adding to a more detailed explanation of 
why selecting IJV partners is often characterized as case-specific. Also, the dras-
tic differences between firms forming Greenfield IJVs and firms completing par-
tial acquisitions in regards to their partner selection processes indicate that pursu-
ing concise models for IJV partner selection may demand separate analyses as 
divided by the form of investment. Clearly, the Greenfield IJV form seems to 
better respond to the earlier literature on IJV or ISA partner selection, whereas in 
partial acquisitions the partner might often be perceived as a necessary evil due to 
a lack of competitive full acquisition options. 
Second, the study shows how prior models of the IJV partner selection process 
depict a limited population of firms selecting their IJV partners, and implicitly 
assume several conditions that do not apply to a major proportion of the actual 
IJV partner selection processes. As called for by Aharoni & Brock (2010), the 
present study incorporates the concept of bounded rationality into the equation, 
and expresses the variation of partner selection process modes by applying previ-
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ous decision making and process typologies indicating significant differences 
concerning the underlying rationality. 
Another contribution of the study relates to the previous findings indicating the 
separability of the partner selection process. Al-Khalifa & Peterson (1999), add-
ing to the pioneering findings by Tomlinson (1970), implied that IJV formation 
and partner selection should clearly be considered two separate decision process-
es. Even though this argument responds well to the “ends” and “means” thinking 
derived from the psychological theory (Dichter 1971, Maslow 1970) as suggested 
by Al-Khalifa & Peterson (1999), the present study argues for a limited separabil-
ity of the partner selection process from the IJV formation decision process entity. 
To widen the perspective herein, the strategic decision process literature was in-
corporated into the study, as well as inspection of the applicability of selection 
modes drawn from the purchasing literature, and the presentation of the entwined 
selection mode applied and modified from Viljamaa (2007) most clearly express-
es how partner selection process is not a universally separable decision process 
entity in the IJV or ISA contexts. 
Third, regarding the partner selection-performance connection, the quantitative 
study presents statistically significant differences between the well- and the medi-
um-to-low-performing IJVs in regards to the relative importance of selection cri-
teria. These results especially indicate the exceptionally high levels of importance 
of partner-related aspects such as trust, commitment and compatibility within the 
selection of partners to the well-performing ventures, clearly a contribution to the 
scarce amount of partner selection-performance research as well as a notion to 
managers assessing the relative importance of the partner-related criteria. Howev-
er, the case studies reflect the multitude of factors potentially affecting the even-
tual performance of the IJV, usually relating to aspects within the IJV operation 
and management, and thus giving support to the notion regarding the relationship 
between partner selection and subsequent performance by Varis & Conn 
(2002:12) suggesting that “whereas it would be naïve to suggest that such a rela-
tionship does not exist, actually corroborating it to a significant degree of certi-
tude and ascertaining that confounding or intermediate factors are not more im-
portant, is pragmatically impossible”. Therefore, it is here concluded that valuing 
trust, commitment and management compatibility may be crucial with regard to 
the  future  of  the  IJV,  yet  it  may also  be  more  sensible  to  examine  the  selection  
criteria in relation to intermediate measures concerning the IJV cooperation, man-
agement and development, rather than linking it directly to the performance out-
comes. 
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Furthermore, regarding the managerial contribution, the present study indicates 
the importance of considering the multitude of contextual dimensions when se-
lecting an IJV partner. Even though a firm is limited in resources, experience or 
information, a structured and systematic approach to selecting a partner may con-
siderably enhance the foundation for eventual successful IJV operation. The re-
sults suggest that a firm may at least partially overcome its resource boundaries in 
case the decision is held in a high strategic importance and treated as such. 
The strategic rationale and compatibility are first and foremost important yet the 
partner-related aspects underlining the cooperative foundation are also essential. 
The case studies additionally indicate the importance of involvement of all main 
functions of the firm when assessing the IJV rationale and design. As they may be 
key to achieve a complete understanding of the IJV rationale, it should not be 
overlooked that the involvement may significantly affect the commitment of per-
sonnel in the eventual development of the IJV as the project advances from for-
mation to the operation stage. 
Finally, the case studies clearly indicate the eventual benefits of open communi-
cation regarding the objectives, upsides and downsides of each partner during the 
initial IJV design discussions, reflecting on the IJV partnership through increased 
trust and commitment. Also, extensive initial design discussions enable the part-
ners to assess their cultural compatibility, and a strongly explicit mutual benefit 
perspective may significantly enhance partners’ willingness to develop the ven-
ture in full cooperation. 
7.4  Limitations of the study and future research avenues 
Several limitations should be taken into account when assessing the generaliza-
tion of the results in this study. These limitations mainly concern the features of 
the empirical data and its collection. 
Even though the effects of several types of biases, such as distortion and memory 
failure (Mintzberg et al. 1976) as well as post-rationalization – i.e. recalling past 
strategies as being more rational and consistent than they really were (Golden 
1992) – can be reduced by using multiple interviewees (Ghauri & Grønhaug 
2010), both the quantitative and qualitative empirical studies used a single in-
formant approach, i.e. a single person represented a firm and its decision making. 
This was due to the accessibility of data – only a very limited amount of persons 
were closely related to the partner selection decision processes and accessing sev-
eral interviewees equipped with valid information was deemed unfeasible. There-
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fore, other sources of information were needed for additional support and triangu-
lation. To expand on the single informant responses within the qualitative empiri-
cal study, additional information was gathered by using several different sources 
such as annual reports, press releases, meeting agenda documentation, and other 
relevant documentation. In compiling the case data, the interview material and the 
above-mentioned documentation were also supported by the questionnaire re-
sponses of each firm, originally gathered for the quantitative empirical study. 
Third, regarding the quantitative empirical study, the limited size of the sample 
clearly affects the generalization of the results. Also, the sample size limited the 
availability of reasonable options for statistical  analysis.  However,  as argued for 
in Chapter 4.2, the sample size is well comparable to majority of the previous 
studies, and larger than the samples in several of the main reference studies (e.g. 
Al-Khalifa and Peterson 1999, Chen and Glaister 2005, Glaister 1996, Glaister 
and Buckley 1997, Maurer 1996). 
The empirical data was exclusively collected from Finnish firms acting as the 
foreign partners in IJVs located in several countries. This brings up two essential 
limitations for the generalization of the research findings: First of all, as the point 
of view taken in this study concerned that of the foreign partner only, the dyadic 
nature of a joint venture process is neglected. Second, the country-of-origin effect 
on IJV formation decisions is not here analyzed or otherwise accounted for, thus 
the findings may not translate to other cultural or institutional backgrounds. This 
has been the case in the vast majority of previous research in the field of IJV part-
ner selection. The single country-of-origin and the sole view of the foreign part-
ner are apparently common to a large part of previous literature (see Table 1 on p. 
18), and mainly caused by the difficulty and cost of collecting data from several 
countries (Geringer and Hebert 1991). Therefore, there clearly is a gap for future 
research with a dyadic focus on IJV partner selection, as the current existing dy-
adic  research  on  the  phenomenon  (Demirbag  et  al.  1995,  Tatoglu  and  Glaister  
2000, Tomlinson and Thompson 1977) is extremely scarce and covers a very lim-
ited ground especially in consideration to a process-oriented perspective, and the 
contextual effects on partner selection as well as its outcomes. 
Another sample issue concerned the features of the cases in the qualitative empir-
ical study. Because of comparison purposes in relation to the form of investment 
and also for distance and context uncertainty, two Greenfield IJV cases and two 
partial acquisition cases were selected, and two of them were located in Western 
Europe while the other two in Far East Asia. Problematic here was the fact that 
the only case data composition available, with regard to the other criteria posited 
for the case selection (p. 63), featured two Greenfield IJVs in China, and two par-
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tial acquisitions in Western Europe, instead of one of each form in each of the two 
geographical/cultural contexts. However, the interviews gave quite clear indica-
tions for the role of each contextual factor as perceived by the respondents of the 
case firms, and special awareness of the issue took place during the interviews 
showing in the form of additional clarifying questioning. 
As the industry and the type of market the firm operates in appeared to signifi-
cantly affect the IJV partner selection process, it might be fruitful to more specifi-
cally focus on partner selection decision making in different industrial contexts. 
Several features in this context are of apparent interest, such as firms in business-
to-business markets in comparison to firms in consumer markets, the R&D inten-
sity, and global competition, to name but a few. 
Furthermore, it was concluded that connecting eventual IJV performance to cer-
tain pre-IJV formation selection criteria composition may appear somewhat naive, 
as the case study results indicated that a perceived success in selecting a suitable 
partner in a rational, systematic and precise manner may lead to a complete fail-
ure, or on the other hand, an opportunistic process lacking a systematic approach 
may eventually lead to a satisfying IJV relationship and bright future expecta-
tions.  How  should  one  then  approach  the  outcomes  of  IJV  partner  selection  in-
stead of focusing on the direct performance relationship? Perhaps the perfor-
mance focus in connection to partner selection should, instead of eventual IJV 
performance, be placed upon the success in selecting a suitable partner as per-
ceived at the beginning of the IJV operation, attempting to exclude effects that 
were unforeseeable at the time of the investment. Regarding the selection criteria 
approach, linkages to different dimensions of compatibility or fit could enlighten 
the selection of a suitable partner (see, e.g., Douma et al. 2000, Chi Cui et al. 
2002, Weber et al. 1996, Luo 1998, Child et al. 2005, Marks and Mirvis 1992, 
Bronder and Pritzl 1992 for conceptualizations regarding different aspects of fit). 
Regarding the theoretical part of the study, it must be noted that the current study 
combines elements from several streams of literature to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of IJV partner selection. Because of this chosen approach the depth 
of elaboration in relation to all of these streams varies, and for this reason may not 
cover every aspect within each of the approaches. For a systematic approach, it 
was here pursued to to cover and explain the aspects of the theories that are most 
directly related to IJV partner selection, and thus present useful tools for their 
holistic understanding. Aharoni and Brock (2010) recently strongly encouraged 
IB researchers to follow the lead of those examining IJVs from the behavioral 
point of view, and to reincorporate the concept of bounded rationality, and thus 
give the study of decision making an important role in the ongoing development 
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of the IB field. It is here agreed on – as the wealth of selection criteria research 
has accumulated since the late 1980’s, it might be fruitful to redirect the research 
focus towards the underlying decision processes in IJV partner selection research. 
Additionally, the call by Shenkar and Reuer (2006) for multicase studies to identi-
fy processes, dynamics and evolution of different types of alliances is here sup-
ported and considered a strong potential direction for contributions in IB research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. Thematic outline of the case interviews. 
1. Background information on the case firm and the respondent 
? The history of international operations of the case firm: exports, foreign production, 
international co-operative operation modes (years, countries) – cross-checked with 
additional documentation 
? A brief description of the internationalization strategy of the firm and its develop-
ment throughout the past decades 
? The respondent’s position / career development in the case firm, highlighting the 
time of the case IJV formation period and further development 
? The respondent’s role and participation in decision making regarding the case firm’s 
foreign operations throughout the time of employment in the case firm 
? The respondent’s similar experience (as above) accumulated under previous employ-
ers 
2. The Case IJV formation 
? A free-form description of the process leading to the case IJV formation 
? Pre-FDI: The original impulses and motives behind the international production de-
cision; also, establishing the starting point for the timeline for the decision making 
process 
? Rationale for forming an IJV over a wholly-owned unit 
? The effect of the following factors on pursuing an IJV over WOS (each asked 
separately): Features of the target country/area; financial resources; previous in-
ternational and target-country-specific experience; attributes of a known partner 
candidate; other 
? The existence and the nature of a potential predetermined ownership strategy when 
entering the IJV formation process 
? Personnel directly involved in the IJV formation process in general 
? Personnel involved in: decision to explore FDI opportunities and to enter an FDI 
formation process; the partner selection process; the final partner selection and 
IJV formation decision 
3. The IJV partner selection process 
? A free-form description on the process of selecting the IJV partner 
? Respondent’s perception on whether certain distinct stages within the partner selec-
tion process can be identified in hindsight 
? Each asked separately: Drawing a desired partner profile; identifying prospec-
tive partners; evaluating the candidates; partnership negotiations; final decision 
? Clarification of the timeline with regard to each of the fore-mentioned process com-
ponents (as applicable) 
? Drawing a desired partner profile: existence of a potential predetermined selection 
criteria, their nature, and the personnel setting these criteria 
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? Identifying potential partner candidates 
? Sources of information used in identifying partner prospects (cues: previous 
business connections of either the firm or the individuals, other connections, 
consult services); personnel directly involved in the identification 
? Evaluating the partner candidates 
? The nature of the criteria that were in the evaluation of partner candidates and 
their relative importance (cues: competences/skills/know-how, financial re-
sources, reputation, trustworthiness, commitment, objectives) 
? IJV partnership negotiations: 
? A freeform description of the negotiation process (cue: potential points of disa-
greement, solutions to overcome these disagreements) 
? The existence of a clearly preferred partner candidate when entering the negotia-
tions 
? Number of candidates that the firm negotiated with 
4. Objectives and motives for the IJV 
? The extent to which the respondent considered that the partners, at the time of the 
IJV formation, reached a precise mutual understanding of each other’s motives and 
objectives in forming the IJV partnership 
? The extent to which the respondent perceived, at the time of the investment, the 
partners’ motives and objectives compatible/in conflict 
? The extent to which the respondent perceived, at present time, the partners’ motives 
and objectives compatible/in conflict 
? If this perception changed significantly over time, the reason(s) for the change 
5. The evaluation of the IJV formation process, as perceived at present time 
? Whether the respondent perceives, at present time, that certain aspects should have 
been taken into stronger consideration or whether the firm should have proceeded in 
a different manner when forming the IJV and selecting the IJV partner 
? If such aspects were brought up, the factors for why the firm did not originally con-
sider these aspects in a required manner (cue: financial / human resource / other re-
source limitations, international / collaborative experience, cultural differences, time 
limitations due to strategic reasons) 
6. Systematics of the IJV formation and partner selection process 
? The extent to which the respondent considered the IJV formation process and espe-
cially the partner selection process systematic, at the time of the investment 
? The extent to which the respondent considers the IJV formation process and espe-
cially the partner selection process systematic, as evaluated at present time 
? The extent to which the IJV formation and partner selection process has had an in-
fluence on the later investment behavior of the firm  
